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ART. I.—ENCOURAGEMENTS TO EFFORT, FOR THE SPEEDY
CONVERSION OF THE WORLD.

It is a principle of christian faith, that the gospel is yet to be propagated through the world, and is every where to exert its purest and most effectual influences. All who pray in the name of Jesus Christ, and as he hath taught them to pray, must needs put it in their daily prayers, that his kingdom may come universally, and that the mountain of the Lord's house may be established in the tops of the mountains, and exalted above the hills, and all nations flow to it and be saved. To the coming of that bright era, the eyes of the ransomed host of God are directed with hope and longing, like the expectation of those who, through a dark and weary watch, are waiting for the morning. Come,—come the golden age of peace, and light, and love,—the age when idolatry, with its foul and bloody orgies, and superstition, with its maddening incantations and its besotting follies, and despotism, with its rod of iron and its chains, and priestly domination, with its heavier fetters for the soul, shall have been swept away before the march of truth; and the earth, renewed in more than pristine beauty, decked with all the ornaments of human industry and art, and crowded with an enlightened, peaceful, happy population, shall reflect the smiles and resound with the praises of its Maker.

It is no part of our design, at present, to defend this point of our faith against the objections and cavils of infidelity. Taking it for granted, that on this point none of our readers have any material difficulties, we shall aim rather at the removal of a practical unbelief, which, by putting off to a great, indefinite distance in the future, the period of the universal triumph of christianity, operates to weaken the motive to effort, which, at the present day, that doctrine presents to all enlightened christians. Our wish is to show, that the *field of the world* is white to the harvest,—that the facilities to effort, and the encouragements to great effort, for the speedy

conversion of all nations, which are peculiar to these times, are such as ought to call forth the utmost energy of every disciple of Christ, in the great work of spreading the knowledge of the Savior through the world. The question is, Are efforts for the *speedy* conversion of the world, chimerical? Is it practicable, within any limited period of time, to send the knowledge of the gospel to all the habitations of mankind? Ought we, individually and unitedly, and with all our strength, to address ourselves to the work of subduing the world for Christ, and in the expectation of a speedy success?

First let us direct our attention, for a moment, to the *political aspect of the world*. What encouragements do we find in this quarter? What indications of the power of a providence, that is arranging the condition and mutual relations of all the kingdoms of this world, with reference to the universal triumph of the kingdom of Immanuel?

1. The majority of the human race is at present either nominally christian, or subject to the governments of nominally christian nations. Fifty years ago, it was far otherwise; but now, of the seven hundred and thirty-seven millions, which, according to the best estimates, make up the population of the globe, about three hundred and eighty-eight millions are either nominally christian, or subject to nominally christian governments.*

2. The Mohammedan and popish powers, which once constituted the greatest external obstacle to the progress of the religion of the bible, are declining. The great Mohammedan empire in India has become entirely extinct; and a British governor-general in Calcutta, sways the scepter of the Great Mogul. The great and dreaded empire of the Turks, whose crescent has hung so long with baleful aspect over the fairest regions of the world, blighting the scenes of all that is sacred in history, is already dismembered; impoverished, half-revolutionized, and, like some wounded monster, exhausted and faint, is staggering to its fall. What a change has taken place in this respect within the last half-century! At the same time, a similar change has been going forward, weakening and destroying that power, which, by the force of priestcraft, has tyrannized for ages over most of the nations of christendom, and which, wherever it has had the power, has never been surpassed even by Mohammedanism, in the malignity with which

* This estimate varies somewhat from the one which computes the subjects of the Chinese empire at three hundred and sixty-two millions; but as so little is known definitely respecting the population of some of the Asiatic portions of the globe, we prefer to retain the calculations of M. Balbi. [See Quarterly Register, vol. iii. pp. 25, 26.] Malte Brun's estimate of the world's population, is only six hundred and forty-two millions. The force of the argument will remain the same, whether we estimate the whole population of the globe as above given, or at the higher number of eight or nine hundred millions.

it has persecuted every thing that dared to question its supremacy. A few years ago, and, though the pope had begun to lose his former power, though kings no longer held his stirrups, or waited barefoot at his gate, he had a throne, a power, a revenue, which will never be his again. With the exception only of Great Britain and Prussia, all the great thrones of christendom were occupied by his minions and tributaries. France was his, politically speaking. Austria was his. Italy was his, peculiarly. Portugal, with all the wealth of dependent Brazil, was his. Spain too, with the gold of Mexico and the silver of Peru, was his. Russia was hardly known, except as a vast, unformed, barbarous power, just beyond the pale of civilization. But how is it now? France, with her power and wealth, is no longer tributary to Rome. Spain and Portugal have lost their dependent provinces,—have almost ceased to be of account in the balance of power, and are now interesting in a political view only, as they are the theater of a conflict, which seems likely to terminate in ridding both kingdoms of the priestcraft which has eaten out their strength, and degraded and debased their character. The Italian states, impoverished and decayed, are also in an unquiet and revolutionary condition. Of all the great pillars of the papal throne, Austria only remains. Russia, that never owned subjection to the pontiff, that never knew an inquisition, or a St. Bartholomew's day, is overshadowing the north, and stretching towards the south, and, wherever its eagles fly, is still reducing the barbarous hordes of its subjects to order, and slowly, but steadily, adding tribe after tribe of Tartars and Cossacks to the realms of civilization.

3. Governments are becoming more liberal. Religious freedom has long been the boast of England; yet what progress has recently been made even there, towards making that freedom complete? A few years ago, since the commencement of the present century, a mighty struggle was necessary in parliament, to secure for British christians the privilege of teaching the gospel to the heathen of British India. In one way or another, similar changes are taking place in all civilized countries. We see such a change going forward even in Turkey, where we should have least expected it. Those governments which are inflexible on the point of religious freedom, are too inflexible on other points, and, one after another, are revolutionized. Among those governments which have been created or molded by the revolutionary spirit of the age, there is no common feature more characteristic, than their indifference to the religious opinions of their subjects.

Let it not be supposed, that we speak of these things as indications of the actual progress of religion in the world. These political changes have no importance in the eye of the christian, except as they remove out of the way, old obstacles to effort. It is in

this aspect only, that we refer to them. The conquests which annexed the millions of India to the British empire, were not the conquests of the cross; but the consequence is, that those millions may now be approached by christian teachers, and may be supplied with the bible, as soon as christians are ready to give it to them. The fall of one Mohammedan empire, and the decline of another, is not of course the progress of christianity; but it is the casting down of a strong and once impregnable intrenchment of the power of darkness. The decline of popery as a political power, is not of course reformation; but it is the opening of a door for truth to enter in and triumph. The progress of political revolution, and of civil and religious liberty, is not the progress of that kingdom which is righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; but it is the casting down of the mountains, and the raising up of the valleys, to prepare the way of the Lord.

Look next at *the great extension of commerce*. The whole world is continually explored and agitated by the spirit of commercial enterprise. The productions of every clime and region find their way to every other. The policy of governments is changing in this respect. Formerly, trade was almost every where restricted, lest it should impoverish; each government sought to make its subjects buy and sell of one another. Now, trade, the fair interchange of commodities among different nations, is almost every where encouraged, for it is found to enrich all the parties engaged in it. Once, commerce went forth, as it were, fettered; now, she goes out free, ploughing every sea and harbor with her adventurous keel, and spreading her canvass to the breezes of every sky. Every tribe of the inland wilderness knows her. Every isle of the Pacific shouts at the earliest glimpse of her approaching sails.

Now, what are the bearings of these facts on the question before us?

1. Commerce diffuses civilization, and excites every where the spirit of improvement. It diffuses civilization, by giving to savage tribes whom it visits, new ideas of comfort, and by thus forming them to habits of industry. It diffuses civilization, by diffusing knowledge, and by imparting the improvements of the more intelligent and favored nations to those who are less so. It promotes the spirit of improvement, not only in these ways, but by bringing different nations into contact with each other, and compelling the ignorant to see their ignorance, and the uncivilized to acknowledge their inferiority. In this way, the Turk already feels, that the christian dogs of Europe, as in his barbarian pride he once called them, know more, and are better off, than himself. In this way, the Chinese must, ere long, become ashamed of his national vanity. In this way, all the Mohammedan and pagan nations on the globe, are either prepared, or are fast preparing, to listen with

deference to the teachers of the religion, the *only* religion, of civilization.

2. The present state of commerce affords a ready access to, and an easy correspondence with, all parts of the world. Wherever you choose to commence a missionary work, thither you can send missionaries, at a comparatively trifling expense, by the ordinary conveyances of commerce; and you can hear from them frequently, of their successes and their wants, after they reach there; and thither you can send them, at your pleasure or their need, supplies and helpers, and all that is required for the successful prosecution of their labors. Your missionaries too, can no where feel themselves beyond the reach of the sympathy and aid of the churches. Every impulse that is given to the cause at home, is felt by the remotest laborer abroad. Every excitement which stimulates the followers of the Lamb in other lands to new zeal and enterprise, to new faith, love, and joy, travels round the earth's circumference, till it warms the heart of the Moravian, amid the snows of Labrador, or refreshes the soul of him who toils in the service of Immanuel, under the burning sky of the equator.

3. Another effect of the present state of commerce is, that it brings in great wealth upon christian nations, and gives to christians,—to those who profess themselves and feel themselves to be the stewards of God,—all the means necessary to furnish, equip, and supply the armament, that shall subdue the world.

It may be thought strange, that, in this connection, we call our readers next to notice *the growing and prospective predominancy of the English language*. Ere the close of the present century, the English language will be spoken in North America from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Lake of the Woods to the gulf of Mexico. It will be spoken not only in this land of the Pilgrims, the land of our children, and in the land of Milton, and Newton, and Baxter, its native seat; but it will be the vernacular tongue of great and growing nations in Western and Southern Africa; it will be spoken by millions in New-Holland; it will have been learned by many a now barbarous tribe, as the medium of civilization and of knowledge; it will have become to India like another Sanscrit. Why is this important, do you ask? Because the English is the language of *protestant christianity*,—richer in evangelical writings and evangelical influences, than any other living language on the earth. Because, too, it is the language of the two nations, Britain and America, from which, more than from all christendom besides, must go forth the light and power that shall regenerate the world.

Again, it is important to look at *the facilities for effort, that grow out of the improved state of science and the arts, and especially, of the means of communicating knowledge*. To state a few particulars:

1. We know more about the various nations of the world, their history, their opinions, their religions, their prejudices, than ever was known before. We know better than was ever known before, where and how to operate, so as to expend our efforts with the best economy.

2. The art of printing, including all the processes in the manufacture of books, from the toil of the paper-maker to the last stroke of the binder, has been carried to an unexampled and unexpected degree of perfection. Indeed it seems difficult to suppose, that any considerable improvement remains to be made in this department of human ingenuity and skill. And what a power is the power of the press, in its present state of perfection ! It is of more value, in respect to the instruction of the world, than the apostolic power of working miracles in attestation of the gospel. It was well said, (by the Rev. D. L. Carroll,) in a public meeting at New-York, not long since, "Suppose that the apostle, instead of having to authenticate his letters, 'The salutation of Paul, with mine own hand, which is the token in every epistle ; so I write,'—could have inscribed at the bottom, 'Stereotype edition,—one hundred thousand copies printed,'—would it not have given Paul new ideas about the conversion of the world ?"

3. The art and science of education, too, has been carried to that pitch of improvement, which makes it such an auxiliary to christian effort, as the apostles would have given their lives to purchase. Look at our schools, from the infant school to the university ; compare them with the privileges of our fathers. Go wherever there is a missionary station ; see the apparatus of instruction, the schools in which heathen children, and heathen adults too, are taught the principles and duties of christianity,—the Lancasterian school, the high-school, the college, where they are trained for the various stations of a civilized and christian community, and all at a comparatively slight expense of means and labor : look at these things, and say, if here is not an instrument of incalculable power.

We can only mention here, as another topic of argument, the fact, *that all the false religions of the world are losing their hold upon the minds of men.* What is Mohammedanism now, compared with that fierce eruption which, in the seventh century, devastated the shores of the Mediterranean, and threatened to cover the world with its fiery billows ? The entire religion of the false prophet has become inert and sluggish. A similar decrepitude has overtaken the vast and once mighty system of Hindoo idolatry ; it is decaying and wasting away. So, into whatever country we may travel, where men think at all, we shall find, that the ancient superstitions are beginning to lose their energy. The foundations of belief seem to be shaken ; and the popular mind seems to be preparing, every where, for a great moral revolution.

It will hardly be strange, if ere long such events are repeated, as were witnessed a few years ago at the Sandwich Islands, where, ere a missionary had landed on its shores, a whole nation, with their king at their head, cast away their idols, and stood waiting for the law of God. Not only does this state of things exist in pagan and Mohammedan countries; it is even more obvious in the Roman Catholic nations. There, the intellectual classes have long despised the prevailing superstitions; and the same contempt is now spreading through society, and preparing the common people either to follow the proud into a cheerless infidelity, or to receive the truth as it is in Jesus.

Moreover, *while false religions are thus waxing old, and ready to vanish away, christianity is reviving, and manifesting new power.* Few men, who have not made the subject a matter of particular study, are at all aware, what a revival and increase of religious feeling, and religious zeal, has taken place throughout protestant christendom within the last half-century. To an unbeliever in christianity, who will thoroughly examine the subject, it will seem almost like a miracle, that this religion has now any footing on the earth. Fifty years ago was the very date of, perhaps, the most extended, combined, and formidable attack, which the christian religion has ever encountered. A crisis then occurred in the history of christianity, such as had never been before known. In the language of another,—(Nat. Hist. of Enthusiasm, pp. 255, 257,)—‘It remained to be seen, whether, when the season of slumber and exhaustion, consequent upon the great agitations of the reformation, had come on, and when human reason, polished and tempered by physical science and elegant literature, had become fully awake to the consciousness of its own powers,—whether then the religion of the bible could retain its hold of the nations,’ and that in spite of a concerted and organized attack on the part of those who were then chiefs and giants in every department of intellectual action. ‘And what were the omens under which it entered upon that new trial of its strength? Were the friends of christianity, at that moment of portentous conflict, awake, and vigilant, and stout-hearted, and thoroughly armed to repel assaults? The very reverse was the fact; for, at the instant when the atheistical conspiracy made its long-concerted attack, there was scarcely a pulse of life left in the christian body, in any of the Protestant states.’ ‘Meanwhile, the infidel machinators had chosen their ground at leisure, and were wrought to the highest pitch of energy, by a confident hope of success, and felt themselves sustained by the secret wishes or the undissembled cheerings of the almost entire body of educated men throughout Europe.’ ‘At the portentous moment of onset, the shocks of political commotion opened a thousand fissures in the ancient structure of moral and religious sentiment, and

the enemies of christianity rushed forward to achieve an easy triumph.' Such was the crisis, such the actual condition, such, to human calculation, were the prospects of christianity, within the memory of living men. And what has been the issue? We will not be so sanguine as to say, that infidelity has been vanquished and driven from the field. Unhappily, evidence to the contrary is found in every direction. But this we may say confidently,—infidelity, so far from having achieved the triumph which it anticipated, is baffled, and shorn of its strength. The infidelity which now sheds its spirit to so disastrous an extent over the literature of Europe, and which mutters its fiendish malignity around us here in America, is hardly to be thought of as a source of danger to the religion of the bible. It is as nothing in comparison with that infidelity, which, under the captainship of Voltaire and his great associates,—great in power as well as great in guilt,—confidently threatened the speedy extinction of the gospel. We may go farther, and say, that at the signal of that attack, the power of christianity in every part of Protestant christendom, began to rally and revive, and from that era has been rapidly advancing. Not only have the churches of Great Britain, and of the United States, received a great addition of strength in respect to numbers and resources, and a great increase of the spirit of self-denial, and of active enterprise; but even the dead 'dry bones' of protestantism on the continent of Europe, have begun to be joined 'bone to his bone,' and to be clothed 'with sinews and with flesh,' and to be informed with the spirit of life, and to stand upon their feet, an army for the Lord. A devout and eloquent Frenchman,* himself once a partaker in the prevalent infidelity of his country, but now lately, after years of faith, and hope, and patience, gone to the rest of the saints, thus testifies, as the result of a widely-extended observation: "Every where, living christianity revives; every where, infidelity finds herself defeated by an invisible hand; the frail weapons on which it relies to overthrow the kingdom of Christ, are turned against itself. It is impossible not to acknowledge, that in Europe, and over the whole globe, for some years, a supernatural and spiritual influence has existed, the more extraordinary, as it appears wholly independent of human will and human wisdom." Does not such a revival of the life and power of true religion, taken in connection with all the other aspects of the times, indicate the approach of a wide and mighty revolution in the moral world?

One leading characteristic of this revival of the power of christianity, is so peculiarly important in its bearings on the subject before us, that it demands a distinct consideration.

* Rev. Casimir Rostan.—See New-York Observer, Nov. 8, 1834.

The work of converting the world has been begun ; and experiment has demonstrated its practicability.

1. It has been shown to be practicable, to organize the christian community throughout the world, and to call out its entire strength, for the work of propagating the gospel. Nay, we should hardly exceed the limits of the most frigid accuracy, were we to say, that the entire christian community *has been* organized for this work. Where are the churches, recognized as belonging to the great fellowship of Christ's disciples, which do not acknowledge, that they hold their very charter from their king, on the express condition of co-operating for the extension of his kingdom ; or to whose solemn assemblies the missionary agent does not come, in one way or another, asking, for this work, their contributions and their prayers ? Where is the individual disciple, to whom the annual, the monthly, or the weekly appeal does not come, demanding of him, in the name of his Redeemer, his portion of time, of money, of thought, of effort, for the conversion of the world ? The christian world is organized for action in this work. It is up, not yet indeed in all its strength, nor with all the self-devotion which so vast an enterprise demands ; still, it is up, and in array for aggression on all the intrenchments and domains of darkness.

Nor is this a mere gust of sudden, and therefore transient excitement. How calm, how deliberate, how intellectual, how conscientious, is the conviction in respect to this subject, which has been fastened upon all the churches ! There is nothing sudden or enthusiastic about it. How gradually has this vast organization been effected ! How steadily, and with how many tokens of an ethereal and irrepressible energy, has this mighty impulse extended itself, till it now connects, with a stronger sympathy than ever, all the kindreds of the redeemed ! The spirit of propagandism is an essential element of christianity ; and the development of that spirit in this age, is only the necessary result of the opportunities for christian effort, which the present aspect of the world spreads out to the eye of reviving faith. See how that spirit pervades the christian literature of the age ; how it mingles itself with the very elements of religious instruction in the sabbath-school, and by the fire-side ; how it thunders from the pulpit, in the voice of every minister of the word ; how it breathes in the prayers of myriads who pray without ceasing ; how it gives to the hymns of Zion a sweeter and more thrilling melody : see how that spirit is showing itself, every where and in every form, to be not an accidental impulse, but an essential characteristic of a pure and living christianity ; and then say, whether experiment has not demonstrated the practicability of calling out in behalf of the world's conversion, the entire strength of the whole christian community.

2. It has been shown to be practicable, to christianize all na-

tions by the simple process of christian instruction. We do not refer here to that experiment which was made with so glorious a success, when apostles and the primitive evangelists went every where preaching the word ; we refer only to the history of modern missions, when we say, that experiment has proved the practicability of converting the world, by the simple process of christian instruction. Missionaries have already gone to all sorts of men ; and every where they have had success enough, at least, to show, that they are engaged in no impracticable enterprise. Do you ask, whether China can be penetrated, and whether the Chinese can be taught the lessons of the gospel ? While you ask, China is penetrated ; Chinese christians are at this moment spreading abroad among their countrymen, the knowledge of the gospel. Do you ask, whether the Hindoo can be christianized,—the Bramin, proud, learned, shrewd, and disputatious,—the Soodra, degraded to the dust,—both bound, as it were hand and foot, with the iron fetters of caste ? The Hindoo has been converted ; the Bramin and the Soodra have been cleansed by a holier ablution than the waters of the Ganges, and, sitting together at the table of the Lord, have eaten of one bread, and drunk of one cup, in remembrance of Jesus. Do you ask, whether the fierce red man of the American forest, can be subdued, and tamed, and humanized ? The gospel has tamed him ; and you may see him sitting at the feet of Jesus, clothed, and in his right mind. The indolent, voluptuous, cruel savage of the Pacific,—he too has felt the power of the gospel ; and O, what wonders has the gospel wrought among those isles that gem the bosom of the southern deep ! What more desperate experiment can there be ? Go to frozen Labrador,—go where, under the rigor of a polar sky, the dwarfish Greenlander maintains a precarious existence amid the everlasting conflict of the elements,—there the experiment has been tried ; and there the wretched native, sitting in his snow-built cabin, through the long, dark watches of his sunless winter, has rejoiced in the splendor of the sun of righteousness. And, to add one more particular to this recital, the African, about whom philosophers have sometimes doubted, whether he is human,—the African, both as we find him far away from the appropriate seat of his race and kindred, crushed under a horrid slavery, and as we find him in his native wilds,—has been sought out by the officiousness of christian love ; and he too is a witness, that the world can be evangelized. The slave has tasted of the liberty of the sons of God ; and the wild negro, the outcast Hottentot, has come and built his hut by the side of the mission-house, and has learned at once the arts of civilization and the virtues of the gospel. If any man would learn whether the conversion of the whole world, by the simple process of instruction, is practicable, let him learn what has been done in

Southern Africa. There the experiment has been tried, more fairly, more thoroughly, and, perhaps, on the whole, in circumstances more unfavorable to success, than any where else. And there, what triumphs has the missionary achieved ! What a work is the missionary there carrying forward ! The simple and humble efforts of the christian teacher have extended the gospel, more or less thoroughly, over a wide tract, beginning at the cape of Good Hope, and extending far into the continent. Village after village has been planted in the deep kloofs, and by the rivers ; tribe after tribe has thrown off the filthy dress of sheep-skin, and with it the brutal manners and vices of savage life,—has learned to cultivate the soil, and to make the wilderness a fruitful field,—has recovered its plundered rights from the grasp of oppression,—has acquired the use of letters,—has received the word of life, and the institutions of christianity,—has been brought completely within the pale of christendom. The change in them has been so signal, so manifestly for the better, that the report of it has traveled to distant tribes ; and barbarous chieftains, men of plunder and of blood, have despatched messengers from afar, begging for missionaries. With such facts as these in view, we feel, that the work of converting the world has been begun, and that experiment has shown it to be practicable.

We would ask our readers now, Do we not hear, as it were, in these exhibitions of success, the voice of our Savior, the voice of our God, coming from the heavens, and from all the regions of the earth,—coming from the four winds, and from every mountain, and plain, and sea, and island, and telling us of the approach of that blessed consummation for which his elect have so long been waiting ? Lift up your eyes, and look upon the field, which is the world,—it is white already to the harvest. Oh, the deafness of that man, who will not hear !—the blindness of that man, who will not discern the signs of the times ! God bids us look upon the aspect of the earth hastening to a crisis, such as earth never yet has known. God calls us as with a voice from heaven, Put in the sickle and reap, for the harvest of the earth is ripe.

“He that reapeth, receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit to eternal life.” What wages does he receive, who toils in this cause ? They are such rewards as God bestows on his servants. They are such rewards as belong to them who turn many to righteousness, and whose it shall be to shine as the brightness of the firmament forever. The harvest to be gathered, is a harvest to eternal life. And what will be their joy, who meet before the throne of God, arrayed in the brightness of eternal purity, and crowned with garlands of immortal joy, the souls to whom they have carried,—to whom they have sent,—that word, which is the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation !

Then will be fulfilled,—how sweetly!—that word of Christ, “that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together.” Then, all who in every age have borne any part, however prominent, or however humble, in the great work of the world’s redemption, will be partakers in the same unutterable and boundless joy. Then, the patriarch, who, in the world’s green youth, went forth from Haran, to seek,—he knew not where,—the place in which the worship and the name of God should abide through ages of universal darkness; he, and the devoted youth, who, in these last days, breaks the dear ties, that bind him to his kindred and his father’s house, and goes forth in the spirit of Abraham, to bear the name of God and Jesus to some barbarous land; yes, then the hoary patriarch, who, at God’s command, bound on the altar his son, his only son,—he whose faith, as manifested in that act, has spoken in resistless tones to unnumbered thousands, cheering them, and helping them upon their way to heaven,—*he*, and the parent, the mother, who in these days gives up her son, or her daughter, to toil and to die in the cause of the world’s salvation, will be partakers in one triumph, even as if on earth they had labored, and wept, and prayed together at one crisis, and in one field. Then, those who in ancient times confessed, that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth; kings, and prophets, and righteous men of old, who by faith wrought righteousness, subdued kingdoms, out of weakness were made strong, and turned to flight the armies of the aliens; apostles and martyrs, who in their day rushed on to fill up the measure of the sufferings of Christ; all who, catching their spirit, and entering into their labors, have been, even by the exertion of the humblest instrumentality, co-workers with them and with God; the martyr for the truth, whose ashes, scattered for a testimony, “flew,—no marble tells us whither;” the exile, who went forth before the storm of persecution, to build the altar of God under a freer sky, upon some barbarous shore; the missionary, who rested from his labors in an early and a foreign grave; the pastor, the teachers, the parents, who trained that missionary, and whose prayers devoted him to God; the humblest of the contributors who sent him on his way; the poor, who had nothing to bestow upon the enterprise but faith; the lonely widow, who in her weakness could only say, with the earnest prayer of a believing soul “Thy kingdom come;” all, all shall stand upon Mount Zion, and with songs and acclamations, such as never yet were heard in heaven, shall shout the **HARVEST HOME**.

ART. II.—GERMAN LITERATURE.

1. *Handbuch der Geschichte der Litteratur von Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Zweite Umarbeitung. 4 Theile. Leipzig: 1823.*

(*Manual of the History of Literature, by Dr. Lewis Wachler. Second Revision. 4 Parts. Leipsic: 1823.*)

2. *Lehrbuch der Litteratur-geschichte von Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig: 1827.*

(*A Text-Book of the History of Literature, by Dr. Lewis Wachler. Leipsic: 1827.*)

ACCORDING to a late and well-authenticated estimate, there are ten millions of volumes printed every year in Germany, and about a thousand new German authors are enumerated in every half-yearly catalogue. We have reason to suppose, then, that there are not less than fifty thousand persons now living in Germany, who have each contributed to its national literature, or to science, one or more volumes. It is in some measure owing to this circumstance, that the Germans, more than other nations, have felt the want of a comprehensive survey of their stores, whilst their philosophical character has led them to trace out the relations between German literature and the literary history of other nations. To these circumstances, also, we owe the productions of Eichhorn, Schlegel, Horn, and other distinguished men, in this department; though in many respects they are surpassed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler, the titles of two of whose works we have placed at the head of the present article. "I can promise to be upright, but not to be impartial," says Goethe, in one of his aphorisms; thus referring to the fact, that a man, though willing to act aright, may be often wanting in knowledge, or unconsciously biased. However true this is in general, we may remark, that the concise but able notices concerning 4,800 authors, furnished by Dr. Wachler, are well calculated in their tendency to excite his readers to extensive research, enable them to engage in a comprehensive examination as to the relative merits of each period of the history of literature, and, by his own example, teach them to be slow and careful in forming and expressing their opinion of literary productions.

Dr. Wachler has successively held a theological and a philosophical chair in two universities. Since 1805, however, he has been professor of history in the university of Breslau. He is favorably known, also, by several theological and philosophical works; but his *Manual of Literary History*, of which the *Text-Book* is in some measure an abridgment, has met with the most extensive favor, as by this work he has supplied a deficiency, which even now is but too deeply felt to exist in English literature. On account of the vast extent of his subject, and the comparatively small space in which it is comprehended, his style

is exceedingly concise; nor are we aware of any other writer, who has better succeeded in reducing the most complicated trains of thought to the fewest possible words. The principal advantages which are to be derived from so comprehensive a history of literature, as has been given by Dr. Wachler, is the assistance which it affords us in forming impartial and enlarged views of the various periods of literary history. After an able introduction, we are led, by the author, to the first commencement of literary activity, to the divine origin of language, and to the invention of the art of writing. These, with a series of remarks on the native land of the human race, richly interspersed with bibliographical notices, form the first era. The second comprises the period from Moses to Alexander the Great; and the third ends with the death of the emperor Augustus. With the fourth era, extending to the general irruption of the barbarous nations, both the period of ancient history and the first volume close. The second volume contains the literary history of the middle ages. The national history of the last three centuries occupies the third volume, separately from the progress of learning, to which the fourth volume is devoted. Under the head of *national literature*, Dr. Wachler comprehends the national language, poetry, oratory, and the criticism of taste. To the department of *learning*, on the other hand, belongs history, philology, mathematics, the natural sciences, medicine, law, and theology, together with their respective auxiliary sciences. In this division, Dr. Wachler seems to deviate from his predecessors in the field of literary history. Rousseau observes, that the method of constantly defining words in writing is impracticable, since for every definition, words are required which again need defining: a remark, the truth of which is strikingly proved in the ever-varying acceptation of the word "literature." Sometimes, in its most comprehensive meaning, it is applied to subjects lying within the whole range of human thought, as embodied in the written language, (and thus is it used by Dr. Wachler;) and again, its meaning is limited to works of the imagination,—a faculty, which is supposed to be occupied only with fictions of poetry or prose. It has been plausibly suggested, that in all such cases, the connection in which these words are found, might itself serve in place of a definition; though the general meaning of the word "literature," is established in some measure by respectable authorities. Madame de Stael, La Harpe, Frederick Schlegel, and many other writers of note, have ranked the science of intellectual and moral philosophy among those branches which are comprised under the term "literature," and have thus supported the opinion, that the distinction between science and literature is founded neither upon the respective faculties to which they owe their origin, nor on the different aims to which they are

directed. Dr. Wachler, in speaking of *national* literature and learning, has thought it necessary to place intellectual philosophy in the latter department.

Our object, however, in the present article, is not properly a review of Dr. Wachler's comprehensive history; but we shall confine ourselves to a few brief remarks on topics connected with German literature, suggested by the work before us.

Dr. Wachler's remarks on the development of the German language, deserve particular attention. Without engaging in a minute and extended inquiry, whether the Sanscrit, the old Persian, or the Greek language, is to be considered as the parent of the Teutonic family of languages; or whether, indeed, the Greek itself is but a branch of the older German; the author fails not to observe, that the traditionary accounts of the Teutonic tribes, agree in claiming an Asiatic origin for themselves, as well as for their language. He omits a particular consideration of the hypothesis by which, in reference to his exile, Ovid has been placed in the rank of the earliest of the German poets; but he justly lays the more emphasis on the fact, that, in the translation of the four gospels into the Mesogothic dialect, prepared by bishop Ulphilas, at the close of the fourth century, the Germans possess a literary and historical monument of a more ancient date, than any other European nation, whose language is considered a living one.

The first division of the German language, was that into the Upper and Lower dialects. In the latter of these was included the old Saxon, which, in the middle of the fifth century, was carried by the Anglo-Saxons to England, and by means of other tribes, to Denmark and Sweden. Besides the Saxon, several other branches of the Lower dialect were found in the north of Germany, of which the Dutch, spoken by the inhabitants of the Netherlands, is one of the more recent formations. At the time of the Reformation, the Lower dialect gave way to the High German, which then became the language of books, and of the cultivated classes; though to this day, distinct traces of it are found in the Low German, for so the language of the more illiterate part of the community is called.

The Upper German dialect, the ancient literary remains of which are much more valuable than those of the Lower, branched out likewise into many subordinate dialects. Of these, the Suabian deserves attention, on account of the poetical character, which, in consequence of powerful external influences, it received under the Suabian emperors. The continual and bloody struggles in which the Spanish warriors were forced to engage, in order to defend themselves against the attacks of the valiant but infidel Saracens, inspired them with a degree of religious enthusiasm and chivalrous daring, such as failed not to call forth a similar spirit,

and a corresponding taste, in the plains and castles of Provence, and of the south of Germany. The exhibition of this spirit of knighthood, fostered and widely diffused by the imperial house of Hohenstauffen, necessarily exercised a powerful influence upon the Suabian dialect, at that time the language of the court. Beauty, love, valor, and piety, were the themes of the melodious lays of the minnesingers, and kings and princes felt honored in being numbered among the crowds of these noble minstrels. As the sonorous and imposing sounds of the Æolic dialect once indicated to an Athenian audience, that they were about to be introduced into the world of poetry ; so did the full and melodious tones of the Suabian dialect form a poetical language, which remained almost entirely distinct from all the other popular dialects, until the deep and lofty spirit of these poetical productions had dwindled away into the compositions of the humble and rude artisan, and the wandering ballad-singer. The Suabian dialect then lost its ascendancy, and, together with the other branches of the Upper German, gave way to the High German, which, principally by the agency of Luther, had been formed out of the two great German dialects, and by his excellent translation of the bible, had acquired a stability, which has enabled it to continue, unimpaired by the influence of more than three centuries. This sudden change in the language and literature of Germany, was but one of the important effects of that great moral revolution, by which, at that period, a large portion of Germany was freed from the thralldom of popery. Thus are spiritual influences often felt, when they are least anticipated, pervading all the relations of mankind with new life ; like the rivulet, which, near its source, loses itself under the earth, but gradually gathering strength, finally breaks forth as a powerful torrent, overthrowing the rocks and mountains which oppose its course, until beautifully meandering through the wide plains, it confers numberless blessings on all the countries around.

Dr. Wachler virtually acknowledges, that it is impossible to exhibit fully the literary life of a nation, without referring, at the same time, to its political history : a truth, which is most strikingly exhibited in the literary progress of Germany. The independent co-existence of several German states, over which the German emperor had only a very limited authority, and which seldom admitted the concentration of their internal interests, must be considered as one of the principal causes why almost all the great revolutions in the literary and social life of Germany, have been occasioned by external influences, and fostered by internal opposition. Neither the Latin controversies, and scholastic discussions, in which the followers of Luther were led to engage, nor the protracted and severe sufferings of the thirty years war, could prevent the spreading of that light, by which Germany had been

first illumined at the time of the Reformation, and which attempted opposition only caused to shine with increased splendor. It must also be ascribed, in a great measure, to the political state of Germany, that the baleful example of French manners and morals, in the time of Louis XIV, could not exercise so unlimited an influence, as might have been the case, if it could have been concentrated in one great focus,—in a German Paris. Finally, as respects the literary development of the Germans, it is likewise owing to their political constitution, that their literary productions have never been subjected to the absolute tyranny of regal censorship, nor have ever been measured by high-handed regulations, and fashionable standards of royal academies or literary inquisitions. The literary life of Germany, in its rapid development, has enjoyed independence ever since Martin Luther replied to the hierarchical pretensions of pope Leo X, by publicly burning the pontifical bull, in the great square at Wittenberg.

The influence which the philosophical inquiries of modern times have had on German prose, has given rise to the unusual fact, that, in general, it is less difficult to understand the poetry than the prose of Germany; whilst another characteristic feature of the German language,—that of representing the slightest and most delicate shades of meaning by its variety of derivations and inflections,—has been developed, and tested to the utmost, by this modern regeneration of the science of the mind.

Having thus briefly adverted to the various branches of the German language, in accordance with the leading principles furnished by our author, we now proceed to glance at the present state of these branches of the language itself. The High German, is founded originally on the partial combination of the Upper and Lower German dialects, which, before the time of Luther, were used for literary purposes; and so greatly do these dialects differ from each other, that a peasant from the south of Austria, would be unable to understand the Low German spoken by his countrymen in the north. This difficulty results from the fact, that the distinction of High German and Low German is founded on a difference of rank; whilst the *Upper* and *Lower* dialects, refer to a difference of geographical situation.

The inhabitants of the Netherlands, originating from that part of Germany where the lower dialect prevailed, have had a language and a literature of their own, for the last three or four hundred years; though the political and commercial relations of that country, have combined to obliterate the traces of the German origin of this language. The High German, then, nor the Low German, is understood by the Dutch, unless through the assistance of the grammar and dictionary; and the Dutch, or Hollandish, is likewise as ill understood by the German.

We may here add, that the distinctive character of these various languages and dialects, may be traced, in some measure, on this side of the Atlantic. The state of Pennsylvania is, in a great measure, inhabited by the descendants of German emigrants, who first arrived in New-York, but who, having quarreled with the Dutch settlers there, removed in a body to Pennsylvania. As they came from the region of the Dutch settlers, and resembled them in their religion and social habits, the term "Dutch" was very naturally applied to them; with as little propriety, however, as it is to their descendants of the present day. With the exception only of the High German, spoken in the Moravian villages, their language is a compound of several Low German dialects, which, from an entire want of cultivation, has so much degenerated, and has become so greatly alloyed with the colloquial English, that it is almost wholly unintelligible to a German directly from Europe, and accustomed only to the High German, and one or two of the Low German dialects.

That there are some English writers, who have used "High Dutch" and "Low Dutch," instead of "German" and "Dutch," cannot weaken the justness of the distinctions which we have made above, and which are supported, both by philosophical research, and the strength of the best authorities. Such writers have been influenced by a popular error; for such it must be considered, so long as the distinctions which they have made, do not present the true state of things, as it exists in Germany and Holland, and while they are in spirit entirely opposed to the terms used by the inhabitants of those countries to which they refer. It may not be irrelevant here to add, that the term *Deutsch*, (nearly like *Doitsh*,) which is the vernacular word for German, and that of "Dutch," by their similarity of form, shadow forth the true relations of the two nations to which they belong; just as we should be led to conclude, from hearing of "Britain" and "Bretagne," that the inhabitants of two countries had a common origin; whilst the words "High Dutch" and "Low Dutch," would lead us to inferences which are contrary to the actual state of the languages to which they refer.

As a proof of that spirit of justice and truth which prevails in Dr. Wachler's work, we would refer our readers to the respect paid to the literary character of Uhland, a writer who is slightly known among us, and even too little known among his own countrymen; though his writings have been gradually gaining an increase of celebrity, and will eventually, we doubt not, be properly appreciated. We make no apology, (as we are sure our readers will feel none to be needed,) for inserting here a translation, by a friend, of one of Uhland's most beautiful poems, in which the spirit of the original is most happily preserved. The poet is

speaking of the tradition respecting a lost church, and the occasional sounding of its bell. In this tradition, he finally recognizes the spirit of martyrdom, of self-devotion, of that deep and fervent, all-pervading piety, which once characterized the church; and in the sound of the bell, he hears the voice of conscience, whose tones of solemn monition are reverberating in undying faithfulness.

THE LOST CHURCH.

Far in the forest's thickly wooded green,
The sound of bells is heard, as from above;
The rush of waters to the dark ravine
Sweeps not more wildly;—yet can none remove
The mists which ever hang upon the sound,
And e'en tradition is in silence bound.

From the lost church, 'tis said, the chime is borne,
And by the wind to this dark forest brought;
The path deserted now, defaced and torn,
How many travelers once with ardor sought!
To the lost church the narrow pathway led,
But every vestige of that path has fled.

As late I wandered to that leafy shade,
Where trodden path no longer marks the sod,
My soul against corruption seemed array'd,
I wept, and longed to find a home with God!
In this lone spot the bell's mysterious voice,
With hollow murmurings seemed to say: *Rejoice!*

Darkness and silence hung on all around;
Again I heard the deep and solemn chime,
And as I followed the unearthly sound,
My soul, exalted, left the things of time;
Thou holy trance! e'en now I cannot tell
How all my being rose beneath that bell.

An age, it seemed, had been vouchsafed to me,
To dream the clouds of sin and sense away;
Clear as the light, a space unbounded, free,
Above the mists, unclos'd with brightest day.
How bright that sun! how deeply blue that sky!
And there a minster stood in sanctity.

It shone resplendent in the gorgeous ray,
And winged winds seemed bearing it afar,
The steeple's point had vanished quite away,
Far, far beyond the light of sun and star;
Yet still I caught the ringing of that bell,
With sound more sweet than ever words can tell.

Yes, from the steeple they came floating by,
Yet not by mortal hand the peal was given;
It breathed of light, and love, and harmony,
Moved by the blessed violence of heav'n.
The very sound seem'd near my heart to beat,
And drew within that splendid dome my feet.

Oh! how I felt within that sweet abode!
The windows darkly gleam'd with antique hue,
The mystic light o'er painted martyrs glow'd,
And into life the holy portraits grew;
Upon a world of sainted ones I gazed,
I heard the hymn the noble martyrs raised.

Before that altar I devoutly bowed,
 And deepest love my all of being fill'd ;
 Upon the ceiling heaven's image glow'd,
 That golden glory every passion still'd.
 But see, the arches of the dome are rent !
 Up to the gates of God my eye is bent.

The splendors of that mighty dwelling-place,
 Those shining walls !—The crystal fountains there !
 And wonders which a creature dares not trace !
 But let them move the sinner's soul to pray'r.
 Oh ! ye to whom that solemn bell shall ring,
 Take heed, and listen to its murmuring !

In reading Uhland's poetry, we often feel inclined to say, in the spirit of Jean Paul, that it is like the gradually declining tones of a bell, which, as the retreating waves, seem to be finally lost at a great distance ; but, although every thing is hushed without, we yet discover a continued vibration of the tones in our own bosoms. Jean Paul's remark, it is true, refers to romantic poetry generally, in distinction from classical or ancient poetry, but this "Lost Church," "The Passage," and many other poems of Uhland, are deeply romantic, if we give to this term the peculiar sense in which the French, the German, and some of our own writers, have agreed to use it. It refers to a combination of the beautiful with the idea of the infinite, and belongs, therefore, emphatically to the spirit of christianity, by which this idea has been fully developed. A Venus may be beautiful, but a Madonna can only, in this sense, be considered romantic. Christianity, to speak once more in the spirit of Jean Paul, overthrew the world of sense, with all its charms, and on this immense pile of ruins, erected the redeeming cross, reaching into the heavens, even into a new world of spirits. The character of the romantic, therefore, must frequently bear a close relation to that of the sublime, which likewise expands into the idea of the infinite, from which, still oftener, it may be said to have originated. The sublime may come before our minds, directly through the organs of sight or of hearing ; for instance, in gazing upon the wide-spread ocean, the lofty mountain-top, or in listening to the peal of thunder. Or, it may spring from the deeper consciousness of our inmost feelings, wakened into life by reflection ; and in such cases, the solemn, awful silence in the realms of nature, may be more sublime than the terrific display of a thunder-storm, or the fall of Niagara. A short parable of Krummacher, will best serve to illustrate our views on this point.

'Asaph, an admirable singer and harper, sat, at the midnight hour, in an upper room of his dwelling, and his countenance glowed with delight. For he thought of a hymn of praise in honor of the Lord, who created heaven and earth, and all that is therein. Thus Asaph sat meditating, and his harp resting before him.

Suddenly it occurred to him to ascend to the broad, flat roof, and

behold from thence the splendor of the starry heavens. My hymn, thought he, will then sound yet more delightfully.

He carried his harp upon the house-top, and gazing up into the heavens, he there beheld Orion, with all the host of stars, which were silently moving over his head in eternal splendor. The holy city, with the surrounding valleys and mountains, lay beneath, glistening in the light of the moon, while all the inhabitants slept in the silence of midnight. The breath of midnight swept over his harp, and the chords trembled.

But Asaph could sing no more; he leaned his head upon his harp in silence, and wept.

When the day appeared, and the people ascended the holy mountain, and the noise was heard of the multitude crowding together, Asaph rose and went down, and boldly struck his harp, and his spirit mounted on the wings of song, above the multitude around him.'

In reflecting on the character of the sublime, in this parable, we find that Asaph, whether weeping in the silence of the starry night, or soaring on the wings of song, reminds us of our eternal home, the only true home of the soul.

This delightful mode of instruction, by means of parables, has been successfully employed by Krummacher, by Herder, and by many other eminent writers in Germany. In most of them we recognize the features which characterize the parables of the old and new testaments. The leading thought is not so completely kept out of sight, as in the allegory, and is, therefore, less symbolical; whilst it is distinguished from the fable, by the fact, that its circumstances may be supposed real. We advert with some emphasis to this subject, since it relates to a department in which English literature is strikingly deficient, though its cultivation might be of practical advantage. With regard to the formation of the female character, for instance, it is worthy particularly of the notice of our female writers. Imagine a young female, whose fondness for dress, or for other trifles, prevent her from attending to more important interests. You have been invited by Lina, (supposing this her name,) to translate for her some beautiful parable of Krummacher. You choose the following:—

'The angel who watches over the flowers, and in the silent night sheds upon them the dew, once fell asleep in the season of spring, and early in the morning, in the shade of a rose-bush. When he awoke, kindly smiling, he thus addressed the rose-bush. Loveliest of my children, I thank thee for thy exquisite fragrance, and for thy ample shade. Canst thou not ask of me some new gift? How gladly would I grant it thee! Adorn me, then, with some new charm, replied the spirit of the rose-bush; and the genius of flowers threw over her a robe of simple moss! Behold the moss-rose, how modestly adorned, and yet the most beautiful of her species!'

Might not our Lina, realizing the force of the parable, be more

likely to quit her spangled dress and glittering gems, and follow the directions of maternal nature? which is, "when unadorned, adorned the most." Returning from this short digression, (if it is one,) we may observe, that even the fastidious taste of the German scholar would not object to the employment of female talent in this department; since, to excel in it, requires a high degree of feeling and refined taste, rather than an intimate acquaintance with the abstractions of philosophical science.

To the philosophical character of German literature, is it partly to be ascribed, that female authorship is so much discountenanced in Germany. Were we to count, in the work before us, the male and female authors, in German and English literature, the latter would be found, in proportion, far richer in this respect; nor do we know of any female writer in German literature, who enjoys so high and well-merited a reputation, as Maria Edgeworth, Hannah More, and many others whom we could name, both in England and in this country. We believe, with our German friends, that our females will never be greatly distinguished as metaphysicians; that there never will be found among them a Leibnitz or a Kant, a Locke or an Edwards; but we are equally well convinced, that, in order to guard them against this extreme, their pens are not to be confined to treatises on the "plastic art of fluids,"* or similar subjects, merely. The want of success among their French neighbors, might be considered as a sufficient warning, as to any such danger. It is to be hoped, that the time is past, when Madame de Stael's Germany, is to be considered as a just representation of German literature. The translations in this work of her's, from the writings of Jean Paul, Goethe, and others, are as defective and inaccurate, as are her views of German philosophy. Of the character of her views of German philosophy, we may form some conception, when we hear her declare, with great naiveté, that she could not conceive, why philosophers laid so much stress upon reducing every thing to a single principle; whether one principle or two was admitted, she thought perfectly indifferent, since it could not explain the universe any better. Madame de Stael too often appears as a Parisian lady, of the *ancienne regime*, ever ready to gratify her vanity by a *bon mot*, at the expense of truth. Her heart, indeed, is always in favor of Germany; but her taste is sadly influenced by the artificial principles of the French school. Kant did not throw himself, like a modern Curtius, into the abyss of abstraction, in order to close it forever, as she would have us believe. The hopes which he always cherished, and which cheered him on, proved deceitful as the mirage to the weary, spent, and thirsty traveler in the desert, when, on reaching his fancied lake, he finds

* The art of cookery, according to certain aesthetic writers.

only new sandy plains, and a scorching sun. It is one of the most remarkable and touching events in the history of man, that this philosopher, after a course of reasoning, which has given to the age in which he lived, the name of *the philosophical*, came to the conclusion, that all human knowledge is vain. He sought not, indeed, for certainty of knowledge, where only it can be found. And it is melancholy to reflect, that the mantle of pride, which, in the tempest of conflicting opinions, he had drawn but closer and closer around him, was not an insupportable burthen, which he gladly threw off, while experiencing the light and warmth of divine grace. Of the principles of morality, which Kant has drawn out in one of his works, we shall merely say, that his scheme is undoubtedly more difficult in practice, than that of christianity; since it refers only to a principle of duty,—a principle which, while it exists in the christian religion, yet is absorbed in the ever-springing and purer fountain of love. Kant, and his successors, Fichte and Schelling, looked upon the world in the pride of their own righteousness, and from a point of abstraction, which disabled them from regarding the nature of man in its true light. Like the Alpine hunter, on his dangerous and giddy path, they had ascended above the mists which this world of sense creates; but, like him, on his rocky height, they beheld this world only through “a rent of clouds,” as adorned with a beauty and loveliness, a softening of the picture, which was the effect, rather of their elevated situation, than the real state of things. “They have been unjustly compared,” says Jean Paul, “to the three eastern sages, who came to adore, and not to be adored.”

When the copious terminology, which had been created by Kant, spread rapidly, together with his philosophy, many weak minds, who were incapable of following the philosopher, fell to playing with these new and fine-sounding words, and found—

“ Their notions fitting things so well,
That which was which they could not tell,
But oftentimes mistook the one
For t’other, as great clerks have done.”

Others, again, dwelt with delight on the fact, that the remark of the royal sage, “that all human knowledge is vain,” was so happily confirmed by the profound philosopher of Königsberg; and, like Plato’s inhabitants of the cave, they sneered at those who spoke of the “light on earth.” It was, however, the fate of many of the most superior minds, to forget the ultimate end of their exertions, in rejoicing over the difficulties which they had surmounted. They remind us of a description of Plutarch, when speaking of the Eleusinian mysteries: “As those,” he says, (we quote from memory,) who were to be initiated, at first assembled in a noisy and tumultuous manner, but when the sanctuary was un-

folded to them, they at once shrunk back in fear and silence ; so is there likewise much confusion and noise, when novices enter the road to science, but after they have approached the goal, their behavior changes, and they lose all marks of an irreverent and boisterous spirit." The literary life of Schiller, furnishes us with a remarkable instance of this misapplication of the views of Kant ; since one of his poems, at least, "*Das Reich der Formen*," cannot be understood without an intimate acquaintance with Kant's system.

"The young divines," says Carlyle, from the best German authorities, in his life of Schiller, "came back from the university of Jena,* full of strange doctrines, which they explained to the examiners of the Weimar Consistorium, in phrases, that excited no idea in the heads of these reverend persons, but much horror in their hearts. Hence reprimands, and objurgations, and excessive bitterness, between the applicants for ordination, and those appointed to confer it. One young clergyman, at Weimar, shot himself on this account ; heresy, and jarring, and unprofitable logic, were universal. Hence Herder's† vehement attacks on this "pernicious quackery,"—this delusive and destructive "system of words."

Let us listen, however, to Schiller's own account of the influence which his devotion to the philosophy of Kant had produced upon himself ; an account which he gave, years after he became first acquainted with the views of Kant, and their intoxicating influence had yielded to a calm review of his intellectual wanderings.

"Criticism," he says, "must now make good to me the damage which she herself has done. And damaged me she has, most certainly ; for the boldness, the living glow, which I felt before a single rule was known to me, have for several years been wanting. I now *see* myself *create* and *form*. I watch the play of inspiration ; and my fancy, knowing that she is not without witnesses of her movements, no longer moves with equal freedom. I hope, however, ultimately to advance so far, that *art* shall become a second nature, as polished manners are to well-bred men. Then imagination will regain her former freedom, and submit to no other than voluntary limitations."

Schiller was not disappointed in his expectations ; and others, undoubtedly, who have earnestly and sincerely studied the works of Kant, have felt, that they have derived advantages,—advantages poorly gained, however, at such an expense,—analogous to those anticipated by the poet, however various the departments may have been, to which they have principally devoted their attention.

* Schiller, and other professors in that university, had embraced the views of Kant, with great zeal.

† The president of the Consistorium.

As the judge makes himself acquainted with all the particulars of the case, concerning which he is called upon to pass judgment ; so ought the critic to read all the works of an author, before he has the right of passing his sentence ; says a cotemporary writer : and we would rather advocate this principle, than see a voluminous writer condemned, in consequence of a few pages merely, which, from their want of connection, perhaps, have proved obscure or unintelligible. It is well known, that those who are not accustomed to dwell upon and develop a connected series of abstract truths, sometimes find it difficult to understand the most simple views, when expressed in an abstract manner. To illustrate this remark, let us first contemplate a truth presented in the usual modes of expression, and then view it in its more general principles. "Those heroes," says Menzel, "who, in the course of centuries, have been created by poets, are almost entirely wanting in national characteristics, and seem to be the offspring of theory only ;" a sentiment, which the philosopher of a certain school would express in a general principle, by saying : in the heroes of poetry, we recognize the analysis of the possible, rather than the synthesis of the actual. If we should attempt to present the link, which some of our readers may think necessary, between these two modes of expressing the same thought, we would say : the poets have been engaged only in *tracing out* and *presenting* (analyzing) the capabilities of the nature of man, (the possible,) without caring how far these capabilities have manifested themselves in the history of man, and without endeavoring to collect and arrange those materials, which might have enabled them to form a true, though ideal, picture of life.

A writer in one of the English reviews, remarks, in regard to this subject, that there are hardly six Englishmen to be found, who are sufficiently well acquainted with the works of Kant, in the German, to succeed in translating them into English ; and the attempts which have hitherto been made by English philosophers, seem to confirm his opinion. Only two years ago, a translation of Tenneman's philosophy of history was published there, by a Rev. Mr. Johnson ; a work, in which all the various philosophies are criticised, according to the modes of thought which are peculiar to Kant. The important fact, however, soon appears, that his work is but a translation of a French translation. In the French translation, Ancillon, the father of the Prussian minister, and greatly distinguished for his philosophical pursuits, had been called *le père*, in order to distinguish him from his son, who, of course, is introduced as "*le fils*." But Mr. Johnson unhesitatingly translates Ancillon *le père*, into father Ancillon, and thus, without mercy, transforms a German nobleman, of high reputation, into a capuchin friar ! In another part of the French translation, Priestly

is called "the great naturalist," (le grand physicien,) but in the pages of Mr. Johnson, he figures as the "great physician!"

The great difficulties which obstruct the success of foreigners, when attempting to read Kant, in the original, have suggested the opinion, that native Germans, after becoming thoroughly acquainted with the English language, might be more successful in introducing the works of Kant to the English reader. We believe, however, that the genius of the English language, and the peculiar modes of thought, which characterize the philosophy of Kant, could not be united with each other, without great sacrifices; and that, on the whole, it would be less laborious to study Kant in the original, than to make use of any, even of the best translations.

Geologists affirm, that of the whole diameter of our earth, we are acquainted with only a very minute portion. Nor, in the knowledge of our minds, have we gone much farther; but, as the German miners have penetrated deepest into the earth, so has the attention of the German writers been most extensively directed to psychological researches. The contemplative tendency of the German mind, which is, in some measure, the result of their political relations, has led them,—to speak in the language of another,—“to cultivate the pleasures afforded in the seclusion of domestic life, rather than to strive for those inalienable rights, which only can secure private happiness. It has enabled them to cultivate the empire of ideas more actively and successfully than any other nation.” We would add, however, that they, like the Athenians, are but too often “*fortes in tabula*,” great on paper only; and that, in many of the German productions, there is something fantastical and ghost-like, something that does not seem adapted to this world, and reminding us of the fact, that the attention of the German author is much oftener directed to the mysterious chaos in his own bosom, than to the world around him. In France, England, and America, a man possessing a great mind, as often becomes an eminent statesman, as in Germany he is distinguished as an author. It is this life of speculative enjoyment, so entirely different from the practical character of other nations, which has impressed itself on the literature of Germany. In judging, therefore, of the literary activity of Germany, it is necessary to bear in mind, that the *popular* element, which characterizes the political, and, in some measure, the social life of other countries, is almost entirely wanting in that country. This national feature appears in German literature, for instance, in a frequent exhibition of personal feelings, and individual states of mind. The German authors are often as unreserved in their works, as they are in the circles of their families or friends. It is the peculiar charm of these circles, which has given to many of their productions, that superior attraction of kindness and love,

which never fails of touching the heart, and which has been too frequently derided, as hyper-sentimental. A union, which is cemented by the conviction, that an unreserved and unlimited confidence must be reciprocated as freely as it is granted, has so much in it lovely and winning, that we are scarcely aware of the fact, that its child-like character sometimes degenerates into the childish. In a country like ours, where the political or the mercantile influence is felt to pervade, more or less, the various departments of social life, the case must be somewhat different. Where, however, these influences yield to the influence of literature, we meet with that general spirit of social warmth, of the want of which, the German emigrant complains in every country but his own. Whether high or low, rich or poor, male or female, it may be said, without exaggeration, that in almost every interview of two Germans in a foreign country, they are heard to lament, that the German "*gemüthlichkeit*," or mutual longing after an unreserved and free communion of spirit, is no where found but in Germany.

It is but another exhibition or development of the same feature in the German character, that, unless the expression of one's countenance should happen to be strikingly repulsive, it is hardly possible to take a walk in the environs of one of the large cities in Germany, without being enriched with the auto-biography of some one with whom we may chance to meet. Willingly, indeed, do we listen occasionally to a tedious narrative, or even to an obvious fabrication, if we are rewarded at other times by acquaintances, which, in their consequences, are even more enduring than our lives. To these social peculiarities, in part, has been ascribed the fact, that the German writers are, as a class, more diligent and efficient in literary enterprise, than those of other nations. It has been affirmed, that, by spending their evenings in the agreeable intercourse of their families and friends, the all-absorbing influence of social feeling produces so powerful a reaction, that it enables them to labor the next day sixteen out of twenty-four hours. This, however, is a somewhat exaggerated representation. The phlegmatic temperament of the German students, is the true cause why they are so persevering and efficient in authorship. Such a temperament is well known to be the most favorable to longevity, which, in Germany, is likewise promoted by the uniform character of the climate, and the hardening, physical discipline, to which the German youth are accustomed. Walking, fencing, gunning, swimming, skating, are objects of sedulous attention, until the physical constitution has been developed; and an hour's exercise during the day, is found sufficient for the scholar advanced in years. In August, however, the most favorable month there for such excursions, even he may be seen walking (like Thales and Pythagoras

of old,) to the Mont Blanc, or the Gothard, with his knapsack on his back, and, in a truly youthful spirit, enjoying through the day, all that is beautiful or sublime on his tour, and at night, giving himself up to as ambrosian a slumber, as any of which Homer ever dreamed.

The remark has been justly made, that this tendency to contemplation makes them better cosmopolites than Germans; and that their national character seems to consist in a desire of having none. Though they wish, like other nations, to become the archetypal people, the beau ideal for others, they seek to arrive at this object in a somewhat different way. Whilst the former endeavor to subject others to their national peculiarities, the Germans seem to aim at incorporating the peculiarities of all the other nations with their own. "If there were but one nation in the world, beside the Germans," says Menzel, "the latter, from their poetical tendency, and persevering labor, would long since have, probably, so completely transformed themselves into this other people, that there would be nothing left of them." These remarks, however, refer principally to the inhabitants of the south. The south of Germany has produced the most distinguished poets, and in warmth and intensity of feeling, surpasses the north, the home of gravity and sober reason. To this circumstance, it must be partly ascribed, that in the south, the Roman Catholic religion continues to prevail; whilst in the north, Protestantism has produced the profoundest thinkers and scholars, and has been embraced by all the northern branches of the Teutonic stock,—by Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the United States,—and, what is worthy of notice, by these branches only. Like the towering oaks of their forests, the northern tribes grew strong and hardy, under the influence of their long winters, whilst the deep and silent seriousness of nature, filled them with solemnity; for, after a short season of beauty and warmth, wood and valley were left dreary and mute:—the passenger-bird had taken a hasty farewell, to seek a warmer clime. This thoughtfulness was ennobled and spiritualized by the power of christianity; and it was equally favorable to the re-publication of christianity,—to Protestantism. But if it is impossible to deny the truth of these facts, the annals of the history of the human race speak likewise of whole nations, as well as of individuals, who have elevated themselves above the influence of nature. For more than two thousand years, the Swedes,—a noble race of men,—have been exposed to the same influences of climate, which the wretched Laplanders have experienced; and yet they have taught us, that the soul of man can rise above the conditions of nature. Even the *physical* diseases, with which the ancient Britons were afflicted, gave way before the power of music; and their rude manners were softened and elevated, by the influence which

the Lord exercised by Luitgard, the Saxon apostle, and his successors. As the same heaven, the same stars, and the same immeasurable distance, extend over the naked rock, the verdant bower, the waving corn-fields; so there is a Spirit, that is ever ready to speak to the soul of that man who is willing to listen. "Elias was a man subject to like passions as we are," but he "prayed earnestly," and he "prayed again," and the Lord heard his prayers. Man has been, and probably will be, found degraded every where; but in every zone, he likewise can raise himself above his condition. Dr. G. Schubart, to whom Dr. W. refers with deserved praise, (though we are far from admitting his sentiments in theology,) describes the firm and eternal resting-place of this power of the soul of man, in so beautiful a manner, that we cannot refrain from quoting a passage, found in his "*History of the Soul*."

'In the midst of the realms of existence, there is a sun, which sustains and preserves every thing, which animates and directs every thing; and there is an eye, which is itself of sun-like nature, and made for that sun. The sun is God, the eye is the soul.

Neither the terrors nor the dread, which come to man on the wings of the storm, or in the thunder of the avalanche, or the eruptions of the volcano,—it is not these which have first proclaimed to him, that there is a God; nor is it from the starry heavens,—letters, as it were,—of his creation, that man has derived this knowledge. Deep as the longing, which, in the new-born babe, calls for the mother, of whom it yet knows nothing; loud as the crying of the young raven, after food which he has never yet tasted; strong and intense as the urgency with which the eye, when unsealed, or the plant, when breaking from its capsule, seeks the light which they have never before felt;—such is the longing which I feel through my whole being, for the living fountain of all being, from which I have derived my existence.

Should I take the wings of the morning, and fly where the last waves of the visible world are lost; should I descend into darkness, where there is no star, where the cries of anxiety, the loud manifestations of joy, nay, where even the softest breathing of life, is no longer heard; and should I remain there, alone and solitary, yet I should feel, that He upholds me; I should perceive his nearness, like the rustling of the eagle's wing; in the still night, I should perceive something within me, which cries after God. Like the anchor cast forth, which, at once penetrating the waves of the sea, sinks to the deep foundation, on which it rests; so is there a desire within my bosom, which takes its way through the midst of the creation, unto God.'

But we must conclude. In conclusion, then, we would express our earnest desire, that our literature may be enriched with a literary history of as comprehensive a character, as is that to which we have directed the attention of our readers. It is by works like this, that a general interest in the highest productions of the human

mind is excited and preserved, notwithstanding the paralyzing influence of mechanical employments, or the exclusive devotion to professional pursuits. To those who are engaged as public lecturers, on the whole, or on single periods, of the history of literature, these volumes will prove of inestimable value; and such persons, especially, will be capable of estimating the great utility of the minute and numerous bibliographical notices, with which their pages are interspersed. "To develop the course of history," says Dr. Wachler, "to represent more fully the particular facts, to review literary productions, and to direct the hearer in the methodical use of particular authors, belongs to oral communications. My lectures on the history of literature, occupy three *semesters*; (that is, half-years.) In the first, ancient literature is lectured upon for six hours each week, and the general introduction for two hours; in the second, the history of the middle ages is treated; in the third *semester*, that of modern times. The latter is reduced to somewhat narrow limits. The literature of professional studies, and of philosophy, is, in many respects, a subject of separate consideration. In general history, it is sufficient, therefore, to direct the attention to the intellectual tendency, which exercises a universal influence, and which is reflected in every particular branch; and to present a historical view of the relations of each individual department, considered in connection with the general character of history."

Having so decidedly spoken of the advantages which the *public lecturer* may derive from these works of Dr. Wachler, we need not enlarge upon their utility, as a book of reference to *students* of the history of literature. We know of no other work, of this kind, which, in practical value, can be compared with these volumes; as we know of no other nation than Germany, which has so distinguished itself, in arranging and digesting the literary productions of the whole world, even from the period when their great reformer became the interpreter and representative of the spirit of his time. With this acknowledgment of the superiority of Germany, where it is due, we would recall the historical fact, that Luther, and his cotemporaries in restoring the freedom of the mind, at the time of the reformation, likewise first laid the foundation of that highest political freedom, which rests upon the principle, that the interests of the government and those of the people are identical. For the preservation of that principle, the founders of this western republic left their ancestral shores, and the enjoyment of both literary and social privileges. Even now, then, in the benefits which we derive from our political institutions, we seem to enjoy the fruits of a mighty tree, which first struck root in the soil of Germany; but, as its growth was there neglected, its branches

have been bending over to us, and we are permitted to gather its rich produce. It is a precious privilege which is thus committed to us; and it becomes us to beware how we lose our birthright, by neglect or licentiousness. In reference to this fact, and hence in a peculiar sense, we may exclaim, with Dr. Wachler, **LIFE IS NOT THE GREATEST GOOD.**

ART. III.—SCRIPTURAL ARGUMENT, ON THE EPISCOPAL CONTROVERSY.

Answer to a Review (in the Quarterly Christian Spectator) of "Episcopacy tested by Scripture;" first published in the Protestant Episcopalian, for May, 1834. Philadelphia: Jesper Harding; 1834. pp. 49.

WHEN the review of the tract, "Episcopacy tested by Scripture," was prepared,* it was not our design, to engage in a controversy on the subject there discussed. We well knew how unprofitable and how endless such a controversy might become; and we felt, that we had more important business to engage our attention, than that of endeavoring to defend the external order of the church. The subject attracted our notice, because, on two different occasions, the tract, which was the subject of the review, had been sent to us, in one instance accompanied with a polite request,—evidently from an Episcopalian,—to give to it our particular attention; because, too, the tract had been published at the "Episcopal Press," and it was known, that it would be extensively circulated; because it had been the subject of no small self-gratulation among the Episcopalians, and had been suffered, notwithstanding the manifest complacency with which they regarded it, to lie unanswered; but *mainly*, because it made an appeal at once to the bible, and professed a willingness, that the question should be settled by the authority of the scriptures alone. This appeared to us to be placing the subject on new ground. The first emotion produced by the title of the tract, was one of surprise. We had been so accustomed to regard this controversy as one, that was to be settled solely by the authority of the fathers; we had been so disheartened, and sickened by the unprofitable nature, the interminable duration, and the want of fixed bounds and principles, in that investigation; we had seen so little reference made to the bible, on either side of the question, that it excited in us no small degree of surprise, to learn, that a bishop of the Episcopal church should be willing to make a direct, decisive, and unqualified appeal to the new testament. It was so unusual; it gave so new a direction to the controversy; it promised so speedy an issue, and one

* Christian Spectator, vol. vi.

so little auspicious to the cause which the bishop was engaged in defending, that we were not unwilling to turn aside from our usual engagements, and to examine the proofs adduced in this somewhat novel mode of the Episcopal controversy.

Shortly after our review was published, an "Answer" to the article appeared in the "Protestant Episcopalian," understood to come from the author of the tract. With a copy of this, the writer of the review was politely furnished by Dr. Onderdonk. The "Answer" is marked with the same general characteristics, as the tract itself. It evinces, in general, the same spirit of christian feeling, and of candid inquiry; the same calm, collected, and manly style of argument; the same familiarity with the subject; and the same habit,—by no means as common as is desirable,—of applying the principles of the inductive philosophy to moral subjects. To this *general* statement, perhaps, should be made a slight exception. A candid observer, possibly, would discern in the "Answer," some marks of haste, and some indications of disturbed repose,—possibly of a slight *sensation* in perceiving, that the *material point* of the argument in the tract, had not been as strongly fortified as was indispensable. As instances of this sensation, we might notice the train of remarks in pp. 8, 9, and especially in the following expressions. "The reasonings throughout his article, (the reviewer's,) are much the same as those usually brought against Episcopacy; and where they are not the same, they are so much *minus* the former ground," etc. "No one, for three years, brought these old reasonings against the tract,—no one, till the reviewer fancied he had discovered a weak spot in it, and might, therefore, re-produce some of them with effect." "The present is only a start in its slumber." And again, on p. 15, the author of the reply speaks of the reviewer, as one whom he suspects "to be a *new comer* into this field of controversy," if not with the intention, at least with the *appearance*, of designing to disparage the force of the arguments, which the reviewer had urged. Now, it is unnecessary for us to remind Dr. Onderdonk, that the inquiry is not, whether the arguments are old or new, but whether they are pertinent and valid. Nor is the question, whether one is a "new comer" into this controversy. Arguments may not be the less cogent and unanswerable, for being urged by one who has not before entered the lists; nor will arguments from the bible be satisfactorily met, by an affirmation, that they are urged by one unknown in the field of debate. It may be proper, however, for us to observe, in self-vindication, that the arguments which we urged, were drawn from no other book than the bible. The "Tract" and the new testament, were the only books before us in the preparation of the article. The course of argument suggested, was that only which was produced by the investigation of the

scriptures. Whether we have fallen into any train of thinking, which has been before urged by writers on this subject, we do not even now know, nor are we likely to know; as it is our fixed purpose, not to travel out of the record before us,—the inspired account of the matter in the sacred scriptures. If, however, the arguments which we have urged, be “the same with those which are usually brought against Episcopacy,” (p. 8.) it furnishes a case of coincidence of results, in investigating the new testament, which is itself some evidence, that the objections to Episcopacy are such, as obviously occur to different minds, engaged in independent investigation.

When the reply appeared, it became a question with us, whether the controversy should be prolonged. A perusal of the “Answer” did not suggest any necessity for departing from our original intention, *not* to engage in such a controversy. It did not appear to furnish any new argument, which seemed to call for notice, or to invalidate any of the positions defended in the review. Almost the whole of the “Answer” appeared to be simply an *expansion* of a note in the tract, (p. 12, note z.) which, when the review was prepared, seemed not to furnish an argument, that required particular attention. The fact, too, that *then* the argument was expressed in a *note*, in small type, and at the bottom of the page, was an indication, that it was not of much magnitude, in the eye of the author of the tract himself. Why it is now *expanded*, so as to constitute the very body and essence of the reply, is to us proof, that the subject, on the *Episcopal* side, is exhausted. This fact is of such a nature, as to impress the mind strongly with the belief, that henceforth nothing remains to be added, in the effort to “Test Episcopacy by Scripture.”

In departing from our original purpose, it is our wish to reciprocate the kind feeling and candor of the author of the “Tract,” and of the “Answer.” Truth, not victory, is our object. We have but one wish on this subject. It is, that the principles upon which God designed to establish and govern his holy church, may be developed and understood. We resume the subject, with profound and undiminished respect for the talents, the piety, and the learning of the author of the Tract and Answer; and with a purpose, that this shall be *final*, on our part, unless something new, and vital to the subject, shall be added. In this, as well as in all other things, our desire is, not to write one line, which, dying,—or in heaven,

—we would wish to blot.

Still, this desire, so deeply cherished, does not forbid a full and free examination of arguments. Our conscientious belief is, that the *superiority* “in ministerial power and rights,” (Tract, p. 15.)

claimed by Episcopal bishops, is a superiority known in the Episcopal churches only, and not in the new testament; and this we purpose to show.

In entering upon our examination of the "Answer," we may remark, that the scriptural argument for Episcopacy is now fairly and entirely before the world. On the Episcopal side, nothing material to be said, can remain. The *whole* argument is in the Tract, and in the Answer. If Episcopacy is not established in these, we may infer, that it is not in the bible. If not in the bible, it is not "necessarily binding." (Tract, p. 3.) To this conclusion,—that the whole of the material part of the scriptural argument is before the world, in these pamphlets,—we are conducted, by the fact, that neither talent, learning, zeal, nor time, have been wanting, in order to present it; that their author entered on the discussion, manifestly acquainted with *all* that was to be said; that the subject has now been before the public more than four years; (See advertisement to the Tract.) and that, during that time, it is to be presumed, if there had been any more *material* statements to be presented from the bible, they would have appeared in the "Answer." There is much advantage in examining an argument, with the conviction, that nothing more remains to be said; and that we may, therefore, contemplate it as an unbroken and unimproveable whole, without the possibility of any addition to the number of the arguments, or increase of their strength. On this vantage-ground we now stand, to contemplate the argument in support of the stupendous fabric of Episcopacy in the christian church.

In entering upon this examination, we are struck with—what we had indeed anticipated,—a very strong inclination, on the part of the author of the tract, to appeal again to certain "extraneous" authorities, of which we heard nothing in the tract itself, except to disclaim them. The tract commenced with the bold and startling announcement, that if Episcopacy has not the authority of scripture, it is not "necessarily binding." p. 3. "No argument," the tract goes on to say, "*is worth taking into the account*, that has not a palpable bearing on the clear and naked topic,—the scriptural evidence of Episcopacy." p. 3. We have italicised a part of this quotation, to call the attention of our readers particularly to it. The affirmation, so unusual in the mouth of an Episcopalian, is, that no argument is WORTH TAKING INTO THE ACCOUNT, that does not bear on the scriptural proof. Now we anticipated that, if a reply was made to our review, from any quarter, we should find a qualification of this statement, and a much more complacent regard shown to the fathers, and to other "*extraneous considerations*," (Tract, p. 4.) than would be consistent with this unqualified disclaimer, in the tract. The truth is, that the fathers are regarded as too material witnesses, to be so

readily abandoned. The 'tradition of the elders,' has been too long pressed into the service of the Episcopacy; there has been too conscious a sense of the weakness of the scriptural proof, to renounce heartily, entirely, and forever, all reliance on other proof than the new testament. The "Answer" would have lacked a very material feature which we expected to find in it, if there had been no inclination manifested, to plunge into this abyss of traditional history, where light and darkness struggle together, and no wish to recall the testimony of uninspired antiquity, to the service of prelacy. Accordingly, we were prepared for the following declaration, which we quote entire, from pp. 3 and 4, of the Answer:—

'Because the author of the tract rested the claims of episcopacy finally on scripture—because he fills a high office in the church—and because the tract is issued by so prominent an episcopal institution as the "Press," the reviewer seems to think, that episcopalians are now to abandon all arguments not drawn directly from the holy volume. Not at all. The author of the tract, in his sermon at the consecration of the four bishops, in October, 1832, advocated episcopacy, besides on other grounds, on that of there being several grades of office in the priesthoods of all religions, false as well as true, and in all civil magistracies and other official structures,—and, in his late Charge, he adverted to the evidence in its favor contained in the Fathers. And the "Press," at the time it issued the tract, issued also with it, in the "Works on Episcopacy," those of Dr. Bowden and Dr. Cooke, which embrace the argument at large. There is no reason, therefore, for thinking, that, however a single writer may use selected arguments in a single publication, either he or other episcopalians will (or should) narrow the ground they have usually occupied. The Fathers are consulted on this subject, because the fabric of the ministry which they describe forms an historical basis for interpreting scripture. And general practice, in regard to distinct grades among officers, throws a heavier burden of disproof on those whose interpretations are adverse to episcopacy: this latter topic we shall again notice before we close.'

This passage, so far from insisting, as the Tract had done, that no argument *was worth taking into the account*, except the scriptural proof, refers distinctly to the following points, which we beg leave to call "*extraneous considerations*," as proof of Episcopacy. (1.) The fact, that there "are several grades of office in the priesthood of all religions;" (2.) That the same thing occurs "in all civil magistracies, and other official structures;" (3.) The evidence of the fathers; and, (4.) "Other grounds," which the author informs us he had insisted on, in an ordination sermon, in 1832. And in this very passage, he makes the following remarkable statement, which we propose soon to notice further: "The fathers are consulted on the subject, because the fabric of the minis-

try which they describe, forms an historical basis for interpreting scripture."

Slight circumstances often show strong inclinations, and habits of mind. How strong a hold this reference to other "considerations" than the scriptures, has taken upon the mind of the author of the Tract, and how reluctant he was to part with the "extraneous" argument from the fathers, is shown by the fact, that he again recurs to it in the "Answer," and presents it at much greater length. Thus on pp. 18, 19, at the very close of the Answer, we are presented with the following recurrence to the argument from other considerations than the scriptures :—

'One word more concerning the "burden of proof," as contrasted with the "presumptive argument." The tract claimed no presumption in its favor, in seeking for the scriptural proofs of episcopacy. We do—a presumption founded on *common sense*, as indicated by common practice. Set aside parity and episcopacy, and then look at *other systems of office*, both religious and civil, and you find *several grades* of officers. In the Patriarchal church, there was the distinction of "high-priests" and "priest." In the Jewish church, (common sense being, in this case unquestionably, divinely approved,) there were the high-priest, priests, and levites. Among Pagans and Mahomedans, there are various grades in the office deemed sacred. Civil governments have usually governors, a president, princes, a king, an emperor, &c., as the heads of the general, or state, or provincial magistracies. In armies and navies, there is always a chief. If the reviewer should claim exceptions, we reply they are exceptions only, and very few in number. The *general rule* is with us. That general rule, next to universal, is, that among officers, there is a *difference* of power, of rights, of rank, of grade, call it what you will. And this general rule gives a *presumption* that such will also be the case in the christian church. We go to scripture then with the presumptive argument fully against parity. If we should find in scripture neither imparity nor parity, still *common sense* decides for the former. If we find the tone of scripture doubtful, on this point, imparity has the advantage, common sense turning the scale. If we find there intimations, less than positive injunctions, in favor of imparity, common sense, besides the respect due to scripture, decides for our interpretation of them. And if any thing in scripture is supposed to prove or to justify parity, it must be very explicit, to overturn the suggestion of common sense. The "presumptive argument," then, is clearly with *us*, and the "burden of proof" lies on parity. Let the reviewer peruse the tract again, bearing in mind the principles laid down in this paragraph, and he will, we trust, think better of it.'

These observations, it will be remembered, are made by the same writer, and in connection with the same subject, as the declaration, that "NO ARGUMENT IS WORTH TAKING INTO THE ACCOUNT, *that has not a palpable bearing on the clear and naked topic,—the scriptural evidence of Episcopacy.*"

Now, against the principles of interpretation here stated, and which the Tract led us to suppose were abandoned, we enter our decided and solemn protest. The question,—the only question in the case, is, Whether Episcopacy “has the authority of scripture?” (Tract, p. 3.) The affirmation is, that if it has not, “it is not necessarily binding.” (p. 3.) The principle of interpretation, which in the Answer is introduced, to guide us in this inquiry, is, that “the fathers are consulted on the subject, because the fabric of the ministry which they describe, forms an historical basis for interpreting scripture.” (Answer, p. 3.) In order to understand the bearing of this rule of interpretation, it is necessary to know what it means. A “basis” is defined to be “the foundation of a thing; that on which a thing stands or lies; that on which it rests; the ground-work or first principle; that which supports.” *Webster*. An “*historical basis*” must mean, therefore, that the opinions, or facts of history, that is, in this case, the testimony of the fathers, constitute the *foundation, the ground-work, or first principle*, of the interpretation of the bible; or that on which such an interpretation *rests*, or by which *it is supported*. It would seem to follow, therefore, that, unless we first become acquainted with this “historical basis,” we are wholly in the dark about the proper interpretation of the bible, and that our interpretation is destitute of any true support and authority. To this principle of interpretation, in this case, and in all others, the objections are obvious and numerous. (1.) Our first objection lies against the supposed necessity of having any such previously ascertained *basis*, in order to a just interpretation of the oracles of God. We object wholly to the doctrine, that the scriptures are to be interpreted by historical facts to be developed long after the book was written. The great mass of men are wholly incompetent to enter into any such “historical” inquiry; but the great mass of men are not unqualified to understand the general drift and tenor of the new testament. (2.) The statement is, that “the fabric of the ministry which they describe,” is to be the basis of such interpretation. But who knows what the fabric of the ministry which they describe, is? It is to be remembered, that the question is not respecting the ministry in the fourth century and onwards. But the inquiry,—and the only one of material value in any supposition,—pertains to the fathers previous to that period. And there every thing is unsettled. Prelacy claims the fathers in that unknown age. The papacy claims the fathers there. Presbyterianism claims the fathers there. Congregationalism and Independency too, claim them there. Every thing is unsettled and chaotic. And this is the very point which has been the interminable subject of contention in this whole inquiry, and from which we hoped we had escaped, by the principles laid down in the Tract. Yet the position *now* advanced, would

lead us again into all the difficulties, and controversies, and jostling elements, and contradictory statements, which have always attended the appeal to the fathers. If we are to wait until we have ascertained "the fabric of the ministry" which these fathers describe, before we have a "basis" for interpreting scripture, we may close the new testament in despair. (3.) This canon of interpretation is contrary to the rule which Dr. Onderdonk has himself laid down in the Tract itself. (p. 3.) In that instance, the authority of the scriptures was declared to be ample, and final. And throughout the Tract, there is a manifest indication of a belief, that the bible is susceptible of interpretation, on the acknowledged rules of language, and the principles of common sense. We hailed such a manifestation, not only as auspicious to the cause of truth in regard to the claims of Episcopacy, but because it evinced the spirit to which the church *must* come,—of a direct, unqualified, and final appeal to the word of God,—to determine religious doctrine. To that standard, we mean to adhere. And, as far as in us lies, we intend to hold it up to the view of men, and to insist on the great truth from which nothing shall ever divert us, and from which we fervently pray the church may never be diverted, that we are not to look for the discovery of truth, by ascertaining *first* an "historical basis," or, a set of instruments by which we are to measure and adjust the proportions of truth which we find in the revelation of God. Without any design to disparage or undervalue the fathers, whom we sincerely reverence, as having been holy, bold, and venerable men; without any blindness, as we believe, to the living luster of that piety which led many of them to the stake; without any apprehension, that their testimony, when examined, would be found to be on the side of Episcopacy,—for it remains yet to be seen, that the fathers of the first two centuries ever dreamed of the pride and domination which subsequently crept into the church, and assumed the form of prelacy and popery: without any thing to influence us, so far as we know, from any of these "extraneous" sources, we intend to do all in our power to extend and perpetuate the doctrine, that the ultimate appeal in all religious inquiry, is to be the bible, and the bible only. "The bible," said Chillingworth, "is the religion of the Protestants." We rejoice, to hear this sentiment echoed from the assistant bishop of Pennsylvania. And without meaning to insinuate, that this sentiment is not as honestly acted on by Episcopalians, as by any other denomination of christians, we may add, that we deem the first sentence of the Tract worthy to be written in letters of gold, on the posts of every Episcopal sanctuary, and over every altar, and on the cover of every "Book of Common Prayer." "*The claim of Episcopacy to be of divine institution, and therefore obligatory on the church, rests fundamentally on the one question,—Has it the authority of*

scripture? *If it has not, it is not necessarily binding.*" (4.) Our fourth objection to this rule of interpretation is, that it is, substantially, that on which rests the papal hierarchy. We do not know, that the papist would wish to express his principles of interpretation in stronger language, than that "the fathers are consulted on this subject, because the fabric of the ministry which they describe, forms an historical basis for interpreting scripture." To us it seems, that this would express all that they ask; and as we doubt not, that Dr. Onderdonk would shrink from any approximation to the papacy, quite as firmly as ourselves, we deem it necessary merely to suggest the consideration, to render the objection at once satisfactory to his own mind.

We object, also, to the principle of interpretation advanced on p. 18, of the Answer, which we have already quoted. The fact there assumed, is, that various orders of men are observable in civil governments, etc.; and hence, that there is presumptive evidence, that such orders are to be found in the scriptures. We are not ignorant of the purpose for which this fact is adduced. It is to show, that the "burden of proof" does not lie so entirely on the Episcopalian, as we had affirmed in the review. We admit, to some extent, the modifying force of the circumstances, so far as the "burden of proof" is concerned. But it merely *lightens* the burden; it does not *remove* it. Presumption, in such a case, is not proof. When the fact affirmed relates to a doctrine of the bible, it is not sufficient to say, that that fact occurred elsewhere, and *therefore* it must occur in the bible. It is still the business of the Episcopalian, to *prove* his affirmation from the new testament itself, that bishops are superior to other ministers of the gospel, in ministerial power and rights. This is *his* affirmation; this is the point which he urges; this is to be made out from the bible *only*; and assuredly the fact, that there are dukes, and earls, and emperors, and admirals, and nabobs, forms, at best, a *very slight* presumption in favor of the affirmation, that the ministry of the gospel consists of three 'orders.' But our objections may be further stated. *So far as the presumption goes, it is not particularly in favor of Episcopacy, as consisting in THREE orders of the clergy.* For, (1.) The fact is not, that there are three orders observable every where. It is, that there are many orders and ranks of civil officers and of men. (2.) The presumption drawn from what has taken place, would be rather in favor of despotism, and the papacy. (3.) The presumption is equally met by the doctrine of Presbyterianism, as by prelacy. Presbyterians hold equally to a division of their community into various ranks,—into bishops, and elders, and deacons, and people. The presumption, drawn from the fact, that civil society is thus broken up, is as really in their favor, as in favor of Episcopacy. (4.) The Con-

gregationalist may urge it with the same propriety. His community registers the names of his minister, *and* deacons, *and* church, *and* congregation, each with distinct privileges and rights. If Dr. Onderdonk should reply to this, that his remark referred only to the distinction of "*systems of office*, both religious and civil," (p. 18.) and "that among *officers*, there is a difference of power and rights." (p. 19.) we reply, that the distinction of *officers* pertains to other churches, as well as the Episcopal. No non-Episcopalian, perhaps, can be found, who holds to a *parity* of *office*. He will refer, at once, to his minister, to his elders, to his deacons, as evincing sufficient *disparity*, to meet the full force of the *presumption* alledged by Dr. Onderdonk. But our main objection here, as before, is to the principle of interpretation. We respectfully insist, that it should be laid aside, as an "extraneous consideration," in the inquiry, whether Episcopacy "has the authority of scripture."

In our review, we stated, that the burden of proof, in this inquiry, was laid wholly on the friends of Episcopacy. (p. 7.) This point was so obvious, that we did not think it necessary to illustrate it at length. Nor do we now intend to do more than merely, by adverting to it, to recall it to the attention of our readers. The author of the "Answer" has endeavored to *remove* this burden from himself and his friends. (p. 4, and p. 18.) This he has done, by attempting to show, that there is a *presumptive* argument in favor of Episcopacy; which presumption throws the task of *proving* the parity of the clergy on those who advocate it. Now we are not disposed to enter into a controversy on this point. To us it seemed, and still seems, to be a plain case, that where it was affirmed, that the clergy of the christian church was separated, by divine authority, into three grades, or orders, and that *one* of those orders had the *exclusive* right of ordination, of discipline, and of general superintendence; it could not be a matter requiring much deliberation, to know where rested the burden of proof. If a man assumes authority over an army, demanding the subordination of all other officers to his will, it is not a very unreasonable presumption, that the burden of proof lies with him; nor would it be the *obvious* course, to expect the entire mass of officers to show, that he had *not* received such a commission. We shall, therefore, feel ourselves to be pursuing a very obvious course, if we do not recognize the authority of Episcopal bishops, unless there is proof positive of their commission. We may add further, that in the supposed case of the commander of the army or the navy, we should not regard that as a very satisfactory proof, which was pursued with as little directness and explicitness, as are evinced in the argument to establish the original domination and perpetuity of the prelatical office. And in this connection we may remark, that it

is perfectly immaterial, as to the main point, what may be the opinion of the man who calls the claim in question, or what may be the particular denomination to which he is attached. Whether he is an Independent, a Presbyterian, or a Congregationalist, it may be equally true, that the bishop of the Episcopal church is unable to make out his claims from the new testament. The only material point, in which *all* other denominations are agreed, is, that the ministers of the new testament are on an *equality*, in the respect under consideration; that the power of ordaining, and administering discipline, and of superintending the concerns of the church, is intrusted to them, as equals, in opposition to the exclusive and exalted assumptions of a few, who claim the right to deprive them of these powers, and to make their ministrations null and void. And when claims of this order are advanced,—claims designed to dispossess the great mass of the ministry throughout the world, of the right of transmitting their office to others; of exercising government and discipline in their own pastoral charges; of superintending and controlling the affairs of the particular portion of the church universal, with which they are specifically intrusted; when claims like these are presented, tending to degrade them from their office, to annihilate their authority, and to leave their charges without a ministry;—we may respectfully insist, that the proof of this should be drawn, by no circumlocution, from the bible. We wish to see, with great pertinency, the chapter, and the verse: we can with difficulty resist the impression, that it should be done *totidem verbis*, or at least, so nearly so, that there could be no possibility of mistake.

We may here remind our readers, of the precise points which Episcopacy is called upon to make out. The *first* is, that the apostles were “distinguished from the elders, because they were *superior* to them in ministerial power and rights.” (Tract, p. 15.) The *second* is, that this distinction “was so persevered in, as to indicate, that it was a *permanent* arrangement.” (Tract, p. 23.) These are independent propositions. One by no means follows from the other. Should the first be admitted, yet the second is to be established by equally explicit and independent proof. Nay, the second is by far the most material point, and should, as we shall show, be fortified by the most irrefragable arguments. The *third* point, indispensable to the other two, is, that there is no evidence in the new testament, that presbyters, or elders, discharged the functions which are now claimed for bishops; that is, that they either (1.) ordained, or (2.) exercised discipline, or (3.) exerted a general supervision. (Tract, p. 11.) Unless then it is shown, that not *one* of these functions was ever performed by presbyters, the Episcopal claim fails of support, and must be abandoned. These

are independent positions, and a failure in one, is a failure in the whole.

To a cursory review of what can be said on these points, we now propose to call the attention of our readers.

The *first* claim asserted, is, that the apostles were "distinguished from the elders, because they were *superior* to them, in ministerial power and rights." (Tract, p. 15.) The points of their alledged superiority, are, exclusive ordination, exclusive discipline, exclusive confirmation, and exclusive right of general superintendence. The question is, whether this is the nature of the superiority, with which the apostles were intrusted; or, which is the same thing, Were *these the purposes for which they were set apart to the apostolic office, and for which they were called apostles?* Dr. Onderdonk affirms it; we take the liberty, most respectfully, of calling for explicit proof of it, from the new testament.

His direct proof is contained in a nut-shell. It consists of *one* expression of scripture: (Acts, xv. 2, 4, 6, 22; xvi. 4.) "Apostles *and* elders," "apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren;" and a note on p. 12, of the tract, and in the reply, expanded to more than two pages, showing that, in his apprehension, they administered discipline. As this is the basis on which the whole fabric is reared, and as it embraces the very gist of the "Answer," we shall be pardoned for adverting to it with some particularity.

We may then inquire, why the apostles were distinguished from the elders, or presbyters. Dr. Onderdonk affirms, that it was because they were "superior in ministerial power and rights." The argument on this subject, from the new testament, is, that the two classes of men are *distinguished* from each other, (Acts, xv. 2, 4, 6, 22; xvi. 4.) by the following expressions; "apostles *and* elders," "apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren." Now in regard to this *proof*, we beg leave to make the following remarks.

(1.) That it is the *only* direct passage of scripture, which Dr. O. is able to adduce, on the subject of the alledged superiority of the apostles. Its importance, in his view, may be seen from the fact, that it is not merely the *only* proof, but, that it is repeated not less than five times, in the space of less than a single page of the tract; (pp. 14, 15.) and that it occupies a similar prominence in the Answer. The tract has been written four years. Diligent research during that time, it would be supposed, might have led to the discovery of some *other* text, that had a bearing on the point. But the matter still rests here. There is no other text; and the fabric is to be sustained on the solitary expression, "apostles *and* elders," "apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren."

(2.) What does this passage prove? It proves this, and no more, that there was a distinction, of *some sort*, between the apos-

tles *and* elders,—which is a point of just as much importance, as when we affirm, that one class were called apostles, *and* another called elders. But it is difficult for us to see, how this determines any thing respecting the *reasons* of the distinction. In Ephesians, iv. 11, the apostle affirms, that God gave some, apostles ; *and* some, prophets ; *and* some, evangelists ; *and* some, pastors and teachers. Here *a* distinction is made out. But is the *nature* of the distinction thereby ascertained ? I speak of guineas *and* doubloons, *and* guilders. I affirm a distinction, indeed ; but is its *nature* ascertained ? Have I determined, that the guinea is, *therefore*, superior in weight or value to the others ?

(3.) We have never denied, that there was a distinction between the apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren. The very fact, that they had the name apostles, shows, that there must have been some distinction, or some reason why they were so called. Unusual discernment, or labored argument, surely, are not necessary to perceive this. But the very point is, *what* is the *nature* of this distinction ? And this is to be settled, not by the use of the word, but by the statement in the new testament ; and it is incumbent on the Episcopalian to show, by *proof-texts*, that it was *because* the apostles were superior, in the power of ordination, of confirmation, of discipline, and of general superintendence of a diocese. Dr. Onderdonk *affirmed*, that the name was not so given, because they were appointed by Christ personally ; nor because they had seen the Lord after his resurrection ; nor because they had the power of working miracles : and then observed, that “it followed, *or* would not be questioned, that it was because they were superior in ministerial power and rights.” (Tract, p. 15.) It seems not to have occurred to him, that they could be appointed to be WITNESSES of his entire ministry, including the fact of his resurrection, as a main point. We took the liberty, therefore, of examining this matter, as very material to the argument. We proved, (1.) That in the original appointment of the apostles, there was no reference to their superiority, in the powers of ordination, discipline, etc. (Review, p. 10.) This position we supported by the three separate accounts of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. (2.) That no such thing occurred in the instructions of our Lord, after his resurrection from the dead. This also we confirmed, by an examination of the testimony of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, in neither of whose gospels was there found a vestige of such instructions. (Review, p. 10.) (3.) That there was no where else in the new testament, any account, that what Dr. O. affirmed, as the peculiarity of the apostolic office, was known to the writers. This conclusion we rested upon our own examination, and the fact, that Dr. O. had not adduced any such passage. (4.) That the reason of the appointment to the apostolic office *was expressly af-*

firmed; and, that it was *not* that which Dr. O. supposed it to be. We showed, (a) that it was expressly affirmed, in the original appointment, (Luke, xxiv. 48. Matt. xxviii. 18, 19.) that they should be *WITNESSES of these things*; (Review, p. 12.) (b) that this was expressly provided for, in the case of the election of one to fill the place vacated by Judas; (Acts, i. 21, 22.) (c) that this was the account which the apostles uniformly gave, of the design of their appointment; (see p. 13.) (d) that the same thing was again expressly provided for, in the case of the apostle Paul, and, that *in order* to a qualification for that office, he was permitted to "SEE the Just one," the Lord Jesus; (Acts, xxii. 14.) and, (e) that he himself expressly appeals to the fact, as a proof, that he was fully invested with the apostolic office. 1 Cor. ix. 1, 2. (See Review, p. 15.) In the course of the argument, we adduced not less than *twenty* explicit passages of scripture, bearing directly on the point, and proving, beyond dispute, that this was the design of the appointment to the apostolic office. Our purpose in this, was evident. It was to show, that the peculiarity of the apostolic office was of such a nature, that it could not be transmitted to distant generations; but, that it had a specific, yet very important design, which, as a matter of course, must cease.

With deep interest, therefore, we opened the "Answer," to ascertain how this array of scriptural argument was met. We did not deem it unreasonable to suppose, that there would be some new attempt to show, that the peculiarity of the apostolic office, was to ordain; that the passages of scripture on which we had relied, were irrelevant; or, that other passages might be adduced in proof of what Dr. O. had affirmed to be the peculiarity of the apostolic office, and which we had respectfully denied. Our readers will join with us in our '*amazement*,' to find the following, as the result of an examination of the "Answer."

(1.) A solemn, and somewhat pompous re-adducing of the expression, (Acts, xv.) "the apostles *and* elders," "the apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren;" (Answer, p. 7.) a passage, maintaining still its solitary dignity, and reposing in the "Answer," as it had in the "Tract," in its own lonely grandeur. We could not restrain our '*amazement*,' that no other passages were even referred to, on this material point; and we came to the conclusion, that we had reached an end of the argument, so far as direct scripture proof was concerned.

(2.) We found a notice of our extended array of proof-texts, showing what was the design of the apostolic appointment, of a character so remarkable, that we shall quote it entire.

'The reviewer, in order to show what *he* thinks was the point in which the apostles excelled the elders, in the matter in question, dwells

largely on the fact, that they were *special* witnesses of our Lord's resurrection,—and with the help of CAPITAL and *italic* letters, he has certainly made a showy argument. But nobody denies, that they were the special witnesses,—or, that they were distinguished from the elders, as well as from others called apostles,—the tract gave due attention to both these particulars. The point is,—was *this* distinction the one that led to the expression, “apostles *and* elders?” Surely not. Among *those* apostles was Barnabas, and perhaps Silas,* neither of whom was a special witness of the resurrection. Besides, the expressions, “apostles *and* elders,” “apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren,” are used with immediate reference to the council at Jerusalem,—and the reviewer is more acute than we pretend to be, if he can say why, in a council, acting on questions concerning ‘idols, blood, things strangled, and licentiousness,’ the special witnesses of the resurrection should, *as such*, have peculiar authority. We really think the tract argues with more consistency, when it says, that the apostles were *ministerially* above the elders.’ Answer, p. 16.

Here, it will be observed, there is no notice taken of the texts, which we had adduced, as irrelevant, or unsatisfactory in number, or as unfairly interpreted. Dr. Onderdonk, if he was the writer of the Answer, deemed it an ample notice of those texts, to remark, that, “with the help of CAPITAL and *italic* letters, he (the reviewer,) had certainly made a showy argument.” (Answer, p. 16.) That our argument was *thus* noticed, was, indeed, to us a matter of ‘amazement.’ It was, however, an indication,—of which we were not slow to avail ourselves, and the hold upon which, we shall not be swift to lose,—that our proof-texts were *ad rem*, and that they settled the question. When all that the assistant bishop of Pennsylvania deems it proper to say, of our array of more than twenty explicit declarations of the word of God, is, that, by the help of capitals and italics, they constitute a “SHOWY argument,” (we mean no disrespect, when we display the word in a *showy* form,) we deem the conclusion to be inevitable, that our texts are just what we intended they should be,—that they settled the question,—and, to use an expression from the favorite chapter of the Acts of the apostles, we “rejoice for the consolation.” Acts, xv. 31.

(3.) Though we were not met by any new proof-texts, or by any answer to our own, we were referred to the sentiments of the following distinguished men, viz.: the late Dr. Wilson, Dr. Miller, Dr. Campbell, Matthew Henry, “the *divines* who argued with Charles I, in the isle of Wight,” and Calvin, to prove, that the apostles were superior to the elders, and the evangelists. (Answer, p. 10.) Respecting these authorities, we may be permitted to remark, (1.) that we shall probably not yield, out of regard to their

* Acts, xiv. 14; xv. 2, 4, 22. 1 Thess. i. 1; ii. 6.

names, to any persons. With us, they have all the authority which uninspired men can ever be allowed to have. The writer of the review may be permitted to remark, perhaps, that he has occasion of peculiar respect for two of those venerable men. By one,—whose superior, in profound powers of reasoning, in varied and extensive learning, and in moral worth, he believes, is not now to be found among the living, in any American church,—he was preceded in the office which he now holds. At the feet of the other, it has been his privilege to sit, for nearly four years, and to receive the instructions of wisdom from his lips; and, whatever skill he may have in conducting this argument, on the government of the churches, he owes to the “basis” which was laid by those instructions. Whatever may be said, therefore, of these authorities adduced in the “Answer,” will not be traced to want of respect for these venerable names. But, (2.) we may remark, that in *this* argument, the authorities of uninspired men are to be laid out of the account. With all due deference to them, and to Dr. O., we must be permitted to believe, that their authority belongs to the “extraneous considerations,” as well as that of the opinion of Cranmer, (Answer, p. 5.) which, by common consent, it had been agreed to lay out of the controversy. (See Tract, pp. 3—10. Review, p. 5.) Our wonder is, that after the disclaimer of relying on these extraneous considerations, in the tract, the author of the Answer should have occupied nearly two pages, with the statements of these distinguished men. (3.) Their authority, even when adduced, does not bear on the point before us. The question is, whether the apostles were superior to other ministers of the gospel, in ministerial power and rights? that is, in the power of ordination, confirmation, discipline, and general superintendence. Their authorities adduced, prove only, that in the judgment of these venerable men, they were superior, in some respects, to evangelists, and teachers; or, that there was a distinction between them,—a point on which we make no denial. On the only question in debate, they make no affirmation. On the claim set up by Episcopalians, that the apostles were superior in *ordination*, etc., they concede nothing, nor did they believe a word of it.

Having thus noticed the “Answer” on this part of our argument, we shall dismiss it. We do it by simply reminding our readers, that the solitary text, which undisputed learning, talents and zeal, have discovered, during a period of more than four years, since the discussion first commenced,—the lonely scripture proof of the sweeping claims, that the apostles *only*, had the power of ordination, and that this was the peculiarity of the office,—stands forth in the Tract, and in the Answer: “the apostles *and* elders,” “apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren!”

But the author of the “Answer” complains, (p. 11.) that we

did not give the 'whole' of his argument on the subject; and he refers to a note on p. 12, of the Tract, designed to show, that the apostles had the power of administering discipline, and that therefore they were superior to the presbyters, or held a more elevated grade of office. The note is this:—

'That the apostles alone *ordained*, will be proved. In 1 Cor. iv. 19–21; v. 3–5; 2 Cor. ii. 6; vii. 12; x. 8; xiii. 2, 10; and 1 Tim. i. 20; are recorded inflictions and remissions of *discipline* performed by an apostle, or threatenings on his part, although there must have been elders in Corinth, and certainly were in Ephesus.'

This note he expands into an argument, which constitutes the most material part of the "Answer." It is incumbent upon us to examine it, and to ascertain how far it goes to settle the point under discussion. Before examining the particular cases referred to, we would remind our readers, that the purpose for which they are adduced, is to show, that the apostles were *superior to presbyters in power and rights*; and the alledged proof is, that *they administered discipline*. To bear on the case, therefore, the passages must prove not only that *they exercised discipline*, but, (1.) That they did it *as apostles*, or in virtue of the apostolic office; (2.) That they did it in churches where there were presbyters; and, (3.) That presbyters *never* administered discipline themselves. The *second* point here adverted to, is all that the author of the "Answer" feels himself called upon to make out. (Answer, pp. 11–13.) Now in regard to this point of the proof, we make the following general remarks: (1.) There were certainly, in all, fourteen apostles; and if we may credit the writer of these pamphlets, and reckon Timothy, and Barnabas, and Sylvanus, and Apollos, and Andronicus, and Junia, and Titus, and perhaps half a dozen others, there were somewhat more than a score invested with this office; yet it is remarkable, that the only cases of discipline referred to, as going to prove the superiority of the whole college of apostles, are cases in which the apostle Paul only was concerned. (2.) There are accounts in the new testament of perhaps some hundreds of churches; and yet, we meet with no instance of the kind of discipline relied on, except in the single churches of Corinth and Ephesus. It is incredible, that there should have been no other cases of discipline in these churches. But if there were, the presumption is, that they were settled without the intervention of an apostle. (3.) These very cases, as we shall presently show, were cases in which Paul administered the rod of discipline in the churches where Titus and Timothy,—apostles also and bishops,—were present, by the showing of the author of the "Answer," and thus were acts of manifest disrespect for the authority of those prelates. And if the fact, that the discipline was administered where there were presbyters,

(Answer, pp. 11, 12.) proves that the apostle was superior to them, the same fact proves, that he was superior to Timothy and Titus. The course of the argument urged by the author of the "Answer," would be, that Paul was disposed to assume the whole power into his own hands, and to set aside the claims alike of bishops and presbyters. It has a very undesirable looking towards the authority claimed by the papacy.

The two cases alledged as proof, that the apostles *only* had the power of administering discipline, are those at Corinth and at Ephesus. Paul wrote fourteen epistles, and wrote them to eight churches. In all these epistles, and in all the numerous churches of which he had the charge, (2 Cor. xi. 28, "the care of all the churches.") these are the only instances in which he was called, so far as appears, to exercise discipline. We now inquire, whether he did it for the purpose of showing, that the apostles *only* had this power?

The first case alledged, is that at Corinth. "In 1 Cor. iv. 19—21, etc., are recorded inflictions and remissions of *discipline* performed by an apostle, or threatenings on his part; although there must have been elders at Corinth." (Note z, Tract, p. 12.) The *argument* here is, that there must have been elders at Corinth, and yet that Paul interposed over their heads to inflict discipline. This is the whole of the argument. (See Answer, p. 11.)

In reply to these, we observe: That there were elders, teachers, ministers, instructors in Corinth, we think is placed beyond a question, by the argument of the "Answer," and by the nature of the case. This fact we do not intend to call in question. The *argument* of the "Answer" from this fact, we state in the author's own words:—

'Yet, without noticing these elders in the matter, so far as the epistles show—though they doubtless were noticed and consulted, as much as courtesy and their pastoral standing made proper—without putting the matter into their hands, or even passing it through their hands, Paul threatens, inflicts, and remits *discipline* among the people of their charge. This is a "ministerial" act. And Paul's doing it himself, instead of committing it to the elders, shows that he, an apostle, was "*superior* to them in ministerial power and rights."' p. 11.

Further, if there were elders there, there was an "apostle;" a prelatical bishop, according to the Tract, there also. This is shown by a quotation from the epistle itself, relating to this very time, and in immediate connection with the case of discipline. (1 Cor. iv. 17.) "For this cause, [that is, on account of your divided and contending state,] have I sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved son and faithful in the Lord, who shall bring you into remembrance of my ways which be in Christ, as I teach every where in

every church." Now, as it will not be pretended by Episcopalians, that Timothy was not an "apostle," and as it is undeniable, that he was at that time at Corinth, the argument will as well apply to set aside *his* right to administer discipline in the case, as that of the elders. Borrowing, then, the words of the Answer, we would say: "Yet without noticing" this apostle "in the matter, so far as the epistles show,—though" he was "doubtless noticed and consulted, as much as courtesy and his" apostolical "standing made proper; without putting the matter into" his "hands, or even passing it through" his "hands, Paul threatens, inflicts, and remits *discipline*. This is a 'ministerial' act. And Paul's doing it himself, instead of committing it to" Timothy, "shows, that he, an apostle, was *superior* to" him "in ministerial power and rights." Now no Episcopalian will fail to be at once deeply impressed with the fallacy of this reasoning, in regard to the "apostle" and "bishop" Timothy. And yet, it is manifestly just as pertinent and forcible in his case, as it is for the purpose of the Answer in regard to the elders of Corinth. It cannot be pretended, that a difference existed, because the "elders" were *permanently* located there, and Timothy not; for the argument of the "Tract" and the "Answer" is, that the apostles were superior, *as apostles*, and therefore it made no difference on this point, whether they were at Corinth, or at Crete, or at Antioch; they were invested with the apostolic office every where. Our conclusion from this instance, and from the fact which we have now stated, is, that there was some peculiarity in the case at Corinth, which rendered the ordinary exercise of discipline by presbyters difficult; which operated equally against any interference by Timothy; and which called peculiarly for the interposition of the founder of the church, and of an inspired apostle,—for one clothed with authority to inflict a heavy judgment, here denominated "delivering unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh," (1 Cor. v. 5.)—a power which could be exercised by none then in Corinth. Our next inquiry is, whether there are any reasons for this opinion? The following we believe satisfactory:—

(1.) Paul had founded that church, (Acts xviii. 1–11.) and his interference in cases of discipline, would be regarded as peculiarly proper. There would be a natural and obvious deference to the founder of the church, which would render such an interposition in the highest degree appropriate. We are confirmed in this view, because he puts his authority *in this very case* on such a fact, and on the deference which was due to him as their spiritual father. 1 Cor. iv. 15. "For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not many FATHERS; for in Christ Jesus *I* have begotten you through the gospel."

(2.) The circumstances of the church at Corinth were such, evidently, as to render the ordinary exercise of discipline, by their

own elders, impossible. They were distracted; were rent into parties; were engaged in violent contention; and the authority, therefore, of one portion of the "teachers," and "instructors," would be disregarded by the other. Thus no united sentence could be agreed upon; and no judgment of a party could restore peace. An attempt to exercise discipline, would only enkindle party animosity, and produce strife. See Chap. i. 11—17. So great, evidently, was the contention, and so hopeless the task of allaying it by any ordinary means, that even *Timothy*, whom Paul had sent for the express purpose of bringing them into remembrance of his ways, (1 Cor. iv. 17.) could have no hope, by his own interference, of allaying it. It was natural, that it should be referred to the founder of the church, and to one who had the power of punishing the offender.

(3.) It is material to remark, that this was not an ordinary case of discipline. It was one, that required the severest exercise of authority, and in a form which was lodged only with those intrusted with the power of inflicting disease, or, as it is termed, "of delivering to satan for the destruction of the flesh." 1 Cor. v. 5. Such cases would inevitably devolve upon the apostles, as clothed with miraculous power; and such, beyond all controversy, was this case. It therefore proves nothing about the *ordinary* mode of administering discipline. This case had reached to such a degree of enormity; it had been suffered to remain so long; it had become so aggravated, that it was necessary to interpose in this awful manner, and to decide it. Yet,

(4.) The apostle supposes, that they *ought* to have exercised the usual discipline themselves. This is evident, we think, from a comparison of the following passages: 1 Cor. v. 9, 10, 11, 12, with v. 2. In these verses it is supposed, that they did themselves *usually* exercise discipline. Paul (ver. 9.) gave them the general direction, not to keep company with fornicators; that is, to exercise discipline on those who did. In ver. 11, he asks them,—in a manner shewing that the affirmative answer to the question expressed their usual practice,—whether they did not "judge those that were within?" that is, whether they did not ordinarily exercise discipline in the church? And in ver. 2, he supposes, that it *ought* to have been done in this case; and as it had *not* been done by them, and the affair had assumed special enormity, he exercised the miraculous power intrusted to him, by inflicting on the offender a grievous disease. (ver. 4, 5; comp. 1 Cor. xi. 30.)

(5.) It is evident that other churches did, in ordinary cases, exercise discipline without the intervention of an apostle. Thus, the church in Thessalonica,—where Episcopacy, with all its zeal, has never been able even to *conjecture*, that there was a diocesan bishop,—was directed to exercise discipline, in any instance where

the command of the inspired apostle was not obeyed. (2 Thess. iii. 14.) We shall soon make this point incontestible.

(6.) The circumstances of the early churches were such, as to make this apostolic intervention proper, and even indispensable, without supposing, that it was to be a permanent arrangement. They were ignorant and feeble. They had had little opportunity of learning the nature of christianity. In most cases, their founders were with them but a few weeks, and then left them under the care of elders ordained from among themselves. (Comp. Acts xiii, xiv. et passim.) Those elders would be poorly qualified to discharge the functions of their office; and they would be but little elevated, in character and learning, above the mass of the people. The churches must be imperfectly organized; unaccustomed to rigid discipline; exposed to many temptations; easily drawn into sin; and subject to great agitation and excitement. Even a great many subjects which may now be considered as settled, in morals and religion, would appear to them open for debate; and parties, as at Corinth, would easily be formed. (Comp. Acts xiv. xv; Rom. xiv. 1 Cor. viii.) In these circumstances, how natural was it for these churches to look for direction to the inspired men, who had founded them? and how natural, that such persons should interpose and settle important and difficult cases of discipline? And after these obvious considerations, are we to suppose, that the fact, that the apostle Paul, in *two* cases,—and two such cases only are recorded,—exercised an extraordinary act of discipline, is to be regarded as proof, that this power appertained *only* to the apostolic office, and was to be a permanent arrangement in the church? We confess our ‘amazement,’ that but *two* cases of apostolic interference are mentioned, during the long and active life of Paul; and we regard this as some evidence, that the churches were expected to exercise discipline, and actually did so, on their own members.

(7.) We are confirmed in our views on this point, from what is known to take place in organizing churches in heathen countries at the present day. Since we commenced this article, we were conversing with one of the American missionaries, stationed at Ceylon.* In the course of the conversation, he incidentally remarked, that the missionaries were obliged to retain the exercise of discipline in their own hands; and that, although the mission had been established more than fifteen years, yet the exercise of discipline had never been intrusted to the native converts. He farther observed, that the missionaries had been endeavoring to find persons, to whom they could intrust the discipline of the church, as elders, but that as yet they had not found one. The native con-

* Rev. Mr. Winslow.

verts were still ignorant of the laws of christianity; they had so little influence in the church; they were so partial to each other, even when in fault; that thus far, discipline,—though somewhat frequent acts of discipline were necessary,—was retained in the hands of the missionaries. Substantially the same thing must have occurred in the early churches in Asia Minor, in Syria, and Greece. Will Dr. Onderdonk infer, that because Mr. Winslow, Mr. Poor, and Dr. Scudder, in Ceylon, have found it necessary to retain the power of administering discipline, that therefore they are diocesan bishops, and that they do not contemplate, that the churches in Ceylon shall be other than prelatical? If not, his argument in the case of the church in Corinth can be allowed no weight.

We have now done with *this* instance of discipline. We have shown, that all the circumstances of the case can be accounted for, without any such conclusion, as that to which the author of the Tract is desirous to conduct it. We turn, therefore, to his other case of discipline, in the church at Ephesus.

The case is thus stated in 1 Tim. i. 20: "Of whom is Hymeneus and Alexander; whom *I* have delivered unto *satan*, that they may learn not to blaspheme." His argument is, that "it is the apostle who inflicts the discipline; the elders do not appear in the matter. And discipline is a ministerial function, and excommunication its highest exercise." (Answer, p. 13.) In reply to this case, we make the following observations.

(1.) It occurs in a charge to Timothy,—Timothy, on the supposition of Episcopalians, an apostle co-ordinate with Paul himself; Timothy, prelate of Ephesus. If Timothy was an apostle, and diocesan bishop, and if the exercise of discipline pertained to an apostle and bishop, why did Paul take the matter into his own hands? Why not refer it to Timothy, and repose sufficient confidence in him to believe, that he was competent to fulfill this part of his Episcopal office? Would it now be regarded as courteous, for the bishop of Ohio to interpose and inflict an act of discipline on some Hymeneus or Alexander, of the diocese of Pennsylvania? And would there be as cordial submission of the bishop of Pennsylvania, as there was of the bishop of Ephesus? If Timothy was at Ephesus, and if the case of discipline occurred at the time which Dr. O. supposes, this case appears, to our humble apprehension, very much as if Paul regarded Timothy as neither an apostle nor a prelate.

(2.) If the exercise of the authority in this case of discipline by Paul, proves, that the presbyters at Ephesus had no right to administer discipline; for the same reason it proves, that Timothy had not that right. By the supposition of Episcopalians, Timothy was there, as well as the presbyters. The assumption of the authority

by Paul, proves as much, that it did not belong to Timothy, as that it did not belong to the presbyters.

(3.) This was a case such as occurred at Corinth. It was not an ordinary act of discipline; it was one, which supposed the infliction of the judgment of God by a miraculous agency. "Whom I have delivered *unto satan*, that they may learn not to blaspheme." Compare this account with the record of the case in Corinth, (1 Cor. v. 5.) and it is evident, that this was not an *ordinary* act of discipline, but was such as implied the direct infliction of the judgment of the Almighty. That such inflictions were intrusted to the hands of the apostles, we admit; and that Paul, not Timothy, inflicted this, proves, that the latter was neither an apostle nor a prelate.

(4.) Dr. Onderdonk supposes, that this occurred at Ephesus, and while Timothy was there. But what evidence is there of this? It is neither affirmed, that the transaction was at Ephesus, nor that Timothy was there. His argument proceeds on the assumption, that Timothy was bishop there when this epistle was written, and that the case of discipline occurred there. And the *proof* of this would probably be, the subscription at the end of the *second* epistle, and the "tradition of the elders." But that subscription has no authority; and it is not to be *assumed*, but *proved*, that Timothy was there in the capacity of a prelate, or there at all, when this epistle was written to him. The demonstration, that a bishop only exercised discipline, it must be admitted, rests on slender grounds, if this be all.

(5.) But if this case *did* occur at Ephesus, what evidence is there, that it occurred at the *time* that bishop Onderdonk supposes? The account in the epistle to Timothy, by no means fixes the time of the transaction. "Whom I have delivered (*παρέδωκα*) unto satan," etc. It was already done; and the presumption is, that it was done when Paul was himself present with them. It is morally certain, that it was *not* an act of discipline, that was then *to be done*.

Our readers have now the whole case before them. Episcopacy affirms, that prelates *only* have the power of administering discipline. It affirms, that the churches are prohibited from exercising it on their own members; that those appointed to preach the gospel, to administer the sacraments, and to be pastors of the flock, and who may therefore be supposed to understand the cases of discipline, and best qualified to administer it, have no right to exercise this act of government over their own members; but that this exclusive prerogative belongs to a stranger, and a foreigner, a prelatical bishop, whom the churches seldom see, and who must be, in a great degree, unacquainted with their peculiar wants and character. All power of discipline, in an entire diocese of some hundreds of churches, is to be taken away from the members

themselves, and from the pastors, and lodged in strange hands, and committed to a solitary, independent man, who, from the nature of the circumstances, can have little acquaintance with the case, and possess few of the qualifications requisite for the intelligent performance of this duty. And does the reader ask, What is the authority for this assumption of power? Why are the churches, and their pastors disrobed of this office, and reduced to the condition of humble dependents, at the feet of the prelate? Let him, in astonishment, learn. It is not because there is any *command* to this effect in the new testament; it is not because there is any declaration implying, that it *would* be so; it is not by any affirmation, that it ever *was* so. This is the reason, and this is all:—The apostle Paul, in two cases, and in both instances over the heads of presbyters, (and over the head of bishop Timothy, too,) delivered men ‘to satan for the destruction of the flesh, that they might learn not to blaspheme;’ and THEREFORE, bishop Onderdonk, and bishop Griswold, and bishop Doane, *only*, have power to administer discipline in all the churches in Pennsylvania, and in the eastern diocese, and in New-Jersey; and THEREFORE, all the acts of discipline exercised by Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, etc., in Pennsylvania, and New-Jersey, and by the Congregationalists of New-England, are null and void. The disposal of *such* antecedents and consequents, may be safely left to all who hold, that “no argument is worth taking into the account, that has not a *clear* and *palpable* bearing on the naked topic,—the scriptural evidence of Episcopacy.” Tract, p. 3.

But we have not done with this subject. We are now prepared to show, not only, that there is no evidence, that the apostles exclusively exercised discipline, but that there *is* positive proof, that all the acts of discipline were *in fact* exercised by the presbyters of the churches. To put this matter to rest, we adduce the following passages of scripture:

Acts, xx. 17, 28. “From Miletus, Paul sent to Ephesus, and called for the PRESBYTERS of the church, and said unto them: Take heed unto yourselves, and to all the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you BISHOPS, (ἐπισκόπους) to feed, (ποιμαίνειν) like good shepherds, to provide for, watch over, and govern,) the church of God.” It would be easy to show, that the word translated *feed*, includes the whole duty which a shepherd exercises over his flock, including all that is needful in the supervision, government, and defense, of those under his care. Proof of this may be found in the following passages of the new testament, where the word occurs in the sense of ruling, or governing, including of course the exercise of discipline; for how can there be government, unless there is authority for punishing offenders? Matt. ii. 6; John, xxi. 16; 1 Peter, v. 2; Rev. ii. 27. “And

he shall *rule* them (ποιμανεῖ αὐτοὺς) with a rod of iron;" an expression which will be allowed to imply the exercise of discipline. Rev. xii. 5; xix. 15. Comp. Ps. ii. 9; xxiii. 1; xxvii. 12; xlvii. 13. And the Iliad of Homer may be consulted, *passim*, for this use of the word. See particularly, I. 263; II. 85.

1 Peter, v. 2, 3. "The PRESBYTERS who are among you I exhort, who am also a PRESBYTER. FEED (ποιμάνετε) the flock of God which is among you, taking the OVERSIGHT (ἐπισκοποῦντες discharging the duty of BISHOPS,) thereof, not by constraint, but willingly," etc. Here the very work which is claimed for prelates, is enjoined on presbyters, the very name which prelates assume, is given to presbyters; and *Peter ranks himself as on a level with them, in the office of exercising discipline, or in the government of the church.* Is it perfectly obvious, that the presbyters at Ephesus, and the presbyters whom Peter addressed, were intrusted with the pastoral care to the fullest extent. It is obvious, that they were required to engage in all the work requisite in instructing, directing, and governing the flock. And it is *as* obvious, that they were intrusted with a power and an authority in this business, with which presbyters are *not* intrusted by the canons of the Episcopal church. We respectfully ask, Whether the bishop of Pennsylvania, or New-Jersey, would now take 1 Peter, v. 2, 3, for a text, and address the "priests," or "second order of clergy," in these words, without considerable qualification: "The PRESBYTERS who are among you I exhort, who am also a PRESBYTER. Feed (ποιμάνετε) the flock of God, ἐπισκοποῦντες discharging the duty of BISHOPS over it, not by constraint, neither as being LORDS over God's heritage."

Heb. xiii. 7. "Remember them which have the rule over you: τῶν ἡγουμένων ὑμῶν, YOUR RULERS." Verse 17. "Obey them that have the rule over you." (Πειθεσθε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις ὑμῶν.) That bishops are here referred to, no one will pretend. Yet the office of *ruling* certainly implies, that kind of government which is concerned in the administration of discipline.

1 Thess. v. 12. "We beseech you, brethren, to know them which labor among you, *and are over you in the Lord.*" (καὶ προϊσταμένους ὑμῶν ἐν κυρίῳ.) 1 Tim. v. 17. "Let the PRESBYTERS that rule well, (προεστῶτες) be counted worthy of double honor." There can be no question, that *these* passages are applied to presbyters. We come, then, to the conclusion, that the terms which *properly* denote government, and discipline, and on which alone, *any* claim for the exercise of authority can be founded,—the terms expressive of governing, of feeling, of ruling, of taking the oversight, are all applied to presbyters; that the churches are required to submit to them in the exercise of that office; and that the very term denoting *Episcopal jurisdiction*, is applied to them also. We ask for

a solitary passage which directs apostles, or prelates, to administer discipline ; and we leave the case of *discipline*, therefore, to the common sense of those who read the new testament, and who believe, that presbyters had any duties to perform.

We have now examined the essential point in Episcopacy ; for, if the claims which are arrogated for bishops are unfounded, the system, as a system, is destroyed. We have examined the solitary passage urged directly in its favor, "the apostles *and* elders," "the apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren ;" and the claims set up in favor of their exclusive right to administer discipline ; and, if we mistake not, we have shown, that hitherto, so stupendous claims have never been reared on so narrow a basis.

The next point which it is indispensable for Episcopalians to make out from the bible, is, *that it was intended, that the superiority in ministerial rank and power, should be a permanent arrangement.* This, it will be perceived, is a distinct and independent inquiry. It by no means follows of necessity, even if all that the Episcopalians claim for the apostles, were conceded ; for it might be true, that the apostles had this superiority, and yet, that it was designed merely as a temporary arrangement. As the "Answer" has added nothing material to the argument of the tract, on this subject, we shall not long be detained on this point. The *sole* argument in the "Tract" is drawn from the claim, that Timothy was bishop of Ephesus, and Titus of Crete ; and, that the "angels" of the seven churches were prelatical bishops. (pp. 23—29.) In our review, we examined these several claims at length. (Review, pp. 17—31.) As the writer of the Answer has not thought proper to notice our argument here, we are left to the presumption, that an obvious or satisfactory reply was not at hand. The train of our reasoning, then, we shall take the liberty of regarding as unbroken and untouched. The only *appearance* of argument on this subject, in the Answer, is found on p. 14, and it is this : that its author supposes, our argument to have been, that Timothy and Titus had a temporary and extraordinary office, because they were "migratory ;" and, as many of the presbyters,—Apollon, for example,—were migratory, hence it would follow, that the office of presbyter, also, was temporary. Now in reply to this, we observe, that although we *did* affirm the appointment of Timothy and Titus to have been 'temporary,' yet we were not so weak, as to suppose, that it was *because* they were migratory. That this fact *indicated*, that they had not a permanent prelatical office, we assuredly did, and still do, believe. But we showed,—in a manner which we marvel the author of the answer did not notice,—that Timothy was sent to Ephesus for a *special* purpose, and that he was to execute that office *only* until Paul returned. (Review, pp. 22, 24. 1 Tim. i. 3 ; iv. 13. 1 Tim. iii. 14,

15.) The same thing we showed, from the new testament, to be the case with regard to Titus. (Review, p. 26. See Titus, i. 6—9; iii. 10, 12.) We never so far forgot ourselves, as to suppose, that *because* Timothy and Titus were “migratory,” that, therefore, they were not bishops. We put the matter on wholly different ground; and in the course of our argument, we quoted no less than *forty-six* passages of the new testament, containing, we believe, all that can be supposed to bear on the point. We cannot withhold the expressions of our ‘amazement,’ that an author, whose express object was, to ‘test Episcopacy by scripture,’ should have left unnoticed, this argument. Never was there invented a shorter and more convenient mode of avoiding such an argument, than by saying of something which we never intended to urge, that the whole of it was founded on the fact of their being ‘migratory.’ We would now remind the author, that our argument was *not* of such a character; but it was, (1.) That Timothy is not even called an apostle; (2.) That he is expressly distinguished *from* the apostles; (3.) That there is no evidence, that he was bishop of Ephesus; (4.) That the scripture *affirms*, he was sent to Ephesus for a *special* and *temporary* purpose; (Review, p. 22.) and, (5.) That the epistles to Timothy contain full proof of the falsehood of any such supposition, as, that he was a prelatical bishop; because, (a) there are but two orders of officers in the church, spoken of in those epistles; (b) they contain no description of his own office as a prelate; (c) they contain full and explicit directions, on a great variety of other topics, of far less importance than the office which, according to Episcopacy, was to constitute the very *peculiarity* of the church; and not a word respecting his brother bishops, then existing, or any intimation, that such an order of men ever *would* exist.

In regard to Titus, we proved, (1.) That he was left in Crete, for the *special* purpose of completing a work which Paul had begun; (2.) That Paul gave him express directions, when he had done that, to come to him; and, (3.) That he obeyed the command, left Crete, and became the traveling companion of Paul; and, that there is not the slightest reason to suppose, that he ever returned to Crete.

In regard to the “angels” of the seven churches, we showed, that the whole of Dr. Onderdonk’s argument was a mere assumption, that there was an inferior body of the “clergy at large;” that there were in each of those cities, more churches than one,—a fact which should be proved, not assumed;—also, that the style of the address to the “angel,” was that of the “angel of *the church*,” evidently referring to an individual congregation, and not to such a group of churches as constitute a modern diocese; and, that the application of the term “angel,” to the pastor of a single church,

was much more obvious, and much the more probable supposition, than to 'the formal, unfrequent, and in many instances, stately and pompous visitations of a diocesan bishop.' (Review, pp. 27—30.)

To this argument there is no reply, except by an assumption, that Timothy was bishop of Ephesus; that the same thing must be presumed to exist in the year 96; and, that the "elders" at Ephesus being there also, and being ministers, any direction to the "angel," must suppose, that he was superior to the presbyters. (Answer, p. 17.) Now the whole of this argument proceeds on the supposition, that the elders at Ephesus were ordained ministers of the gospel, a distinct rank of the clergy, and sustaining the same office as the "second order" in the Episcopal church. But this is assuming the very point in debate. In our review, we showed, (p. 23.) that all the facts in the case of the elders at Ephesus, (Acts, xx. 17. etc.) are met by the supposition, that they were ruling elders, or persons appointed to govern, guide, and secure, the spiritual welfare of the church. Our argument is, (1.) That Dr. O. admits, that the word rendered "feed," (*ποιμαίνειν*), may mean, to rule; (Tract, pp. 24, 37.) (2.) That the idea of *ruling*, is the one which is there *specifically* dwelt on. That he directs them to "feed," or exercise the office of a shepherd over them, that is, to guard, defend, provide for them, as a shepherd does, in the care of his flock. He directs them to watch against the grievous wolves which should come in, and against those who should rise up from among themselves, to secure parties, etc.; (3.) There is no counsel given them about the proper mode of administering the sacraments, the peculiar duty of the "second order" of clergy. (4.) There is no expression of lamentation, that they had not a prelatical bishop; or any intimation, that they would soon be furnished with one. (5.) It is evidently implied, that the *number* of these elders was considerable. They are addressed as such; and yet they are addressed as in charge of one "flock," over which they had been placed. Now it is incredible, that any considerable body of the "second order of clergy" should have been ordained in an infant church like Ephesus. And it is equally incredible, that *if* Paul had so ordained them, he should have set them over *one* flock, in a single city,—collegiate 'rectors' in a single church in Ephesus,—under a "diocesan" also, of the single "flock," or church; a diocesan not then present, and concerning whom not the slightest hint was dropped by Paul, either of lamentation or promise. So that, on the whole, one knows not at which to be most surprised, the number of *assumptions* indispensable to the purpose of "enthroning" the bishop Timothy at Ephesus, or the singular coolness with which Episcopalians urge all these assumptions, as if they were grave matters of historical record.

In reference to the term "angel," as used in the apocalypse,

we have only to remark, further, that the interpretation which makes it refer to a prelatical bishop, is so unnatural, and forced, that Episcopalians are, many of them, themselves compelled to abandon it. Thus Stillingfleet, than whom an abler man, and one whose praise is higher in Episcopal churches, is not to be found among the advocates of prelacy, says, of these angels: "If many things in the epistles be denoted to the angels, but yet so as to concern the whole body, then, of necessity, the angel must be taken as a *representative* of the whole body; and then, why may not the word *angel* be taken by way of representation of the body itself, either of the whole church, or, *which is far more probable*, of the *consessors*, or order of presbyters, in that church? We see what miserable, unaccountable arguments those are, which are brought for any kind of government, from metaphorical or ambiguous expressions, or names promiscuously used." *Irenicum*.

In regard to this *second* point, which it is incumbent on Episcopalians to make out, we are now prepared to estimate the force of these arguments. The case stands thus. (1.) There is no *command* in the new testament, to the apostles, to transmit the peculiarity of the apostolic office. If there *had* been, the industry of Dr. Onderdonk would have called it to our attention. If the peculiarity of the office was to be transmitted, it was required, that such a command should be given. (2.) There is no affirmation, that it would be thus transmitted. If there had been, Dr. O's tract would not have been so barren on this point. And we ask him, whether it is credible, that the apostles were bishops of a superior order, and that it was designed, that all the church should be subject to an order of men, "superior in ministerial rank and power," deriving their authority from the apostles; and yet, not the slightest command thus to transmit it, and not the slightest hint, that it would be done? We say again, *Credat Judæus Apella!* (3.) It was *impossible*, that the peculiarity of the apostolic office *should be* transmitted. We have shown, not by assumptions, but by a large array of passages of scripture, what that peculiarity was,—to bear witness to the great events which went to prove, that Jesus was the Messiah: we have been met in this proof, by the calm and dignified observation, that this was a "showy" argument; and we now affirm, that the peculiarity of that office, as specified by Jesus Christ, by the chosen apostles, by Paul, and by the whole college, *COULD NOT* be transmitted; that no bishop is, or can be, a *witness*, in the sense, and for the purpose, for which they were originally designated. (4.) We have examined the case of Timothy, of Titus, and of the angels of the churches,—the slender basis on which the fabric of Episcopal pretension has been reared. We now affirm, (5.) That, should we admit all that Episcopalians claim, on each of these points, there is not the

slightest proof; as a matter of historical record, that the Episcopal office has been transmitted from prelate to prelate; but that the pretended line has been often broken, and that no jury would give a verdict to the amount of five dollars, on proof so slender as can be adduced for the uninterrupted succession of prelates. As satisfactory evidence on this point, we repeat the following passage, contained in the September number of this journal :

‘ We are informed by many ancient historians, and very expressly by Bede, in his famous Ecclesiastical History, “ That at the request of Oswald, king of Northumberland, certain *presbyters* came (in the seventh century) from Scotland into England, and ordained bishops; that the abbot, and *other presbyters* of the island of Hy, sent Aydan for this express purpose, declaring him to be worthy of the office of bishop, and that he ought to be sent to instruct the unbelieving and the unlearned.” He informs us, that “ those presbyters ordained him and sent him to England on this errand; and that Finan, sent from the same monastery in the same island, succeeded him in the Episcopal office, after having been ordained by the Scottish presbyters.”

Upon this testimony of Bede, Baxter remarks, “ You will find, that the English had a *succession* of bishops by the *Scottish presbyter’s ordination*; and there is no mention in Bede, of any dislike or scruple of the lawfulness of this course. The learned Dr. Doddridge refers us to Bede and Jones, to substantiate the fact, that “ the ordination of English bishops cannot be traced up to the church of Rome as its original; that in the year 668, the successors of Austin, the monk, (who came over A. D. 596,) being almost extinct, *by far the greater part* of the bishops were of Scottish ordination, by Aydan and Finan, who came out of the Culdee monastery of Columbanus, and were no more than *presbyters*.”

And is it verily so, that the Episcopal blood was thus early and extensively contaminated in England? Is it verily so, that when the effects of pious Austin’s labors had become almost imperceptible, the sinking church was revived again, by sending to Scotland for *presbyters* to come and *ordain* a *multitude* of bishops? Then it is verily a fact, that Presbyterian ordination is one of the sturdiest pillars that support the vast fabric of the church of England. No matter if only *ten* bishops were thus ordained, the contamination (if it be one,) having been imparted more than *eleven hundred years ago*, has had a long time to diffuse itself, and doubtless has diffused itself so extensively from bishop to bishop, that not a single prelate in Great Britain can prove, that he has escaped the infection. For what one of them can tell, if he was not consecrated by bishops, who were themselves consecrated by bishops, and they by other bishops, to whom all the ordaining power they ever had, was transmitted from the *presbyters of Scotland*? But this is not the whole of the evil. As no one bishop can trace his Episcopal pedigree further back, perhaps, than two or three centuries, so he cannot certainly know, that any presbyter, on whose head he has imposed hands, has received from him any thing more than Presbyterian ordi-

nation. Nor is this all the evil. The Protestant Episcopal bishops and presbyters in America are in the same plight; for I am told, that all their authority came from England. But as the English bishops who gave it to them, could not *then*, and cannot *now*, certainly tell whence it came, so who knows but all the Episcopal clergy in the United States of America, are originally indebted to the hands of *Elder Aydan* and *Elder Finan*, for all their ministerial powers? I tremble for all Protestant Episcopal churches on both continents, if Presbyterian ordination be not **VALID** and **SCRIPTURAL**.' pp. 486, 487.

One point more, in the argument for Episcopacy, remains. It is, *that none but prelates ordained*. It is incumbent on Episcopalians to prove this, as essential to their argument. For if presbyters or elders exercised the office of *ordaining*, then the main point claimed for the superiority of bishops, is unfounded. We aim, therefore, to show, that there is positive proof, that presbyters *did* ordain. We have shown, in the course of our argument, that they exercised the office of *discipline*, one of the things claimed peculiarly for bishops; we now proceed to show, that the office of *ordaining* was one which was intrusted to them, and which they exercised. If this point be made out, it follows still further, that the peculiarity of the office of the apostles was not, that they ordained, and that the clergy of the new testament are not divided into 'three orders,' but are equal in ministerial rank and power. The argument is indeed complete without this; for, unless Episcopalians can show, by positive proof, the superiority of their bishops to the right of ordination and discipline, the parity of the clergy follows as a matter of course.

The writer of these articles is a Presbyterian. But the argument does not require, that he should go largely into the proof of his own views on church polity. The object is, to *disprove* Episcopacy. If *this* is disproved, it follows, that the clergy are on an equality. If it is shown, that the doctrine of the new testament is, that presbyters were to ordain, it is a sufficient disposal of the "feeble claims of lay-ordination," and of all other claims. It will follow, that a valid ordination is that, which is performed in accordance with the direction, that *presbyters* should ordain. What particular churches, *besides* the Presbyterian, accord, in their practice, with the direction, it is not our business to inquire. It is sufficient for our purpose, that the *Presbyterian* and *Congregational* churches accord with that requirement, and follow the direction of the new testament, in the ordination of their ministry by presbyters, and in their ministerial equality. This is all the reply that is necessary, to the train of reflections in the "Answer." (pp. 5, 6.) We have seen, also, that Episcopal ordination is valid, not because it is performed by a prelate, but because it is, as we remarked, (Review, pp. 32, 33.) in fact a mere Presbyterian performance.

In proof of the point now before us, therefore, we adduce 1 Tim. iv. 14: "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." Of this passage, which, to the common sense of mankind, affirms the very thing under discussion, it is evidently material for Episcopalians to dispose; or their claims to exclusive rights and privileges are forever destroyed. We shall, therefore, examine the passage, and then notice the objections to its *obvious* and *common-sense* interpretation, alledged by Dr. Onderdonk.

We observe then, (1.) That the translation of the passage is fairly made. Much learned criticism has been exhausted, to very little purpose, by Episcopalians, to show, that a difference existed between "with," (*μετὰ*) in this place, and "by," (*διὰ*) in 2 Tim. i. 6. It has been said, "that such a distinction may justly be regarded as intimating, that the *virtue* of the ordaining act flowed from Paul, while the presbytery, or the rest of that body if he were included in it, expressed only *consent*." (Tract, p. 22.) But it has never been shown, nor can it be, that the preposition "with" does not fairly express the force of the original. The same observation may be applied to the word, "presbytery," (*πρεσβυτεριον*.) It denotes properly a body, or assembly of elders, or presbyters. In Luke, xxii. 66, it is applied to the body of elders which composed the Sanhedrim, or great council of the Jews, and is translated "the elders of the people:" το πρεσβυτεριον τοῦ λαοῦ. See also, Acts, xxii. 5: "the estate of the elders." The word occurs no where else in the new testament, except in the passage under consideration. Dr. Onderdonk has endeavored to show, that it means "the *office* to which Timothy was ordained, not the *persons* who ordained him; so that the passage would read, 'with the laying on of hands to confer the *presbyterate*,' or presbytership, or the clerical office;" and appeals to the authority of Grotius and Calvin, in the case. (Tract, pp. 19, 20.) In regard to this interpretation, we observe, (1.) That if this be correct, then it follows, that Timothy was not *an apostle*, but *an elder*,—he was ordained to the office of the *presbyterate*, or the eldership. Timothy, then, is to be laid out of the college of the apostles, and reduced to the humble office of a presbyter. When prelacy is to be established by showing, that the office of apostles was transmitted, Timothy is an apostle; when it is necessary to make *another* use of this same man, it appears that he was ordained to the *presbyterate*, and Timothy becomes a humble *presbyter*. But, (2.) If the word "presbytery" (*πρεσβυτεριον*) here means the *presbyterate*, and not the *persons*, then it doubtless means the same in the two other places where it occurs. In Luke, xxii. 66, we shall receive the information, that "the presbyterate," "the presbytership," or "the clerical office" of the people, that is, the body by which the people conferred "the

presbyterate," came together with the scribes, etc. In Acts, xxii. 5, we shall be informed, that "the presbyterate," or "the clerical office," would bear witness with the high-priest to the life of Paul. Such absurdities show the propriety of adhering, in interpretation, to the obvious and usual meaning of the words. (3.) The word is fixed in its meaning, in the usage of the church. Suicer (*The-saurus*,) says, it denotes "an assembly, congregation, and college of *presbyters* in the christian church." In all the instances which he quotes from Theodoret, (on 1 Tim. iv. 14.) from Chrysostom, (Homil. xiii. on this epistle,) from Theophylact, (in loco,) and from Ignatius, (Epis. to Antioch, and to the Trallians,) there is not the slightest evidence, that it is *ever* used to denote the *office*, instead of the *persons*, of the presbytery. (4.) As the opinion of Grotius is referred to by Dr. O., we beg leave to quote, here, a passage from his commentary on this place. "The custom was, that the presbyters who were present, placed their hands on the head of the candidate, at the same time with the presiding officer of their body," *cum cætus sui principe*. "Where the apostles, or their assistants, were not present, ordination took place by the presiding officer (*Præsidem*) of their body, with the concurrence of the presbytery." We were particularly surprised, that the authority of CALVIN should have been adduced, as sanctioning that interpretation, which refers the word *presbytery* to *office*, and not to *persons*. His words are, "They who interpret *presbytery*, here, as a collective noun, denoting the college of presbyters, are, in my judgment, right." Our first argument, then, is, that the word "presbytery," denoting the persons who composed the *body*, or *college of elders*, is the proper, obvious, and established sense of the passage.

(2.) It is evident from this passage, that whoever or whatever else might have been engaged in this transaction, a material part of it belonged to the presbytery or eldership concerned. "*Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy; WITH THE LAYING ON OF THE HANDS OF THE PRESBYTERY.*" Here it is evident, that the presbytery bore a material part in the transaction. Paul says, that the gift that was in Timothy, was given him by *prophecy*, with the laying on of the hands *of the presbytery*. That is, that prophecy, or some prophecies relating to Timothy, (comp. 1 Tim. i. 18, "according to the prophecies which went before in thee,") had designated him as a proper person for the ministry, or that he *would* be employed in the ministry; but the prophecy did not invest him with the office,—did not confer the gift. *That* was done,—that formal appointment fulfilling the prophecy,—by the imposition of the hands of the presbytery. It was necessary, that that act of the presbytery should thus concur with the prophecy, or Timothy had remained

a layman. The presbyters laid their hands on him ; and he thus received his office. As the prophecy made no part of his ordination, it follows, that he was ordained by the presbytery.

(3.) The statement here, is just one which would be given now in a *Presbyterian* ordination ; it is *not* one which would be made in an *Episcopal* ordination. A *Presbyterian* would choose these very words, to give an account of an ordination in his church ; an *Episcopalian* would not. The former speaks of ordination by a *presbytery* ; the latter, of ordination by a *bishop*. The former can use the account of the apostle Paul, here, as applicable to ordination, without explanations, comments, new versions, and criticisms ; the latter cannot. The passage speaks to the common understanding of men, in favor of *Presbyterian* ordination,—of the action of a *presbytery* in the case : it never speaks the language of *Episcopacy*, even after all the torture to which it may be subjected by *Episcopal* criticism. The passage is one, too, which is not like the “ apostles and elders,” “ the apostles, and elders, and brethren,”—the *only* direct passage on which *Episcopacy* relies,—a passage which has no perceptible connection with the case ; but it is one, that speaks on the very subject ; which relates to the exact transaction ; and which makes a positive affirmation of the very thing in debate.

(4.) The supposition, that this was not a *presbyterial* transaction, renders the passage unmeaning. Here was present, a body of men, called a *presbytery*. We ask the *Episcopalian*, why they were present ? The answer is, *not* for the purpose of ordination, but for “ concurrence.” Paul, the bishop, is the sole ordainer. We see Timothy bowing before the *presbytery*. We see them solemnly impose their hands on him. We ask, Why is this ? ‘ *Not* for the purpose of ordination, the *Episcopalian* replies, but for “ concurrence.” Paul is the ordainer.’ But, we ask, Had they no share in the ordination ? ‘ None at all.’ Had they no participation in conferring the gift designated by prophecy ? ‘ None at all.’ Why, then, present ? Why did they impose hands ? For “ concurrence,” for form, for nothing ! It was an empty pageantry, in which they were mistaken, when supposing, that their act had something to do in conferring the gift ; for their presence really *meant* nothing, and the whole transaction could as well have been performed without, as with them.

(5.) If this ordination was the joint act of the *presbytery*, we have here a complete scriptural account of a *Presbyterian* ordination. It becomes, then, a very material question, how the *Episcopalians* dispose of this passage of scripture. Their difficulties and embarrassments on this subject, will still farther confirm the obvious interpretation which *Presbyterians* suggest, and hold. These difficulties and embarrassments are thus presented by Dr. Onderdonk :

He *first* doubts, whether this transaction was an *ordination*. (Tract, pp. 18, 19.) To this we answer, (1.) That, if it were not, then there is no account, that Timothy was ever ordained; (2.) That there is no specific work mentioned in the history of the apostles, to which Timothy was designated, unless it was ordination; (3. That it is the *obvious* and fair meaning of the passage; (4.) That, if *this* does not refer to ordination, it would be easy to apply the same denial to all the passages which speak of the "imposition of hands," and to show, that there was no such thing, as ordination to the ministry, in any case; (5.) That it accords with the common usage of the terms, 'imposition of hands,' ἐπιθεσις τῶν χειρῶν, in the new testament. The phrase occurs but four times:—Acts, viii. 18; 1 Tim. iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6; Heb. vi. 2. In all these places, it evidently denotes conferring some gift, office, or favor, described by the act. In 2 Tim. i. 6, it denotes, by the acknowledgment of all Episcopalians, ordination to the ministry. Why should it not here? (6.) If, as Dr. Onderdonk supposes, it refers to "an inspired designation of one already in the ministry, to a particular field of duty," (Tract, p. 19.) then, (a) we ask, why we have no other mention of this transaction? (b) We ask, how it is to be accounted for, that Paul, while here evidently referring Timothy to the duties and responsibilities of the ministerial office in general, should not refer to his *ordination*, but to a *designation to a particular field of labor*? His argument to Timothy, on such a supposition, would be this: 'Your office of a minister of the gospel, is one that is exceedingly important. A bishop must be blameless, vigilant, sober, of good behavior, given to hospitality, apt to teach, not given to wine, etc. (chap. iii.) In order to impress this more deeply on you, to fix these great duties in your mind, I refer you,—not to the solemnity of your ordination vows,—but *I solemnly remind you of "an inspired separation of one already in the ministry, to a particular field of duty."*' We need only observe here, that this is not a strain of argument that looks like Paul. But,

Secondly. Dr. O. supposes, that this was not a *Presbyterian* ordination. (Tract, pp. 19—21.) His first supposition is, that the word "presbytery" does not mean the *persons*, but the office. (p. 19.) This we have already noticed. He next supposes, (pp. 20, 21.) that if "the presbytery" here means not the office given to Timothy, but a body of elders, that it cannot be shown, "of whom this ordaining presbytery was composed." (p. 21.) And he then proceeds to state, that there are "seven modes" in which this "presbytery" might be composed. It might be made up of "ruling elders;" or, it might be composed of the "grade called presbyters;" or, as Peter and John called themselves "elders," it might be made up of "apostles;" or, "there may have

been ruling elders *and* presbyters ; or, presbyters *and* one or more apostles ; or, ruling elders and one or more of the apostles ; or, ruling elders, *and* presbyters, and apostles." (p. 21.) Now, as Dr. O. has not informed us *which* of these modes he prefers, we are left merely to conjecture. We may remark, on these suppositions, (1.) That they are *mere* suppositions. There is not the shadow of proof to support them. The word "presbytery," "a body of elders," does not appear to be such a difficult word of interpretation, as to make it necessary to envelop it in so much mist, in order to understand it. Dr. O's argument, here, is such as a man always employs, when he is pressed by difficulties which he cannot meet, and when he throws himself, as it were, into a labyrinth, in the hope, that amidst its numerous passages, he may escape detection, and evade pursuit. (2.) If this "body of elders" was made up of "ruling elders," or, "of the grade called presbyters," then the argument of Episcopacy is overthrown. Here is an instance, on *either* supposition, of Presbyterian ordination, which is fatal to the claims, that bishops only ordain. Or, if it be supposed, that this was not an ordination, but "an inspired separation of one already in the ministry, to a particular field of duty," it is an act equally fatal to the claim of prelates to the general "superintendence" of the church ; since it is manifest, that these "elders" took upon themselves the functions of this office, and designated "the bishop of Ephesus" to his field of labor. Such a transaction would scarcely meet with Episcopal approbation in the nineteenth century.

But in regard to the other suppositions, that a part of all the "presbytery" was composed of apostles, we remark, (1.) That it is a *merely gratuitous* supposition. There is not an instance in which the term "presbytery," or "body of elders," is applied, in the new testament, to the collective body of the apostles. (2.) On the supposition, that the "presbytery" was composed entirely of apostles, then we ask, how it happens, that, in 2 Tim. i. 6, Paul appropriates to himself a power, which belonged to every one of them, in as full right as to him ? How came they to surrender their power into the hands of an individual ? Was it the *character* of Paul, thus to assume authority which did not belong to him ? We have seen, already, how, on the supposition of the Episcopalian, he superseded bishop Timothy, in the exercise of discipline, in Corinth, and in his own diocese at Ephesus : we have now an instance, in which he claims all the virtue of the ordaining power, where his fellow-apostles must have been equally concerned.

But if a *part* only of this "presbytery" was composed of apostles, and the remainder presbyters, either ruling elders, or "the second grade," we would make the following inquiries : (1.) Was he ordained as a *prelate* ? So the Episcopalians with

one voice declare,—prelate of Ephesus. Then it follows, that Timothy, a prelate, was set apart to his work, by the imposition of the hands of elders. What was then his prelatical character? Does the water in the cistern rise higher than the fountain? If laymen were concerned, Timothy was a layman still. If presbyters, Timothy was a presbyter still. And thus all the power of prelates, from him of Rome downward, has come through the hands of humble presbyters,—just as we believe, and just as history affirms. (2.) Was he ordained as a *presbyter*? Then his Episcopal character, so far as it depends on his ordination, is swept away; and thus we have not a solitary instance of the consecration of a prelate, in all the new testament.

Which of these suppositions of Dr. O., he is disposed to receive as the true one, we are unable to say. All of them cannot be true; and whichever he chooses, is, as we have seen, equally fatal to his argument, and involves a refutation of the claims of prelacy.

The only other reply, with which Dr. O. meets the argument for Presbyterian ordination, from this passage, is, by the supposition, that the *virtue* of the ordaining act was derived from the apostle Paul. The passage on which he rests the argument, is, (2 Tim. i. 6.) “that thou stir up the gift of God which is in thee, by the putting on of my hands.” On this passage we observe, (1.) Paul does not deny, that *other* hands were also imposed on Timothy; nor that his authority was derived *also* from others, in conjunction with himself. (2.) That, by the supposition of Episcopalians, as well as Presbyterians, other hands were, in fact, imposed on him. (3.) It was perfectly natural for Paul, in consequence of the relation which Timothy sustained to him, as his adopted son; (1 Tim. i. 2.) as being selected by him for the ministry; (Acts, xvi. 3.) and as being his companion in the ministry, and in travels, to remind him, near the close of his own life, (2 Tim. iv. 6.) that he had been solemnly set apart to the work by himself,—to bring his *own* agency into full view,—in order to stimulate and encourage him. That Paul had a part in the act of the ordination, we admit; that others also had a part,—the “*presbytery*,”—we have proved. (4.) The expression which is here used, is just such as an aged Presbyterian minister would now use, if directing a farewell letter to a son in the ministry. He would remind him, as Paul does in this epistle, (2 Tim. iv. 6.) that he was about to leave the ministry, and the world; and, if he wished to impress his mind in a peculiarly tender manner, he would remind him, also, that *he* took part in his ordination; that, under his own hands, he had been designated to the work of the ministry; and would endeavor to deepen his conviction of the importance and magnitude of the work, by the reflection, that he had been solemnly

set apart to it by a *father*. Yet who would infer from this, that the aged Presbyterian would wish to be regarded as a *prelate*?

Dr. O. remarks on this case, (Tract, p. 22.) that, if *Paul* was engaged in the transaction, it was the work of an *apostle*, and was "an apostolic ordination." We admit, that it was an "*apostolic* ordination;" but when will Episcopalians learn to suppose it possible, that an "*apostolic* ordination" was not a *prelatical* ordination? Did not Dr. O. see, that this was *assuming* the very point in debate, *that the peculiarity of the apostolic office was, the power of ordaining*? We reply further, that whoever was engaged in it, a "*presbytery*" was concerned, and it was a *Presbyterian* ordination.

We have now considered all the objections, that have been made to the obvious interpretation of this passage; and we are prepared to submit it to any candid mind, as a full and unqualified statement, of an instance of Presbyterian ordination. Whichever of the half-dozen suppositions,—assuming a hue, chameleon-like, from the nature of the argument to be refuted,—which Episcopalians are compelled to apply to the passage, is adopted, we have seen, that they involve them in all the difficulties of an unnatural interpretation, and conduct us, by a more circuitous route, only to the plain and common-sense exposition of the passage, as decisive in favor of Presbyterian ordination.

Having thus shown, that there was one Presbyterian ordination, in the case of Timothy, claimed by Episcopalians as a prelate, and this too, in perhaps the only instance of ordination to the ministry, recorded in the new testament; we now proceed to adduce the case of a *church*, that was *not* organized on the principles of Episcopalians, with three orders of clergy. We refer to the church at Philippi. "Paul and Timothy, servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus, who are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons." *σὺν ἐπισκόποις καὶ διακόνοις*. In regard to this church, we make the following observations. (1.) It was organized by the apostle Paul himself, in connection with Silas, and was, therefore, on the truly 'primitive and apostolic' plan. (Acts, xvi.) (2.) It was in the center of a large territory, the capital of Macedonia, and not likely to be placed in subjection to a diocesan of another region. (3.) It was surrounded by other churches; as we have express mention of the church at Thessalonica, and the preaching of the gospel at Berea. (Acts, xvii.) (4.) There is mention made of but two orders of men. What the *deacons* were, we know from the appointment in Acts, vi. 1—6. They were designated, not to preach, but to take care of the poor members of the church, and to distribute the alms of the saints. As we have there, in the original appointment of the office, the express and extended mention of its functions, we are to infer, that the design was the same at Philippi. If we admit, however, the supposition of the Episcopa-

lians, that the deacons were *preachers*, it will not at all affect our argument. The other class, therefore, the "bishops," constitute the preaching order, or the clergy,—those to whom were committed the preaching of the word, the administration of the sacraments, and of the discipline of the church. Now, either these bishops were *prelates*, or they were the *pastors*, the *presbyters* of the church. If Episcopalians choose to say, that they were *prelates*, then it follows, (a) that there was a plurality of such prelates in the same diocese, and the same city, and the same church; which is contrary to the fundamental idea of Episcopacy. It follows, also, (b) that there is entirely wanting, in this church, the 'second order' of clergy; that an Episcopal church is organized, defective in one of the essential grades, with an appointment of a body of prelates, without presbyters; that is, an order of 'superior' men, designated to exercise jurisdiction over "priests" who had no existence. If it be said, that the "presbyters," or "second order," might have been there, though Paul did not expressly name them; then we are presented with the remarkable fact, that he specifies the *deacons*, an inferior order, and expresses to them his christian salutations; that he salutes and addresses also the saints, and yet entirely disregards those who had the special pastoral charge of the church. Paul thus becomes a model of disrespect, and incivility. In the epistles to Timothy, he gives him directions about every thing else, but no counsel about his brother prelates: in the epistles to the churches, he salutes their prelates, and their *deacons*, but becomes utterly regardless of the 'second order of clergy,' the immediate pastors of the churches.

But if our Episcopal brethren prefer to say, that the "bishops" here mean, not prelates, but presbyters, we, so far, shall agree with them; and then it follows, (a) That here is an undeniable instance of a church, or rather a *group* of churches, large enough to satisfy the desire of any diocesan bishop for extended jurisdiction, organized without any prelate. None is mentioned; and there are but two orders of men, to whom the care of the "saints at Philippi" is intrusted. (b) If there was a prelate there, then we ask, why Paul did not refer to him, with affectionate salutations? Why does he refer to 'the second and the third orders of clergy,' without the slightest reference to the man who was 'superior to them in ministerial rank and power?' Was Paul jealous of the prelate? or have we here *another* instance of indecorum and incivility? (c) If they had had a prelate, and the see was now vacant, why is there no reference to this fact? why no condolence at their loss? why no prayer, that God would send them a man to enter into the vacant diocese? (d) Episcopalians have sometimes felt the pressure of these difficulties to be so great, that they have supposed the prelate to have been absent, when this epistle was

addressed to the church at Philippi; and, that this was the reason why he was not remembered in the salutation. Of this solution, we observe only, that, like *some* other of their arguments, it is mere assumption. And even granting this assumption, it is an inquiry of not very easy solution, why Paul did not make some reference to this fact, and ask their prayers for the absent prelate. One can scarcely help being forcibly reminded, by the ineffectual efforts of Episcopalians to find a prelate at Philippi, of a remarkable transaction mentioned 1 Kings, xviii. 27, 28, to which we need only refer our readers. It is scarcely necessary to add, that, if a single church is proved to have been organized without the "three orders of clergy," the parity of the ministry is made out by apostolic appointment, and the Episcopal argument is at an end.

We may add, that our view of the organization of the church in Philippi, is confirmed by an examination of the organization of the church in its immediate neighborhood, in Thessalonica. In the two epistles which Paul directed to that church, there is not the slightest reference to any prelatical bishop; there is no mention of 'three orders of clergy;' there is no hint, that the church was organized on that plan. But *one* order of ministers is mentioned, evidently as entitled to the same respect, and as on an entire equality. They were men, clearly of the same rank, and engaged in discharging the functions of the same office. "And we beseech you, brethren, to know them which labor among you, and are over you in the Lord, and admonish you; and to esteem them very highly in love, for their work's sake." 1 Thess. v. 12, 13. Will our Episcopal friends be kind enough to inform us, why there is no mention of the prelate, whether present or absent?

We are here prepared to estimate the force of the undeniable fact, that there is no distinction of grade or rank, by the *names* which are given to the ministers of the gospel in the new testament. It is admitted by Episcopalians themselves, that the names bishop, presbyter, etc., in the bible, do not denote those ranks of church-officers to which they are now applied, but are given indiscriminately to all. On this point, we have the authority of Dr. Onderdonk. "The name 'bishop,' says he, "which now designates the highest grade of the ministry, is not appropriated to this office in scripture. That name is given to the middle order, or presbyters; and ALL THAT WE READ IN THE NEW TESTAMENT CONCERNING 'BISHOPS,' (including, of course, the words 'overseers,' and 'oversight,' which have the same derivation,) IS TO BE REGARDED AS PERTAINING TO THIS MIDDLE GRADE." (Tract, p. 12.) "Another irregularity of the same kind, occurs in regard to the word 'elder.' It is sometimes used for a minister, or clergyman of any grade, higher, middle, or lower; but it more strictly signifies a presbyter." Tract, p. 14.

In accordance with this fact, which is as remarkable as it is true, we have seen, that Peter applies to himself the name presbyter, and puts himself on a level with other presbyters. "The presbyters which are among you, I *exhort*, (not, I *command*, or *enjoin*, as a prelate would do,) who am also a presbyter." 1 Peter, v. 1. And in the very next verse, he exhorts them (the elders, or presbyters,) to "feed the flock of God, taking the oversight, (*ἐπισκοποῦντες* exercising the office of bishop,) not by constraint," etc.

Now let these conceded facts be borne in mind. The term presbyter is applied to the apostles. "All that we read of in the new testament concerning 'bishops,' is applied to the middle grade." The apostles address each other, and their brethren, by the same terms,—by no words or names, that indicate rank, or grade, or authority. We maintain, that this fact can be accounted for, only on the supposition, that they regarded themselves as ministers, as *on a level*. If they meant to teach, that one class was superior in rank and power, to others; we maintain, that they would *not* have used terms *always* confounding such distinctions, and *always* proceeding on the supposition, that they were on an equality. It will not be pretended, that they *could* not employ terms, that would have marked the various grades. For if the term 'bishop' can now do it, it could do it then; if the term presbyter can now be used to denote 'the middle grade,' it could then have been so used. We maintain, too, that if such *had* been their intention, they would have thus employed those terms. That the sacred writers were *capable* of using language definitely, Dr. Onderdonk will not doubt. Why, then, if they *were* capable, did they choose *not* to do it? Are Episcopal bishops, now, ever as vague and indefinite in their use of the terms 'bishop' and 'presbyters,' as were the apostles? Why were the latter so undesirous of having "the pre-eminence?" (3 John, 9.)

It is remarkable, that the mode of using these terms in the new testament, is precisely in accordance with the usage in Presbyterian and Congregational churches. *They* speak, just as the sacred writers did, of their ministers, indiscriminately as 'bishops,' as 'pastors,' as 'teachers,' as 'evangelists.' *They* regard their ministers as on an equality. Did not the sacred writers do the same?

It is *as* remarkable, that the mode of using these terms in the Episcopal churches, is *not*, (*ex concessis*) that which occurs in the bible. And it is *as* certain, that *were* they thus to use those terms, it would *at once* confound their orders and ranks, and reduce their ministers to equality. Do we ever see any approximation, in their addresses, and in their canons, in this respect, to the language and style of the new testament? Do we ever hear of bishop Tyng, or bishop Hawkes, or bishop Schroeder, or bishop Croswell? Do we ever hear of presbyter Ives, or Doane, or Onderdonk? How would

language like this, sound in the mouth of a prelatical bishop? Would not all men be amazed, as if some new thing had happened under the sun, in the Episcopal church? And yet, we venture to presume, that the terms used in the new testament, to designate any office, may be used still. We shall still choose to call things by their true names, and to apply to all ranks and orders of men, the terms which are applied to them by the spirit of inspiration. And as the indiscriminate use of these terms is carefully avoided by the customs and canons of the Episcopal church; as there seems to have been a presentiment in the formation of those canons, that such indiscriminate use would reduce the fabric to simple 'parity' of the clergy; and as these terms *cannot* be so used, without reducing these 'ranks and orders' to a scriptural equality, we come to the conclusion, that the apostles *meant* to teach, that the ministers of the new testament are equal in ministerial rights and powers.

We have now gone through this entire subject. We have examined, we trust, in a candid manner,—we are sure with the kindest feelings towards our Episcopal brethren,—every argument which they have to adduce from the bible, in favor of the claims of their bishops. We have disposed of these arguments, step by step. We have done this, remembering, that these are *ALL* the arguments which Episcopacy has to urge from the bible. There is nothing that remains. The subject is exhausted. Episcopacy rests here. And it is incumbent on Episcopacy to *show*, not to *affirm*, that our interpretation of those passages is not sustained by sound principles of exegesis.

The burden of proof still lies on them. They assumed it, and on them it rests. They affirm, that enormous powers are lodged in the hands of the prelate,—every thing pertaining to ordination, to discipline, to the superintendence of the christian church. They claim powers, tending to degrade every presbyter in the world, to the condition of a dependant and inferior office; stripping him of the right of transmitting his own office, and of administering discipline among his own flock. They arrogate powers, which go to strip all other presbyters, except Episcopalian, of any right to officiate in the church of God; rendering their ordination invalid, their administrations void, and their exercise of the functions of their office, a daring and impious invasion of the rights of the priesthood, and a violation of the law of Christ. The foundation for these sweeping, and certainly not very modest claims, we have examined with all freedom. The argument for prelacy, may be summed up in a word. It consists in the text,—the solitary text,—“the apostles *and* elders,” “the apostles, *and* elders, *and* brethren,” joined to a circuitous train of reasoning, remote from common apprehension, and too abstruse for the guidance of

the mass of men. Step by step, we have followed them in their circuits ; argument after argument, we have patiently displaced ; and, at the conclusion, we may ask any person of plain common-sense, to place his finger on that portion of the book of God, which is favorable to prelacy.

This argument having been met and disproved, we have produced an instance of express Presbyterian ordination, in the case of Timothy. Two churches we have found, that were organized without prelates. We are thus, by another train of argument, conducted to the same result,—that prelates are unknown in the new testament. And, to make our argument perfectly conclusive; we have shown, that the *same titles* are applied indiscriminately to all.

Our argument may be stated in still fewer words. The Episcopal claims are *not* made out ; and, of course, the clergy of the new testament are equal. The Episcopalian has failed to show, that there were *different* grades ; and it follows, that there must be *parity*. We have examined the only case of ordination specified in the new testament, and the constitution of the churches, and find, that it *is* so ; and we are conducted, inevitably, to the conclusion, that prelacy is not in the bible.

We now take our leave of the Episcopal controversy. As Episcopacy has nothing which it *can* add to the scriptural argument, we regard our labors in this department as at end. The whole *scriptural* argument is exhausted, and here *our* inquiry ends ; and here *our* interest in this topic ceases. We take leave of the subject, with the same kind feelings for that church, and the same respect for the author of the "Tract," with which we began the inquiry. We remember the former services which the Episcopal church rendered to the cause of truth, and of the world's redemption ; we remember the bright and ever-living lights of truth, which her clergy, and her illustrious laymen, have in other times enkindled in the darkness of this world's history, and which continue to pour their pure and steady luster on the literature, the laws, and the customs of the christian world ; and we trust the day will never come, when our own bosoms, or the bosoms of christians in any denomination, will cease to beat with emotions of lofty thanksgiving to the God of grace, that he raised up such gifted and holy men, to meet the corruptions of the papacy, and to breast the wickedness of the world.

In our view of ecclesiastical polity, we can have no unkind feelings towards any branch of the true church of God. We strive to cherish feelings of affectionate regard for them all, and to render praise to the common Father of christians, for any efforts which are made to advance the intelligence, the purity, and the salvation of mankind. In our views of the nature of mind, and of

freedom, we can have no unkind feelings towards any denomination of true christians. "There are diversities of operations, but the same spirit." We have no expectation, that all men, in this world, will think alike. And we regard it as a wise arrangement, that the church of God is thus organized into different sections and departments, under the banner of the common Captain of their salvation. It promotes inquiry. It prevents complacency in mere forms and ceremonies. It produces healthy and vigorous emulation. It affords opportunities for all classes of minds to arrange themselves according to their preferences, and their habits of thought. And it is not unfavorable to that kindness of feeling which the christian can cherish, and should cherish, when he utters in the sanctuary, the article of his faith, "I believe in the holy catholic church, the communion of saints." The attachment of a soldier to a particular company or squadron, need not diminish his respect for the armies of his country, or extinguish his love of her liberty. Being joined to a company of infantry, need not make me feel, that the cavalry are useless, or involve me in a controversy with the artillery.

We ask only, that Episcopacy should not assume arrogant claims; that she should be willing to take her place among other denominations of christians, entitled to like respect as others, to all the tender and sympathetic affections of the christian brotherhood; and willing, that others should walk in the liberty wherewith Christ has made his people free? We shall have no contest with our Episcopal brethren, for loving the church of their choice, and the church in which they seek to prepare themselves for heaven. We shall not utter the language of unkindness, for their reverencing the ministerial office, in which the spirits of Cranmer and Leighton were prepared for their eternal rest. Content that other denominations should enjoy like freedom, while they do not arrogate to themselves unholy claims, and attempt to "lord it over" other parts "of God's heritage;" we shall pray for their success, and rejoice in their advancement. But the moment they cross this line; the moment they make any advances which resemble those of the papacy; the moment they set up the claim of being the only 'primitive and apostolical church;' and the moment they speak of the 'invalid ministry' and the 'invalid ordinances' of the churches, and regard them as 'left to the uncovenanted mercies of God,' that moment, the language of argument and of christian rebuke may properly be heard from every other denomination. There *are* minds, that can investigate the bible, as well as the advocates for Episcopacy; there are pens, that can compete with any found in the Episcopal church; and there are men, who will not be slow to rebuke the first appearance of arrogance and of lordly assumption, and who will remind them, that the time has gone by, when an appeal to the in-

fallible church will answer in this controversy. Arrogant assumptions, they will be at once reminded, do not suit the present state of intelligence in this land, nor the genius of our institutions. While the Episcopal church shall seek, by kind and gentle means, to widen its influence, like the flowing of a river, or like the dews of heaven, we shall hail its advances; when she departs from this course, and seeks to utter the language of authority, and denunciation,—to prostrate other churches, as with the sweepings of the mountain-torrent,—she will be checked by all the intelligence and piety of this land; and she will be reminded, by a voice uttered from all the institutions of these times, that Episcopacy has had its reign of *authority* in the dark ages, and at the Vatican; and that the very genius of protestantism is, *that one church is not to utter the language of arrogance over another; and that not authority or denunciation, but SCRIPTURAL EXPOSITION, is to determine which is in accordance with the book of God.*

In our review, we expressed at length our feelings towards the Episcopal church. (pp. 36—38.) After quoting a *part* of our remarks on this subject, the author of the Answer makes these candid and kind observations:—

‘A truly splendid eulogium on our church,—and one which does credit to the candor, the benevolence, the superiority to prejudice, of the elevated mind that conceived it, and the honorable frankness which gave it public utterance. With the feelings of such a heart, as that of the author of these paragraphs, we have, we can have, no controversy whatever,—we rather desire to copy them more perfectly ourselves, and be taught more of the grand duty of love, by an opponent who so nobly and so delightfully exemplifies it.’ p. 19.

The author of the “Answer” quoted the whole of our remarks, with the exception of the last five lines. In those lines, we expressed the hope, that “the Episcopal church was destined yet to be, throughout, the warm friend of revivals, and would consecrate her wealth and power to the work of making a perpetual aggression on the territories of sin and of death.” (Review, p. 36.) Why *this* part of our remarks was omitted, as not worthy of the comment of being a “splendid eulogium on the church,” we know not. The fact was striking. We were not “amazed” by it; but we were conscious of that feeling of pensiveness, which involuntarily steals over the soul, when a christian, high in office and in talent, evinces any degree of coldness towards the great work of converting the world. We could not but ask ourselves, Is this to be interpreted as an indication, that the author of the “Answer” is alarmed at the word REVIVALS? Are we to consider it as an indication, that he could not join us in the wish, that the wealth and power of the Episcopal church should be consecrated to the work of sa-

ving the world? Are we to understand, that there is such a fear of the word revivals, and such a dread of an entire consecration of wealth and power to fulfill the special command of Christ, as to induce the author of the "Answer" to pause,—*in medias res*,—in the very midst of a quotation, rather than repeat or write the word revivals, or speak of such a consecration? It may have been, indeed, wholly an inadvertent omission; and as we prefer such an interpretation, to one which implies suspicion or improper motive, we shall close this article, as we did the former, with the wish,—a wish which shall never depart from our heart,—that, whatever may be the strength or the numbers of the Episcopal church, when the Son of God shall come, to take to himself his great power, she may be found foremost among the friends of REVIVALS,—of pure, spiritual piety, and engaged with untiring zeal amidst the van of the christian host, in making a perpetual aggression on the territories of sin and of death.

ART. IV.—MAN'S DEPENDENCE ON THE GRACE OF GOD, FOR
HOLINESS OF HEART AND LIFE.

No doctrine of the bible has been more vehemently opposed, than that of *man's dependence for holiness on the grace of God*. In every age of the world, it seems to have been the grand stumbling-block of our fallen race, and, in one form or another, has been an object of unceasing attack. This, however, should excite no surprise, when we consider, from what quarter much of the opposition here spoken of, has arisen. In the case of unrenewed men, this opposition was to have been expected. Those who hate God, as a holy being, and one who, from his very nature, as such a being, must interfere with their schemes of happiness, while in their sins, it would be natural to suppose, would quarrel with their dependence on *Him* for salvation; would dislike to be in his hands, (where this doctrine places them;) and would strongly resist the sentiment, that nothing but special and distinguishing grace will ever bring them to Christ for salvation. But, we regret to say, that opposition to this doctrine, and to the kindred doctrine of the saint's dependence on divine influence for continuance in holiness, has not always been confined to wicked men. It has sometimes been regarded by professed christians, and even by large religious denominations, as an unscriptural and dangerous doctrine, tending to produce either presumption or despair, and therefore, as decidedly hostile to the interests of true religion. That the doctrine in question has been sometimes exhibited in such a way, as to justify these impressions, we will not deny. But the true doctrine of dependence is liable to no such imputa-

tion, as we hope to show, in our further consideration of the subject. In this article, we shall confine our views to the dependence of the *christian* on divine grace, for his continuance in holiness; reserving for a future number, an examination of the doctrine, as it applies to the impenitent.

Our course of thought will lead us to exhibit the nature and reality of man's dependence for holiness on divine grace; to consider some of the difficulties which it is supposed to involve, and show, that they have no real force; and to dwell at some length upon the happy influences of this doctrine, when correctly understood, and faithfully applied.

1. In respect to the *nature*, or kind, of dependence which we have in view, we mean by it this:—that such is the perverseness of men's hearts, even after regeneration; so strong are their remaining inclinations to go astray; and so many the temptations by which they are surrounded, which are adapted to lead them astray; that, without the special grace of God to prevent it, they will, in fact, go astray, to their own undoing. There is in them no such strength of virtuous principle, as of itself to keep them in the path of duty. On the contrary, if left to themselves, they will certainly “draw back unto perdition,” in any stage of their christian course, from the period of their regeneration to the close of life. Our dependence on divine grace, then, is a dependence growing out of wrong inclination,—out of remaining sinfulness,—and not out of incapacity to do our duty. And here, we think, an erroneous view of the doctrine has very often been taken, and representations made of it, which are both false and dangerous. Whenever men are represented as *unable*, in the strict sense of the term, to obey the commands of God; when their dependence on divine grace is made the result, not of an unwillingness, but of a want of constitutional powers, to be holy; then the doctrine is not represented aright, and an impression is made respecting it, which is decidedly false: and no wonder, that, in this view of it, the doctrine is stripped of all its salutary influences, and the grace of God, involved in it, is robbed of every thing, that is attractive and lovely. This view of dependence, *so far as impenitent sinners are concerned*, is, in New-England, almost entirely discarded. Not only do the clergy, but all intelligent private christians, resist at once the plea of the sinner, that God requires him to do what he has not the capacity to perform, and then magnifies his grace, by acting as a hard master, in dispensing renewing influences to some, while he withholds them from others. They tell the sinner, that he possesses ability to do his duty, without divine aid; that the certainty, that he never *will* do his duty, if he is left to himself, is the result of his perverseness merely; that, although in fact he never will return to God, except as drawn by the influences of the Spirit, still he is not to

fold his hands, and wait inactive, till these influences descend upon him; that the truths of the gospel, if listened to, are adapted to effect his conversion; that in his conversion, he himself must *act*, as well as be acted upon from on high; that, by sitting down to wait God's time, he will seal his own perdition; that, if renewing grace shall ever reach his heart, it will be through the influence of truth, and while he is striving to "enter in at the strait gate." But while New-England christians, as a body, are thus faithful to *impenitent sinners*, in the statements which they make, respecting the doctrine of dependence, we fear they are not always equally faithful to *themselves*, in applying the same truths to their *own* hearts and consciences. That is, they do not sufficiently feel, we fear, what is the nature of dependence in their own case; that it consists, not in the want of *power*, but in the sinful corruption of their hearts.

The dependence of which we speak, therefore, is the dependence of an *active, voluntary, moral* being. It is not the dependence of mere matter. It is not the dependence of simple intelligence, upon Him who created and upholds it. It relates solely to the fact, that men, as *free, active, voluntary* beings, never *will* give their hearts to God, except as he inclines them to do it. They *will*, invariably, act wrong, till he influences them to act right. They will freely choose the way to death, till he turns them from it. And when they have become christians,—when they have thus begun to act right, and have entered upon the path of life,—God, by his Spirit, must *keep* them in that way, or they will otherwise forsake it and perish. But, in exerting an influence thus to uphold them, it must be borne in mind, that it is exerted, not upon passive, inert matter, nor upon mere intelligence, (to give light and knowledge,) but upon *active, voluntary, moral* beings; and of course, that its effects upon them will be those only, which the nature of such beings allows. That is, in all that takes place, as the result of this influence upon man, he is still the same, active, voluntary being as before, and his actions are as properly his own, as they are when he acts purely from himself, and without any influence from on high. There is no influence of the Spirit, on the heart of the christian or the sinner, which does not relate to him, wholly and entirely, as an *active, voluntary* being. It finds him such, as it meets him; and it leaves him such, after all its power has been exerted upon him, while he was subject to its influence.

It is proper to remark further, under this topic, that the dependence of which we are speaking, is *entire*; christians are dependent on divine grace, for *all* their holiness, from first to last. This is as true after men are converted, as at the time of their conversion. The first right purpose and right feeling within the soul, and every subsequent right purpose and feeling, through life, are the

fruits of the Spirit's influence upon us ; insomuch, that without the Spirit's influence upon us, they would never have existed. Thus we are prepared, by the doctrine under consideration, with literal truth, to ascribe to God the whole praise of our deliverance from sin, and transformation into his image, from its commencement to its consummation. It is, really and truly, the result of his own efficacious grace.

2. But it is alledged, that there are serious *difficulties* connected with this subject ; difficulties so serious, that many do not know how to remove them. We cheerfully grant, that difficulties do exist on this subject ; but they are rather of a philosophical, than of a practical kind, and such, as need not seriously embarrass the christian for a single moment. Indeed, we think, that these difficulties are apt to vanish, as soon as men are ready, *in practice*, to undertake their removal. They lie in the way till then, because, till then, men have an end to serve, in letting them lie there. To present at once the whole force of these difficulties, take a case often stated for that purpose, the case of the *backsliding* christian. He acknowledges, that he has fallen into a state of coldness ; that he does not realize eternal things, as he once did ; and that he has lost his wonted enjoyment, as a christian. In this condition, the doctrine of dependence on the grace of God, is presented to him. He looks at it, and says : If these things are truly so ; if, without the Spirit's influences, I shall never return from my backslidings, and regain my wonted peace and serenity of mind ; then what have I to do, but to sit down and wait till these influences descend upon me ? Is he told, that he must pray, for that God has graciously promised to bestow these influences upon his children, when they ask for them ? True, he replies ; but the asking must be in faith : it is not the mere cry of suffering nature ; it is the plea of filial confidence, to which the promise is made. But faith is itself the gift of God, the result of that very influence which the backslider needs to revive his soul. How then is he to pray aright for divine influence, unless it is first given him ? And what can he do *at all*, towards breaking away from the power of corruption in his heart, and returning back to God, except as the Spirit of God shall *previously* move upon his darkened soul ? The result is, that he sits down to wait God's time, in his coldness and backsliding. Such, we believe, is the actual influence of the view entertained by many, respecting man's dependence on the grace of God. The practical inference, which they deny to the impenitent sinner, they themselves adopt, and act upon. We believe it to be, both to the christian and the sinner, one of the most subtle temptations of the adversary of souls. Now, that in *some* way these views are wrong, must be evident to any one who looks into the word of God. Not one inference of this kind, do we find to have been

made by a single saint, whose experience is recorded in the sacred volume. Nothing is more clear, than that the scripture doctrine of dependence on divine grace, was never intended to cherish a spirit of sloth or inactivity, nor to operate in any way, as a discouragement to exertion. On the contrary, it is uniformly held out as a motive to strenuous *effort*, for the attainment of holiness. Whether we can explain the philosophy of the subject, or not; whether we can understand how the backsliding christian can *begin* to seek God at all, or not; we know, that the inferences stated above are erroneous. We know, too, by our own experience, that if we begin, in the coldest and most unpromising state of mind, to cry to God in prayer; to occupy our thoughts in contemplations upon his excellence and glory; to press home upon conscience a sense of guilt; to dwell steadily on that most affecting of all spectacles, the sufferings of Christ in the room of sinners: although our minds for a time may seem unaffected; though all may be dark and discouraging, and our spiritual sensibility may seem utterly extinguished; still, if we are faithful to ourselves, if we take time, and yield not to the despairing suggestions of an evil heart, we shall at length succeed, and though we "sow in tears, we shall reap in joy." The true doctrine, then, of our dependence on divine grace, is a doctrine which never dispenses with our activity. "Sanctify them through thy *truth*," is the prayer of the Savior himself; and we know, therefore, what to do, whenever we desire to grow in grace. Without suffering our minds to be perplexed, for a moment, with metaphysical subtleties, we must begin at once to *act*; we must apply our understandings, with steady and persevering effort, to the contemplation of divine truth, and urge, with reiterated cries, our suit at the throne of grace, without one moment's delay, or a single doubt of our ultimate success. Divine truth is perfectly adapted to such a being as man. It is not a mere appointment of sovereignty, that the truth should be used, in our endeavors after holiness. There are principles, in the very structure of the human soul, to which the truths of the bible make the strongest and most affecting appeals. In the case even of the *unconverted*, the Holy Spirit operates (as we are assured,) through the instrumentality of these truths, though, as we firmly believe, in some more direct way, than merely by presenting them to the mind. But in the case of one who has already been renewed, there is, in addition to these natural principles, a spiritual seed implanted, which is never wholly extinct,—a spiritual sensibility begotten, which, though it may seem utterly suspended, in our seasons of backsliding, still exists, to be operated upon by that word of God, which is "sharper than any two-edged sword." We believe, therefore, that whatever *metaphysical* difficulties there may seem to be, on a first view of the case, these difficulties will

all disappear, whenever the mind is led to look at them with candor, and when it no longer wishes to make use of them, as the hiding-places of obstinacy and sloth. And we would here repeat a sentiment, which we have formerly expressed in our pages, that there is no reason to believe, that the gift of the Holy Spirit is an arbitrary dispensation; or, that the child of God, who is faithful and persevering, need ever remain, for any length of time, without sensible evidence of the presence of that blessed comforter, in his own heart.

The same difficulty, which we have just been attempting to obviate, is sometimes stated in *another* form. How, it is asked, shall the christian, who has been reclaimed from his backslidings, and is now living near to God, *preserve* this happy state of mind? He dreads to lose it; and from his past painful experience, he knows, that if left to be his own keeper, he will lose it. But if he is thus dependent on the Spirit of God, for the continuance of his present spirituality and joy, is there any thing at all for *him* to do, to "keep himself in the love of God"? We answer, as above, that there is something for *him* to do. This happy state of mind will not of itself continue; it may and will be lost, except as appropriate steps are taken on his part to preserve it. These steps are, in a word, meditation on divine truth, watchfulness over himself, and prayer. There is no necessity for the christian's growing cold and formal again, after he has been reclaimed from his backslidings. His heart may be, habitually, kept warm and engaged in the service of God. He may live always under the influence of the great truths of the bible, and, day by day, feel their governing power upon his soul. But he cannot do this, without taking pains for it. He cannot do this, if he entertain any such views of his dependence on the Spirit's influences, as shall lead him to remit his own efforts, and sit down in idleness and sloth, to wait God's time. He must follow the inspired direction, "*work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure.*" As to *motives* to such effort, (another difficulty sometimes alleged,) under a true view of dependence, they are abundant. They are to be found in the fact, that God requires such effort; that such effort is adapted to the end in view; that it has uniformly been followed, in all past experience, with success; and that, without it, the christian graces as uniformly all droop and wither. Let every child of God, then, remember, that the warmth and elevation of his piety will be proportioned to the amount of well-directed *effort*, which he shall put forth, to advance in holiness. And if his piety now, is in a low and declining state, let him know and feel the *cause* of it, and not charge upon the doctrine of dependence, consequences which by no means belong to it.

3. With this view of the true *nature* of dependence on divine grace, and the *difficulties* supposed to be involved in it, we come now to the main design of this article,—to point out some of the *beneficial influences* of this doctrine, when it is properly understood, and faithfully applied in practice.

1. Correct views of the nature of the christian's dependence on divine grace, inspire and cherish a sense of God's presence, and a reliance upon his aid, in *all* the varied employments and concerns of life. Most christians feel, that on important occasions, and in trying emergencies, they are to look to God, for the temper and spirit which are requisite to a proper discharge of their duties. But how apt are they to forget this, in respect to every-day occurrences,—the thousand *little* concerns which try our tempers, and affect more or less our christian character! But when we carry out the doctrine of dependence to its proper length, and feel, that without the Spirit's influences, we shall do *nothing* right; that a holy heart is our best counsellor, in the most common concerns of life, as well as in more trying emergencies; we shall then be continually lifting up our souls to God for his aid, in the midst of *all* our employments, both small and great. The effect of thus constantly coming back to God, as to every thing, and looking to him for the requisite aid in the discharge of *all* duty, must be truly desirable. It will give a proper balance to the mind, under prosperity; when, without some check or counterpoise of this kind, the mind will be in danger of losing its balance, and becoming inflated with pride and self-exaltation. What a support, also, does it give in adversity, when the heart is in danger of sinking into despondency, and becoming discouraged, except as there is something for it to lean upon, from without itself, and beyond the present scene! What an incentive does it supply, to watchfulness over ourselves, and to the humble, cheerful, persevering "exercising of ourselves unto godliness"! What an all-pervading influence is there in the reflection,—*God is present*; he is the source of my spiritual strength in every thing, in the smallest as well as the greatest duties; and, if I am active and faithful to secure his guidance, I shall never be without his aid! Is there any view, which the human mind can take, which, in so many ways, tends to exert a beneficial influence upon us, under all circumstances, and at all times? Is it any wonder, that the christian who acts habitually under this influence, should exhibit a calmness, an equanimity, a moral courage, a fixedness of purpose, in the path of duty, such as christians sometimes have exhibited, and such as were never produced by any other cause?

2. A proper view of our dependence on God for holiness, cherishes a *humbling* sense of our *depravity* by nature, and those other graces to which that state of mind gives rise. There are

views of the doctrines of dependence, we believe, which have no such influence, but which have directly the opposite tendency. They are those to which we have already alluded, which represent man as incapable, in *any* sense of the term, of doing any good thing; which make him dependent on the grace of God for power, as well as for willingness, to do his duty. Such views must, of necessity, preclude any definite or practical sense of guilt. For how is it possible, that a man should feel guilty of having done wrong, when he believes himself *unable* to do otherwise? If there is a dependence for holiness, which makes it necessary for God to bestow his grace, in order to give men ability to obey his commands; then where is the criminality, without this grace, of *not* obeying his commands? And how, on this principle, can a just sense of guilt ever be fastened on the sinner's mind? The *gracious* ability to do our duty, (of which some speak,) seems to us to partake nothing of the nature of *grace*; for if God requires obedience of those who are unable to render it, he is bound to bestow the ability, before the obligation to comply with his requirement can exist. How this tends to preclude a sense of guilt, and to make the sinner feel, that he is unfortunate, rather than to blame, is easily seen. But on the other view, that man is not unable, but unwilling, to obey God; that his dependence on divine grace results entirely from his own wicked perverseness; there is ample ground to charge home guilt upon him, and room for his feeling the justice of the charge, and sinking into the dust, under the weight of it. And this is the direct and proper tendency of a right view of dependence: it goes to produce a deep and overwhelming sense of guilt, and of depravity by nature, and thus to cover us with shame and confusion of face before God. When we see and feel, that it is nothing but the sheer perversity of our hearts, which renders the grace of God necessary to our holiness; when we reflect on all the *motives* which we have to love God, and then dwell on the dreadful truth, that we have never done it, and never shall do it, except as the direct result of divine influence on our hearts; how can we help laying our hand on our mouth, and our mouth in the dust, and crying, Unclean! unclean! God be merciful to me a sinner! To feel, after all the joy and peace which we have had in believing, that if God were to let us go for a moment, we should sink back into utter hardness of heart and blindness of mind,—how dreadful an exhibition is this, of our lost and ruined state by nature! How is such a view of ourselves, and of all that we are, in and of our ourselves, irrespectively of divine grace, calculated to humble us, and to show us the extreme and hopeless misery of our case, without the influences of the Spirit to raise us up from out of this condition! Surely, if any thing can beget within us the spirit of humility, it is this view of ourselves. If any truth can

lower our pride, shut out self-confidence, and break down the principle of separation between us and God, it is this very thing; it is found in the doctrine of our dependence on God's special grace for holiness. Besides, it is a natural result of these humbling views of ourselves, as thus taught us by the doctrine in question, to lead us to cherish a feeling of forbearance towards *others*, and a reluctance to condemn them; a feeling, that, aside from the grace of God, we are probably more guilty than they, and deserving of a sorer condemnation; a resolution, never to speak of their faults, unless required to do it, as an act of duty; a disposition to place ourselves low, not only before God, but before one another, "esteeming others better than ourselves." Some of the "resolutions" of Edwards, and many passages in the life of David Brainerd, will here occur to our readers, who are familiar with the writings of these eminently holy men. We may remark, also, in this place, that these humbling views of ourselves, as thus taught us by the doctrine of our dependence on divine grace, will induce us to urge that doctrine upon others, and especially the impenitent, in a spirit of deep humility and kindness. The doctrine of dependence, and that of divine sovereignty, are sometimes inculcated, unconsciously perhaps, in a harsh and unfeeling manner; and the denunciations of wrath, in the word of God, against those who shall be left to perish in their sins, are often uttered in a tone of superiority, and almost of unkindness, which ill becomes a worm of the dust, who speaks in the name of his Maker. When we remember, that, in uttering these denunciations, we may be pronouncing our own doom, and should be, but for preventing grace, a sense of propriety would surely dictate, that we should abstain from all appearance of severity or unkindness; that we should feel tenderly towards all men; that our bowels of compassion should yearn over them; and that, if their conduct is such, that we *must* tell them their "end is destruction," we should do it as St. Paul did, "even weeping." Now these, and such as these, are the very feelings, towards others, which a correct view of our own dependence on the grace of God for salvation, will naturally produce.

3. A just view of the doctrine of dependence, gives the most cheering *encouragement* to *diligence* and *effort*, in building up the kingdom of God in our own souls, and in all our attempts for the benefit of others. False views of this doctrine, as we have already intimated, discourage effort. They wrap the backsliding christian in the mantle of indolence, and make him to exclaim, as to the impenitent around him: "If the Lord should make windows in heaven, then might this thing be." But when we take the doctrine in its true character, as involving an influence which implies, in its very nature, the activity of its subject, we then feel the whole force of the apostle's exhortation, "Work out your own salvation,—for it

is God that worketh in you." When oppressed by a sense of sin, and by the strength of sinful inclinations, and surrounded by difficulties on every side, this doctrine is our only support ; and when properly embraced, it is an unfailing support, because it sends us to One, who is able to succor. We can then understand the apostle, when he says : " When I am weak, then am I strong ; " " I can do all things through Christ, who strengtheneth me ; " " most gladly, therefore, will I glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me." There is an influence, then, in this reliance on divine aid, which is of the most encouraging and cheering kind. When the doctrine is not held in such a manner, as to dispense with our own activity ; when it is viewed as ever involving the necessity of such activity on our part, and yet the reliance is on *God*, to give us success ; can there be any thing better adapted to encourage to untiring effort ? Nothing, then, in the path of duty, seems too great for us to undertake. Nothing, then, which ought to be done, in the business of our own spiritual improvement, or in sacrifices and self-denials for Christ's sake, is regarded as an impracticable matter. We can take up any cross ; we can face any danger. So, too, in our efforts for the benefit of others. We feel, on the one hand, that the work is God's ; and, on the other, that well-directed human instrumentality is indispensable, and may avail much. The humble *pastor*, as he weeps and prays over his beloved flock,—what an encouragement is it to him, to know, that there is a Being, who can subdue men's corruptions, and triumph over every difficulty which obstructs the success of the gospel. When he has presented to his people, again and again, the truths of the Bible, to no purpose, and perceives their hearts to be growing more and more hardened, perhaps, under these truths ; how sustaining, how encouraging to his sinking mind, is the assurance, that the grace of God can yet give efficacy to his hitherto fruitless ministrations among them ; and that, if he is faithful and persevering in his efforts to do them good, and in his prayers in their behalf, there is much reason to believe, that he will not be suffered to labor in vain, and spend his strength for nought ! The christian *parent*, too, as he watches, and prays, and longs for, the conversion of his children,—what an encouragement is it to him, that he can recur to the doctrine under consideration, and look up to God, and feel, that the hearts of the loved ones are in His hands, and that he can turn them, as the rivers of water are turned ! What an encouragement is this, for him to use means with them, and try unceasingly to do them good, and never to give over, while life lasts ! The same may be said of the *sabbath-school teacher* and of every good man, in all the various instrumentalities which we are called to use, in building up the kingdom of Christ on earth. Pre-eminently is this true of the *missionary*, when he goes forth

to distant heathen lands, "to turn men from darkness to light, and from the power of satan unto God." In all these cases, a just view of the doctrine of dependence, is the sole ground of encouragement to go forward in our work. For it is indubitably certain, that, without the influence of God's Spirit, such is man's perverseness of heart, not a soul will listen to the gospel, and be saved. Paul may plant, and Apollos water, in vain. How delightful, then, is it, in looking over this world,—this wide waste of sin,—this vast scene of corruption, guilt, and misery,—to know, that God has given us encouragement to look to *him*, that he would perform the mighty work, and bring the reign of sin on earth to a close, through our instrumentality! What other and higher encouragement to action than this, can we need or have?

4. A right view of dependence on divine grace, cherishes a proper spirit, in *prayer* for the conversion of the world. This is the great object on which the hearts of christians ought to be fixed,—to carry into effect the dying injunction of the Redeemer, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." Until the church has a very different spirit, on this subject, from what has been felt hitherto by christians generally, the people of God must bear the reproach of standing in the way of the progress of the gospel, and of holding back from mankind, the universal reign of truth and holiness. God himself has said, that he does not desire the death of the wicked; and has spoken of a period, when he will descend upon the nations, by the influence of his Spirit, like "the rain that watereth the earth." But how much of the prayer which is offered for the introduction of the millennial day, is utterly ineffectual, because founded in false views of the doctrine of dependence! Multitudes seem to feel, as though the millenium was to be brought about by some miraculous exertion of physical power, on the part of God. Let just views of this doctrine prevail; let men feel, that human activity is inseparably connected with the influences of divine grace; and they will either cease to pray for the millenium, or begin to act efficiently, in preparing the way for its coming. If the whole church, at this moment, had just views of this subject; if they united, as they ought, the doctrines of activity and dependence, with God's yearning compassion over this lost world, and his desires for its salvation; have we not reason to believe, that the work of converting the world, would be consummated within the compass of a single generation? Is there room for any serious doubt on this subject? If not, how can christians excuse themselves, to their own consciences, for their negligence? If it be true, or *may* be true, that this world's conversion to God is delayed, through their criminal indifference and inactivity, what a tremendous amount of responsibility are they taking upon themselves! But we do not see how

this inference can be avoided. Christians who are inactive, and living without the proper spirit of prayer for the conversion of the world, are standing in the way of the progress of Christ's kingdom. To them it is owing, that millions upon millions, in every generation, go down to death, without the knowledge of a Savior. We tremble, and are amazed, at such a responsibility. Now, would these things be so, if the view taken by many, of man's dependence, were the *right* view, and the spirit of the church, in *prayer* for the world's conversion, were the proper spirit?

5. A right view of dependence, would cherish an habitual spirit of *cheerfulness* and *joy* in the heart of the christian. He needs such a spirit, to carry him through his trials, and animate him in his work. The influence of christian joy and confidence in God, as a stimulus to successful action, in such a world as this, must be apparent. A calm, steadfast, joyous reliance on Almighty aid,—how it would help us to go forward in trying circumstances, and to surmount difficulties, which, in any other state of mind, it would be impossible for us to overcome! An obligation, too, is resting upon us, to exhibit religion to others, in an interesting and attractive light. We cannot be faithful to our divine Master, in any other way. We cannot be true to his cause, except as we hold forth, in our deportment before the world, and in the very spirit which animates us to run the race set before us, the delightful influence, the peace, the hope, the temporal satisfaction and joy, which may, and should, spring from a firm reliance on God for success. Others, in the world around us, have a right to claim the benefit of such an example at our hands, and we are bound to furnish it. We are bound to let them see what christianity is, in its practical, everyday influence upon our life and temper, that they may obtain a right impression of it; and then, if they turn away from it, as thus exhibited, the fault will not be ours. Now, what *is* the natural effect, upon the temper and the life, of just views of dependence on a God of love, and purity, and power, for progress in holiness? What feelings does this sentiment tend to awaken within us? Does it not tend eminently to *encourage* and *animate* to effort? Is not its whole influence, to fix the heart immovably on its proper center,—God; and thus to inspire the cheerfulness of living hope, and ceaseless confidence and joy? What calm delight; what tempered satisfaction, in prosperous circumstances; what strength, and fixedness of heart, under trials; what superiority to the power of temptation; what sweet assurance of our acceptance with God; what anticipations and foretastes of heavenly blessedness; what humility; what prevalence in prayer; in a word, what a beautiful specimen of happy piety, would be presented to the world, if the full influence of the doctrine under consideration, were exemplified in the lives of all christians! But, to see the full

influence of this doctrine,—to learn all its tendencies to make those happy who truly embrace it,—we must look beyond this world; we must trace its effects, in the feelings and in the songs of the redeemed on high. What, then, is the *chief* ingredient in the blessedness of the saints above, as they cast their crowns before the throne,—what is it, but the blessedness of ascribing their salvation, not only to the atonement of Christ, but to the distinguishing, efficacious grace of the Holy Spirit? Such, too, when they have a right view of it, is the influence of the same doctrine upon God's children on earth. It prompts them to exclaim, "Why me!" "Why me!" "Infinite grace!" "Infinite grace!"

In concluding this interesting theme, two remarks seem specially necessary. The *first* is, that we should be careful to *distinguish*, clearly, between a true and a false reliance on God, for holiness, and for salvation. A true reliance, while it makes God all in all, as the efficient agent in our progress heavenward, includes, also, and at every step of our advance in holiness, our own personal activity. God does not make us holy, and fit us for heaven, as mere passive recipients of divine influence; but he does it by leading us, in the exercise of our active powers, to do his will; by exciting us to use in a right manner, the capacities which he has given us; by inclining us to act, as he would have us act, with the powers which we already possess. This is the sum and substance of such a doctrine. A dependence, then, on the grace of God for holiness, which leaves us inactive, and still sunk in sloth and apathy, is indeed far from being the true doctrine upon this subject. It is wholly a different thing, although it is often, very often, we fear, mistaken for the other.

Our *second* remark relates to the importance of *cultivating* the actual and ever-present *feeling* of dependence on the grace of God. It is one thing, to believe this doctrine, as an abstract truth, and another thing, to *feel* and *realize* it, as a matter of fact. It is in this latter view of it, that its practical utility wholly consists. And it is in this view of it, especially, that we would urge the importance of making use of every possible means to acquire such a realizing sense of it. It can be acquired. A sense of dependence on divine grace can be, and should be felt, and felt deeply and habitually, by every christian; it is the best safeguard of our virtue here; it is our only ground of rest and confidence, that we shall not fall away, and be lost forever. Let us therefore cultivate, with all our power, the actual *feeling* of dependence on God, for sanctification, as well as for justification, for the fruits of the Spirit on earth, as well as for their blissful reward in heaven. And as *means* to this end, let us often ponder upon our depravity and guilt; let us take deep and thorough views of the corruption of our hearts; let us dwell much on the infinite

excellence and glory of God, on the offices of Christ, and the work of the Spirit, in our redemption. Let us often think of the worth of the soul, and of the value of the prize at stake,—the prize for which the christian runs,—“the prize of the high calling of God, in Christ Jesus our Lord.” As we are careful to guard against a false view of our dependence, so, too, let us not be satisfied with a slight and feeble *sense* of our dependence. Let us have the sentiment firmly established within us, so that we can carry it with us, *practically*, into all the employments of life. Let it be present with us in our trials and sorrows. Let it not be laid aside, nor forgotten, in our brighter and more prosperous days. Let it guide, and let it animate us, through all our pilgrimage on earth. Let it support us in death. Let it be the theme of our everlasting songs. But, we reiterate the caution already given, let it not be mistaken for something else, nor perverted to any other use, than its true and legitimate one. Let it be, only and always, a stimulus to effort and diligence, in promoting holiness and happiness, as far as we can, and as long as we live.

ART. V.—COUSIN'S PSYCHOLOGY.

Elements of Psychology: included in a critical examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. By VICTOR COUSIN, Professor of Philosophy of the Faculty of Literature, at Paris; Peer of France; and member of the Royal Council of Public Instruction. Translated from the French, with an introduction, notes, and additions, by C. S. HENRY. Hartford: Cooke, & Co. 1834.

WE entered on the reading of this volume with unusual interest. The Edinburgh reviewer, and others, had spoken of the work in terms of admiration. We had a curiosity to see, what fashion would be given to mental philosophy, by habits of thinking, so peculiar as those of the French people. We were anxious to know, how the principles of Locke would fare, in the hands of a metaphysician so distinguished as Cousin. *The Essay on the Human Understanding* has so long been read as a text-book, in our schools and colleges, that our philosophical speculations derive much of their support, from the foundation which that work has laid. If this should prove to be unsound, we may be under the necessity of looking around for other means of giving stability to many of our favorite metaphysical structures. On the other hand, if the ground-work of Locke is found to stand the trial of a thorough examination, by the philosophers of Paris, and to receive their sanction, our confidence in the correctness of his principles will naturally be strengthened. For, as Voltaire says, “When a Frenchman and an Englishman think alike, there must be some very good reason for it.”

The translator makes the following statement, in the advertisement prefixed to the volume :—

'In the year 1829, M. COUSIN delivered a course of Lectures, which was published in two volumes octavo, under the title of "History of Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century." Of this course, the *second* volume contains an extended critical analysis of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. The Lectures, from the sixteenth to the twenty-fifth inclusive, are taken up with this analysis. These are the Lectures of which a translation is here given to the public.

This examination of the Essay on the Human Understanding, is pronounced, by the writer of the article on the "Philosophy of Perception," in the EDINBURGH REVIEW, for October, 1830, No. 103, Art. IX. p. 191, to be "*the most important work on Locke, since the Nouveaux Essais of Leibnitz.*"

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In regard to the form of the work, I have thought it best to print the ten Lectures of which the work is composed, as so many distinct chapters; changing the numbering, to give to it the form of a work by itself. As to the rest, I have aimed to give an exact translation, with no other changes than the omission of some of the more direct forms of address used by a lecturer to his audience, and also an explanatory word or clause occasionally inserted in brackets.

In the appendix, I have brought together,—without any pretensions to a regular plan of elucidating the text, and without having any particular class of readers in view,—such remarks as occurred to me in the progress of preparing the work; and also, extracts from the author's other writings, and from other sources,—partly as they were indicated by the author, and partly as they occurred to my own recollection.' pp. iii, iv.

A correct knowledge of the system maintained by Locke, is essential to an advantageous study of the history of modern intellectual philosophy; as his opinions are interwoven in the discussions of almost all succeeding writers on the subject, both in Great Britain, and on the continent of Europe. They are either his followers, or perverters, or opposers. The object of his celebrated Treatise on the Understanding, is, to "inquire into the origin, extent, and certainty of human *knowledge*;" and in preparing the way for this, to explain the origin and nature of our *ideas*. In entering on an examination of his work, almost every page of which treats of ideas, we are met with the preliminary question, whether we really *have any ideas*? Some philosophers affect to consider what they are pleased to call Mr. Locke's *ideal system*, as already exploded. We shall in vain look for a satisfactory decision on this point, unless we have a distinct understanding of the meaning of the term *idea*. We think, that it is used in *three* different senses. In common discourse, it is, perhaps, generally understood to be

synonymous with *thought*. To have an idea, is to have a thought. But by some philosophers, and sometimes even in familiar conversation, the term idea is used to signify, not thought itself, but the *object of thought*; that about which any one is thinking: not the *act* of the mind, but the object which is presented to its view; that which any one sees, or hears, or imagines, or remembers. Again, it has been supposed by many, that an external object can be perceived only by means of an *image*, or *species*, as it is termed, introduced into the brain, and there presented to the view of the mind, in some such manner, as a distant object is *seen*, by means of an image painted on the retina of the eye. We have, then, these three significations of the term idea.

1. *Thought*.
2. The *object* of thought.
3. The *medium* of thought.

The latter may be called, for distinction sake, a *representative* idea.

Whole systems of philosophy, as we apprehend, owe their origin to the confounding of these several meanings. As Mr. Locke uses the term in almost every paragraph; as his whole work is an inquiry into the origin, nature, and comparison of ideas, and the knowledge which we derive from them; it is all-important, in reading his treatise, to be able to interpret correctly the meaning which he gives to the word. His style is not distinguished for philosophical precision in the use of terms. His language is often figurative, and not unfrequently ambiguous. Avoiding, for the most part, the technical phraseology of metaphysics, he endeavors to express philosophical opinions in common English; a language, which, in his day, was far from being brought to the state of precision which it has since attained, by the labors of philologists and lexicographers, and the influence of logical, and scientific, and literary discussion. As he introduced a new philosophy, there was then no scientific language accommodated to the original views which he wished to express. The technical words and phrases of the *old* philosophy, would not answer his purpose. He gives to certain terms a latitude of signification, which would scarcely be admissible, in philosophical writings, at the present day. For example, the word *perception* he employs to express the notice which the mind takes of *any* object, whether material or mental; whereas, it is now commonly restricted, in logical use, to our observation of the qualities of matter. He appears not to have particularly marked the distinction, so advantageously made by later writers, between *perception* and *sensation*; using them interchangeably, except that he applies the latter term to the effects produced on the mind by material objects only. His language is not so logically exact, that the precise signification can

always be determined from a single sentence, cut out from its place, and transferred to the pages of another writer, so as to exclude the opportunity of illustration from adjoining passages. His meaning is to be gathered, rather from the general current of the composition, than from particular and insulated expressions. There are few writers who would be more liable to be misunderstood, from mere fragments of passages presented in quotations. Whole volumes of finely-wrought speculation, have originated in the misconstruction of a single sentence. On one essential point, however, as if anticipating the blunders of his commentators, he has taken special pains to guard against misapprehension; though, we have reason to believe, without much success. As his whole *Essay on the Human Understanding* depends upon the meaning of the word *idea*, he has opened the work with a formal definition.

In what sense, then, does Mr. Locke use the term *idea*? Does he mean by it, *thought*, simply, or the *object* of thought, or the *medium* of thought? Let him speak for himself. "I must here, in the entrance, beg pardon of my reader, for the frequent use of the word *idea*, which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the *object of the understanding*, when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the *mind can be employed about* in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it. I presume it will be granted me, that there are such ideas in men's minds; every one is *conscious* of them in himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy him, that they are in others." B. I. ch. i. § 8. Again, "Every man being conscious to himself, that he thinks; and that which his *mind is applied about* whilst thinking, being the ideas that are there; 'tis past doubt, that men have in their minds several ideas, such as are those expressed in the words, whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others; it is, in the first place, to be inquired, how he comes by them." B. II. ch. i. § 1. "Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate *object* of perception, thought, or understanding, *that I call idea*." B. II. ch. viii. § 8. In Mr. Locke's second letter to the bishop of Worcester, he says, "The *things* signified by *idea*, are nothing but the *immediate objects* of our minds in thinking. So that, unless any one can oppose the article your lordship defends, without *thinking on something*, he must use the *things* signified by ideas; for he that thinks, must have some immediate object of his mind in thinking: i. e., must have ideas."

Does Mr. Locke, in these passages, by defining *idea* to be the "immediate object of the mind in thinking," mean to say, that it is that *image or species* in the brain, which some philosophers sup-

pose to be the *medium* of thought; the *means* by which objects are brought into the view of the mind? He has, it is true, introduced into his definitions, the ambiguous terms, *phantasm*, *notion*, and *species*. These are *sometimes* used to signify an image on the brain. But they are not invariably to be so understood. With respect to "such ideas" as Mr. Locke has defined, he says, "Every one is conscious of them in himself." Now, is *every* man conscious of having images or species in the brain; those phantasms which are supposed, by some philosophers, to be the medium of thought? Are these the *only* objects on which we are conscious of thinking? Phantasms in the brain *may be* ideas, even in Mr. Locke's sense, whenever some philosopher, in his speculations, happens to be thinking of them; that is, to make them the object of his thoughts. But do we never think of *any thing else*? Are these the only objects to which, according to the evidence of consciousness, our attention is directed, when we look abroad, upon the diversified scenes of the world around us? Mr. Locke says he uses the word idea, to signify *whatever* it is which the mind *can* be employed about in thinking. The *hypothesis* concerning the *means* of thought, is wholly distinct from the *fact*, that whenever we think, we are *thinking of something*; and that this something is the object of our thoughts.

What, then, is the meaning which Mr. Locke intends to give to the term ideas? We understand him to mean, THE OBJECTS OF THOUGHT; the things, either real or imaginary, on which we are at any time thinking: to use his own language, "whatever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks." He takes it for granted, that a man cannot think, "without thinking on something," and that something is the "thing signified by idea."

Can it be so, then, that, according to Locke, *things themselves*, and not mere *images* of things, are signified by the term ideas? Does he mean to call the heavens and the earth, mountains, rivers, forests, and every thing else, ideas? Is there no distinction to be made between *ideas* and *things*? We answer, that so far as things are brought before any man's mind; so far as they are made the objects of his thoughts; they are, for the time, that man's ideas, in the sense in which we understand Mr. Locke. Speaking of our complex ideas of substances, he observes, "I shall consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind, taken from combinations of simple *ideas existing* together constantly *in things*." B. II. ch. xxxii. § 18. Again, the mind is said to make a false judgment, "when in its complex idea, it has united a certain number of simple *ideas that do really exist* together, in some sorts of creatures; but has left out others as much inseparable." B. II. ch. xxii. § 23. "Our complex ideas of substances, are such combinations of sim-

ple ideas, as are really united, and *co-exist in things without us.*" B. II. ch. xxx. § 5. "All the inquiries, that we can make concerning any of our ideas; all that we know, or can affirm, concerning any of them, is, that it is or is not the same with some other; that it does or does not co-exist with some other, *in the same subject*; that it has this or that relation to some other idea; or, that it has a *real existence without the mind.*" B. IV. ch. i. § 7.

What then is the *difference*, according to Locke, between ideas and things?

Our idea of a thing, is what the thing *appears* to us to be; what we *think* it to be. But the appearance may be different from the reality. If a man thinks of any thing precisely as it is, there is *no* difference between his idea and the thing. If he has a correct notion of a circle, the circle itself is his idea, the real object of his thoughts. But things often *appear* to us very different from what they are in fact. Our ideas of them are then different from the things themselves. An idea is not always a real thing. It may be a picture of the imagination. On the other hand, a thing is not always an idea. It may be the object of no man's thoughts. It may be an idea at one time, and not at another. It may be the idea of one man, and not of others.

But Mr. Locke speaks of ideas, as being *in the mind*. Does not this imply, that he uses the term to signify *thought itself*, rather than the object of thought? "'Tis past doubt," he says, "that men have *in their minds* several ideas, such as those expressed in the words, *man, elephant, army, drunkenness, etc.*" Is an elephant a thought? Is drunkenness a thought? We can easily understand, that they may be *objects* of thought. But it would require more metaphysics than we have at command, to convert them into thought itself. Locke says, that "*fluidity* is a simple idea;" that "the substance *wood*, which is a certain collection of simple ideas so called, by the application of fire, is turned into another substance called *ashes*, i. e., another complex idea." B. II. ch. xxvi. § 1. Are wood and ashes collections of *thoughts*? When he speaks of ideas as "*co-existing in things without us*;" as having "*a real existence without the mind*;" does he mean to say, that our *thoughts* have an existence without the mind? Do the hills, the rocks, and the rivers, *think*, whenever we happen to be thinking of them? He says, that "diagrams drawn on paper, are *copies* of the ideas *in the mind.*" B. III. ch. iii. § 19. Does he intend by this, that when we see a circle or triangle, we have a circular or triangular thought?

What then *can* be meant, when it is said, that ideas are *in the mind*? Just what is meant in common discourse, when we speak of any object of thought, as being in the mind; not *in the same place*,

or *in contact* with the mind; but *in view* of the mind; as we say, we have a distant object *in our eye*; that is, it is brought into our view. "If these words, to be *in* the understanding," says Mr. Locke, "have any propriety, they signify *to be understood*." B. I. ch. ii. § 5. When a man thinks of the battle of Waterloo, does he bring its marshaled hosts, its thundering artillery, its slaughtered thousands, literally *into* his mind?

Still, the question may be asked, Are not our ideas, even when considered as objects of thought, *phenomena* of mind; especially in the case of unreal pictures, formed by the imagination? Are not these mere creations of our mind? Are they really distinct from our thoughts? We answer, our ideas, considered as objects of thought, cannot be so separated from our thoughts, as to continue still to be our ideas, when we are no longer thinking upon them. But the *act* of the mind, in forming a conception, is distinct from the object conceived. We can think of *pain*, without suffering pain at the time. Some of our happiest moments are those in which our minds are dwelling upon the danger and distress which we have just escaped. We can make *anger* the object of our thoughts, without being angry. In the case of *memory*, the event remembered is distinct from the act of the mind in remembering. "If we pay any regard to the common sense of mankind," says Dr. Reid, "thought and the object of thought are different things, and ought to be distinguished." "In the perception of an external object, all languages distinguish *three* things,—the *mind*, that perceives, the *operation* of that mind, which is called perception, and the *object* perceived. The structure of all languages supposes this distinction. Philosophers have introduced a *fourth* thing in this process, which they call the *idea* of the object; which is supposed to be an *image*, or *representative* of the object." Intellect. Essays, B. II. ch. ix. and xii. These observations of Dr. Reid are very just. But he labors under a great mistake, as we think, in supposing, that this *fourth* thing is what Mr. Locke means by idea.

Mr. Locke says, that "the ideas of primary qualities are *resemblances* of them; and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves." B. II. ch. viii. § 15. How is this consistent with the supposition, that he considers the *qualities themselves* as ideas, when made objects of thought? We shall not stop, in this place, to inquire into the *truth* of this most prolific assertion, which has brought forth whole volumes of comment and inference. Our present object is merely to state, what we suppose to be Mr. Locke's *meaning* in the passage, as illustrating his use of the term idea. As we understand him, he speaks of our ideas of certain qualities, as being *resemblances*, rather than being the qualities themselves; because, in his opinion, our ideas of substances are al-

ways *imperfect*; partially, but not fully, conforming to the reality. "That our abstract ideas of substances do not contain in them all the simple ideas, that are united in *the things themselves*, is evident, in that men do rarely put into their idea of any substance, all the simple ideas they do *know* to exist in it." B. II. ch. xxxi. § 8. "Herein is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances, that all our complex ideas of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones, as have been discovered to *co-exist in nature*. And our ideas being thus true, though not, perhaps, *very exact copies*, are yet the subjects of real knowledge of them." B. IV. ch. v. § 12. As far as we truly perceive the nature of a substance; *so far*, our idea, or object of thought, is the substance itself. But the thing, as apprehended by us, is not precisely the thing, as it really exists. Our idea of the city of London, does not include every particle of matter, and every element of thought, which the place contains. It is only a faint resemblance of the reality. Our idea of a thing, is only *so much of it*, as is made the object of our thoughts. When Don Quixote mistook a wind-mill for an enchanted castle, his idea was a castle, and not a wind-mill. When an astronomer and an ignorant peasant look at the moon, their ideas of it are very different; and both, different from the reality.

We beg pardon of our readers, for detaining them so long upon Mr. Locke's definition of the word idea. A correct understanding of his meaning of this term, is the key to his whole book. Our inquiries bring us to this result, that, according to Mr. Locke's definition, *idea is the object of thought*; the object, as it *appears* to the mind: not thought merely, except when considered as itself the object of reflection; not an image in the brain, or in contact with the mind, the supposed *means* of thought.

We doubt whether he has effectually provided for his own reputation, as a philosopher, by giving a meaning to the term, varying so materially from the signification which had previously been given to it, in other philosophical writings, particularly those of Descartes. Certain it is, that he has not secured his work against numerous and gross misapprehensions. For the most contradictory results are professedly derived from his principles. We do not assert, that he *invariably* uses the word idea, in the sense in which he has defined it. We think, that he does not. He has done as other philosophical writers find it necessary to do. When they have occasion to express a new combination of thought, they must either coin a new word, or give a new signification to a term already in use. The latter method is commonly adopted. But the same writers may have occasion also to speak of the things to which the newly defined term had been *previously* applied. They must then use it in its common acceptance. Mr. Locke, we think, has

done the same. In a work on the Human Understanding, he could not avoid speaking of thoughts, as well as of objects of thought. He must, then, almost of necessity, sometimes use the word *idea* with its customary meaning. He has also, in a few instances, briefly referred to the philosophical hypothesis of images in the brain, or in the *place* of the mind. In such cases, he would naturally copy the language of the advocates of that theory. In reading his work, we think, that fair dealing requires, that we interpret the word *idea*, according to his own definitions; except in those passages in which the *connection* evidently shows a different meaning.

Of the philosophical *theories*, which have derived some apparent support, from misapprehensions of Mr. Locke's peculiar phraseology, one of the most subtil and refined, is that of Bishop Berkeley. He maintains not only, that we have *no knowledge* of *material* things; but, that the very *supposition* of such a world as is commonly believed to exist, is absurd. "It is indeed an opinion strongly prevailing among men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding." *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 4. "From what has been said, it follows, there is not any other substance than *spirit*, or that which perceives." § 7. "It is plain, that the very notion of what is called *matter*, or *corporeal substance*, involves a contradiction in it." § 9.

What are the *arguments* relied on, to prove these bold assertions? One of the principal of them is summarily this. We perceive, that is, notice, nothing but *ideas*. Now all ideas are acts or states of the mind. Therefore we can perceive nothing *exterior* to the mind. It is true, that Mr. Locke and other philosophers tell us, that "though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind; yet there may be things *like* them, whereof they are *copies*, or *resemblances*, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be *like* nothing but an idea; a color or figure can be like nothing but another color or figure." § 8. The conclusion is then drawn, "that all the choir of heaven, and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without the mind; that their being is to be perceived or known;" in short, that they are *nothing but ideas*. The fallacy here turns upon that ambiguity, in the word *idea*, which we have endeavored to explain. If ideas are nothing but *thoughts*, or acts of the mind, we cannot suppose *material* things to resemble these. But what absurdity is there in saying, that the qualities of matter may resemble the *objects* of our thoughts? Can the mind *think* of nothing but its own acts?

Hume, pushing the sophistry of Berkeley to a still bolder ex-

treme, undertook to annihilate not only the material, but the *mental* world; to throw doubt and darkness over every thing in the universe, except impressions and ideas. But what has this show of reasoning to do with Mr. Locke's account of ideas, considered as objects of thought?

Dr. Reid, alarmed at the scepticism of Berkeley and Hume, undertook to trace it back to the doctrines of phantasms and species in the brain, or in contact with the mind; to which he ascribes an origin as early at least as Aristotle. In showing, that this ancient and long-continued theory is altogether hypothetical, he seems to think, that he has demolished, at a single stroke, not only *that*, but the idealism of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume. It is truly a matter of wonder, that Dr. Reid should have so greatly misapprehended Mr. Locke, upon whose writings he has commented so largely. Though he has himself stated particularly the distinction between the *mind*, its *thoughts*, and the *objects* of thought; and has, once at least, stumbled upon Locke's real meaning, in admitting, that "he uses the word *idea*, not unfrequently, to signify objects of thought, that are *not in the mind*, but *external*: and, that "when he affirms, as he does, in *innumerable* places, that all human knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, it is impossible to put a meaning upon this, consistent with his principles, unless he means by ideas, *every object of human thought*, whether mediate or immediate; every thing, in a word, that can be signified by the subject, or by the predicate of a proposition:" yet in all his reasonings upon what he calls the ideal theories, he goes upon the supposition, that Locke's meaning of *idea* is an image in the brain, or in the place of the mind. And the *Edinburgh Review*,* with its formidable array of psychological technics, in defending Dr. Reid against the animadversions of Dr. Brown, after it has shown, that Locke's signification of *idea* does not coincide with Brown's, appears to take it for granted, that no other meaning of the word can be found, except a representative image, in the brain or the mind. But the English and the Scotch philosophers seem resolved not to understand each other. It may be thought, perhaps, that Mr. Locke has given some occasion for these misapprehensions, by introducing into his definition of *idea*, the expression, the *immediate* object of thought, or of the mind in thinking; seeming to imply something *intervening*, between a more remote object and the mind. But even Dr. Reid says, "It seems very hard, or rather impossible, to understand what is meant by an object of thought, that is not an *immediate* object of thought."

* For October, 1830.

Dr. Reid represents Mr. Locke as giving an influence in favor of the idealism of Berkeley, by resting our belief in the existence of matter upon *argument*. So far from this, he places our knowledge of material objects, upon the *immediate evidence of the senses*. "It is the actual receiving of ideas from without, that gives us notice of the existence of other things; and makes us *know*, that something doth *exist*, at that time, *without us*." "I think no body can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be *uncertain* of the things which he sees and feels." Then he adds: "But *besides* the *assurance* we have from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us, of the existence without us, when they are affected by them, we are farther *confirmed* in this assurance, by other concurrent reasons." B. IV. ch. ii. § 2, 3. These "concurrent reasons," Dr. Reid seems to represent, as the *only* foundation upon which Mr. Locke rests our knowledge of material objects.

The idealism of Locke will be overthrown, when it can be proved, that we have no *objects* of our thoughts; that whenever we think, we are thinking about nothing. The idealism of the Peripatetic school is something widely different. Locke appears to have been willing to leave it as he found it; referring to it incidentally, in a few passages only. It is evident, that he was not much enamored with it. He speaks of "those places which brought the Peripatetic philosophy into their schools, where it continued many ages, without teaching the world any thing but the *art of wrangling*." B. IV. ch. vii. § 11. The idealism of Locke is the *fact*, that when we think we are conscious of thinking about something, and this something, whatever it may be,—substance, quality, or action,—real or imaginary, he calls an idea. The idealism of the Peripatetics, and schoolmen, is the *hypothesis*, that there are images in the brain, or at the mind, which are the *means* of thought.

One of the grossest of all the perversions of the principles and language of Locke, is the theory brought forward by Condillac and his followers, in France, denominated the *sensual system*. These philosophers have *reversed* the argument of Berkeley; proceeding, however, on his principle of the *resemblance* between our ideas and the objects of sense. *He* takes for granted the acts of the mind; and arrives at the conclusion, that we can have no knowledge of any thing which does not resemble these. *They* take for granted the qualities of matter; and consider all our thoughts and feelings as resembling these. They represent all the operations of the understanding, not only as *originating* in sensation, but as being themselves *transformed sensations*, copies, or *relics* of sensation. They ascribe all our knowledge to this single source. It is truly marvelous, that any one who had read the *Essay of Locke*, ever so superficially, should venture to claim him,

as furnishing the basis of a theory like this. His whole work is constructed upon the plan of deriving all our knowledge from *two* distinct sources, sensation and reflection. This is the prominent feature of the book. After disposing of the subject of innate ideas, and expressing his belief, that all our knowledge is acquired; he enters upon a formal statement of the distinction between the two methods by which thoughts are introduced into our minds. As Dugald Stewart observes: "Through the whole of his Essay, he uniformly represents sensation and reflection, as radically *distinct* sources of knowledge." Even Cousin asserts, that "Locke admits two distinct sources of ideas; he does not confound the operations of the soul with sensations." p. 35. "By reflection," says Locke, "I would be understood to mean, *that notice which the mind takes of its own operations*;" evidently including, under the term *notice*, not only consciousness, as defined by logicians, but also attention, contemplation, and memory. We firmly protest against the practice, countenanced even by Cousin, of confounding two systems, differing so widely from each other, as those of Locke, and of the French materialists, by giving them the common appellation of *sensualism*. Locke's derives only a *part* of our knowledge from sensation. Does any philosophy do less than this? We agree with Mr. Locke, in the leading principle of his system, that although we have innate *capacities*, and a faculty of *intuitively* perceiving truth, yet we have no evidence, that any of our *knowledge* is *innate*, that is, imprinted on the mind at the first moment of our existence; but that, so far as we have the means of knowing, the materials of our intellectual furniture are all *acquired*; and that, with the exception of immediate inspiration, they are acquired by *experience*, by external and internal observation. But we are not prepared to follow, when he pushes his theory to the extreme which he does, in some passages of his work, of considering all our ideas as either *objects* of sensation, or objects of consciousness; either external *material* things, or *operations* of our own minds. These unquestionably furnish by far the *greater portion* of the materials of our knowledge, but not absolutely *all*. To give, at present, but a single example of an object of thought, which is neither material nor mental. *Time* is not an object of sense. We can neither see it, nor hear it, nor taste it. Nor is it, in our apprehension, an operation of the mind, a thought, a feeling, or a volition. Still it may be true, that even this is first introduced to our notice *by means* of sensation and reflection. In this qualified sense, then, we would be understood to adopt Mr. Locke's fundamental principle, that although all the materials of thinking are not strictly *objects* of perception or of consciousness, yet, so far as we are able to observe, they are brought before the mind *by means* of sensation and reflection.

To come more directly to the work of Cousin. After a few complimentary observations on the independent spirit of investigation which characterizes the philosophy of Locke and his followers, he proceeds to remark on the *method* on which the *Essay* on the Understanding is constructed. p. 8. This he approves, so far at least as this, that it begins not with ontology, the *essence* of the mind, but with psychology, the *phenomena* of the understanding: mistaking, however, as we apprehend, Mr. Locke's definition of *idea*; supposing him to use the word to express thought itself, and not the object of thought. p. 14. He then proposes a subdivision of mental phenomena, into the *actual* and the *primitive*.

' This is not all. Within these limits there is ground likewise for two distinct orders of investigation.

We may investigate by internal observation the ideas which are in the human understanding as it is now developed in the present state of things. The object, in this case, is to collect the phenomena of the understanding as they are given in consciousness, and to state accurately their differences and resemblances, so as to arrive at length at a good classification of all these phenomena.

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This done, you will know the understanding as it is at present. But has it always been what it is at present? Since the day when its operations began, has it not undergone many changes? These phenomena, whose characters you have with so much penetration and fidelity analyzed and reproduced, have they always been what they are and what they now appear to you? May they not have had at their birth certain characters which have disappeared, or have wanted at the outset certain characters which they have since acquired? This is a point to be examined. Hence the important question of the origin of ideas, or the primitive characters of the phenomena of the understanding.

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The question of the present state of our ideas, and that of their origin, are then two distinct questions, and both of them are necessary to constitute a complete psychology. In so far as psychology has not surveyed and exhausted these two orders of researches, it is unacquainted with the phenomena of the understanding; for it has not apprehended them under all their aspects. It remains to see with which we should commence. Shall we begin by investigating the actual characters of our ideas, or by investigating their origin? For as to the process of their generation and the passage from their primitive to their present state, it is clear that we can know nothing of it, till after we have exactly recognized and determined both the one and the other state. But which of these two shall we study first?

Shall we begin, for example, with the question of the origin of ideas? It is, without doubt, a point extremely curious and extremely important. Man aspires to penetrate the origin of every thing, and particularly of the phenomena that pass within him. He cannot rest satisfied without having gained this. The question concerning the origin of

ideas is undeniably in the human mind ; it has then its place and its claim in science. It must come up at some time, but should it come up the first ? In the first place it is full of obscurity. The mind is a river which we cannot easily ascend. Its source, like that of the Nile, is a mystery. How, indeed, shall we catch the fugitive phenomena, by which the birth and first springing up of thought is marked ? Is it by memory ? But you have forgotten what passed within you then ; you did not even remark it. Life and thought then go on without our heeding the manner in which we think and live ; and memory yields not up the deposit that was never intrusted to it. Will you consult others ? They are in the same perplexity with yourself. Will you make the infant mind your study ? But who will unfold what passes beneath the veil of infant thought ? The attempt to do it readily conducts to conjectures, to hypotheses. But is it thus you would begin an experimental science ? It is evident, that if you start with this question concerning the origin of ideas, you start with precisely the most difficult question.

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Wisdom, then, good sense and logic demand, that omitting provisionally the question of the origin of ideas, we should be content first to observe the ideas as they now are, the characters which the phenomena of intelligence actually have at present in the consciousness.' pp. 16, 17, 18, 19.

Cousin objects to the method of Locke, that it *inverts* the proper order of investigation ; that it commences with the more difficult problem, the *origin* of our ideas, and postpones or even omits the characters and classification of our mental operations, what may be properly called the *statistics* of psychology. p. 20. There is some weight in these observations. Yet, as Locke did not profess to furnish a *complete* system of mental philosophy, he had a right to select his own topics for discussion ; and he has actually interwoven many observations on the *nature* of our ideas, with his inquiries concerning their origin. According to Cousin, the position of Locke, which has been the occasion of the "theory of *sensation transformed*, of sensation, as the sole and single principle of all operations of the mind," is this, that among the several mental faculties, the one which is *first called into exercise*, is that of perception. p. 37. Yet Cousin himself admits, that the *first* materials of our knowledge are derived from the external world. pp. 133, 182. So far as this position furnishes, to the sensual school of France, an apology for leaning on Locke for support, let them avail themselves of it. But let them not make him responsible for a doctrine diametrically opposed to the fundamental principle of his system. M. Cousin, in attempting to show the insufficiency of Mr. Locke's theory to account for the origin of *all* our knowledge, adduces our idea of *space*. Is this an object of sense ? Can we see it, or taste it, or feel it ? We may see or feel the *boundaries* of certain *portions* of space, marked out by

visible or tangible objects. But this is not making space itself an object of our senses. Nothing can act upon these but *matter*, or, as Mr. Locke calls it, *body*.

‘According to Locke himself, the idea of space,* and the idea of body, are totally distinct. To establish this distinction, and place it in clearer light, let us now notice the different characters which these two ideas present.

You have an idea of a body. You believe that it exists. But is it possible to suppose, and could you suppose, that such a body did not exist? I would ask you, can you not suppose this book to be destroyed? Undoubtedly. Can you not also suppose the whole world to be destroyed, and no body to be actually existing? Unquestionably you can.

For you, constituted as you are, the supposition of the non-existence of bodies involves no contradiction. And what do we term the idea of a thing which we conceive as possibly non-existent? It is termed *a contingent and relative idea*. But if you should suppose the book destroyed, the world destroyed, all matter destroyed, could you suppose *space* destroyed? Can you suppose, that if there were no body existent, there would then no longer remain any space for the bodies which might come into existence? You are not able to make the supposition. Though it is in the power of the human mind, to suppose the non-existence of body, it is not in its power to suppose the non-existence of space. The idea of space is then *necessary and absolute*. You have, then, two characteristics perfectly distinct, by which the ideas of body and of space are separated.’ p. 44.

If Mr. Locke’s theory be taken in its extreme dimensions, as affirming, that all the materials of our knowledge are *objects* of sense, or of consciousness, it is contradicted by the fact, that space is neither an object of sense, nor a mental operation. But does it follow, that our idea of space is not first introduced into the mind by *means* of sensation? If we rightly understand M. Cousin, he admits, that our idea of *body* is introduced by sensation, and that this necessarily *brings with it* the idea of space.

‘There are two sorts of origin. There are, in the assemblage of human intellections, two orders of relations which it is important clearly to distinguish.

Two ideas being given, we may inquire whether the one does not *suppose* the other; whether the one being admitted, we must not admit the other likewise, or be guilty of a paralogism. This is the *logical* order of ideas.

If we regard the question of the origin of ideas under this point of view, let us see what result it will give in respect to the particular inquiry before us.

The idea of body and the idea of space being given, which supposes the other? Which is the logical condition of the admission of the other? Evidently the idea of space is the logical condition of the admission of the idea of body. In fact, take any body you please, and you cannot

admit the idea of it but under the condition of admitting, at the same time, the idea of space ; otherwise you would admit a body which was nowhere, which was in no place, and such a body is inconceivable.' pp. 46, 47.

'Unquestionably, then, when we regard the question of the origin of ideas under the logical point of view, this solution, which is incontestible, overwhelms the system of Locke. Now it is at this point that the Ideal school has in general taken up the question of the origin of ideas. By the origin of ideas, they commonly understand the logical filiation of ideas. Hence they have said, with their last and most illustrious interpreter, that so far is the idea of body from being the foundation [Kant should have added, the logical foundation] of the idea of space, that it is the idea of space which is the foundation (the logical condition) of the idea of body. The idea of body is given us by the touch and the sight, that is by experience of the senses. On the contrary, the idea of space is given to us, *on occasion* of the idea of body, by the understanding, the mind, the reason ; in fine, by a faculty other than sensation. Hence the Kantian formula : the pure rational idea of space comes so little from experience, that it is the *condition* of all experience. This bold formula is incontestibly true in all its strictness, when taken in a certain reference, in reference to the logical order of human intellections.

But this is not the sole order of intellection ; and the logical relation does not comprise all the relations which ideas mutually sustain. There is still another, that of anterior, or posterior, the order of the relative development of ideas in time, their *chronological* order. And the question of the origin of ideas may be regarded under this point of view. Now the idea of space, we have just seen, is clearly the logical condition of all sensible experience. Is it also the chronological condition of all experience, and of the idea of body ? I believe no such thing. If we take ideas in the order in which they actually evolve themselves in the intelligence, if we investigate only their history and successive appearance, it is not true that the idea of space is antecedent to the idea of body. Indeed it is so little true, that the idea of space chronologically supposes the idea of body, that, in fact, if you had not the idea of body, you would never have the idea of space. Take away sensation, take away the sight and touch, and you have no longer any idea of body, and consequently none of space. Space is the place of bodies ; he who has no idea of a body, will never have the idea of space which contains it. Rationally, logically, if you had not the idea of space, you could not have the idea of a body ; but the converse is true chronologically, and in fact, the idea of space comes up only along with the idea of body : and as you have not the idea of a body without immediately having the idea of space, it follows that these two ideas are contemporaneous.

* * * * *

Undoubtedly, and I cannot repeat it too much, for it is the knot of the difficulty, the secret of the problem, undoubtedly as soon as the idea of *body* is given, that instant the idea of *space* is evolved ; but if this

condition be not fulfilled, the idea of space would never enter the human understanding.' pp. 48—50.

From the consideration of space, M. Cousin proceeds, in his own original and felicitous manner, to treat of *time* :—

'There is no one, who, if he has directly before his eyes, or represents to his imagination, any event whatever, does not conceive that it had passed, or is passing, in a certain time. I ask whether it is possible to suppose an event, which you are not compelled to conceive as taking place some hour, some day, some week, some year, some century? There is not an event, real or possible, which escapes the necessity of this conception of a time in which it must have taken place. You can even suppose the abolition, the non-existence of every event; but you cannot suppose this of time. Standing before a time-piece, you may very easily make the supposition, that from one hour to another, no event has taken place; you are however none the less convinced that time has passed away, even when no event has marked its course. The idea of time, then, like the idea of space, is marked with the characteristic of necessity.' p. 58.

'Now it is with respect to the origin of the idea of time as with the origin of the idea of space. Here again we are to distinguish the order of the acquisition of our ideas from their logical order. In the *logical* order of ideas, the idea of any succession of events pre-supposes that of time. There could not be any succession, but upon condition of a continuous duration, to the different points of which the several members of the succession may be attached. Take away the continuity of time, and you take away the possibility of the succession of events; just as the continuity of space being taken away, the possibility of the juxta-position and co-existence of bodies is destroyed.

But in the *chronological* order, on the contrary, it is the idea of a succession of events, which precedes the idea of time as including them. * * * Time is the place of events, just as space is the place of bodies; whoever had no idea of any event, [no perception of any succession.] would have no idea of time. If, then, the logical condition of the idea of succession, lies in the idea of time, the chronological condition of the idea of time, is the idea of succession.

To this result, then, we are come: the idea of succession is the occasion, the chronological antecedent of the necessary conception of time. Now every idea of succession is undeniably an acquisition of experience. It remains to ascertain of what experience. Is it inward, or outward experience? The first idea of succession,—is it given in the spectacle of outward events, or in the consciousness of the events that pass within us?' pp. 59, 60.

Cousin concurs with Locke, in ascribing our first ideas of time, to the succession of thoughts in our own minds :—

'The merit of Locke consists in having proved that the idea of time,

of duration, of eternity, is suggested to us by the idea of some succession of events; and that this succession is taken, not from the external world, but from the world of consciousness.' pp. 62, 63.

But our author here takes occasion to correct an error, which had long since been observed in Locke; that of confounding, or seeming to confound, the *succession of our ideas* with *time*:—

‘Locke saw that the idea of time is given in succession, and that the first succession for us, is, necessarily, the succession of our own ideas. Thus far Locke deserves only praise, for he gives the succession of our ideas merely as the condition of the acquisition of the idea of time; but the condition of a thing is easily taken for the thing itself, and Locke, after having taken the idea of body, the mere condition [chronological antecedent, and occasion] of the idea of space, for the idea of space itself, here also takes the condition of the idea of time, for the idea itself. He confounds succession with time. He not only says that the succession of our ideas, is the condition of the conception of time; but he says that time is nothing else than the succession of our ideas.’ p. 63.

‘In truth, where do the elements of any succession follow each other, if not in some duration? Or how could succession,—the distance, so to say, between ideas,—take place, unless in the space proper to ideas and to minds, that is, in time?’

Moreover, see to what result the theory of Locke leads. If succession is no longer merely the measure of time, but time itself; if the succession of ideas is no longer the condition of the conception of time, but the conception itself, it follows that time is nothing else than the fact of there being a succession of our ideas. The succession of our ideas is more or less rapid; and time then is more or less short, not in appearance only, but in reality. In absolute sleep, in lethargy, all succession of ideas ceases; and then we have no duration, and not only have we no duration, but there is no duration for any thing; for not only our time, but time in itself, is nothing but the succession of our ideas. Ideas exist but under the eye of consciousness; but there is no consciousness in lethargy, in total sleep, consequently there was no time. The time-piece vainly moved on, the time-piece was wrong; and the sun, like the time-piece, should have stopped.

These are the results, very extravagant indeed, and yet the necessary results of confounding the idea of succession with that of time; and the confusion itself is necessary in the general system of Locke, which deduces all our ideas from sensation and reflection. Sensation had, according to him, given space; reflection gives time; but reflection, that is, consciousness with memory, pertains only to the succession of our ideas, of our voluntary acts; a succession finite and contingent, and not time, necessary and unlimited, in which this succession takes place. Experience, whether external or internal, gives us only the measure of time, and not time itself. Now Locke, by his assumed theory, was forbidden any source of knowledge but sensation and reflection. It was necessary of course to make time explicable by the one or the other.

He saw very clearly that it was not explicable by sensation, and it could not be by reflection, except upon condition of reducing it to the measure of time, that is to say, to succession. Locke has thus, it is true, destroyed time; but he has saved his system.' pp. 64, 65.

This criticism appears to be just, if applied to the theory of Locke, when stretched so far as to affirm, that all the materials of our knowledge are *objects* of perception or of consciousness. We are not strictly conscious of time. Still it is true, even according to Cousin's explanation, that we obtain the idea of duration *by means* of consciousness. He says, "The *chronological* condition of the idea of time, is the idea of succession; and the first succession is given us in ourselves, in consciousness."

The theory of Locke, in the opinion of Cousin, is insufficient to account for our idea of *substance*, or even of *our own existence*. "No substance," he says, "material or spiritual, is in itself a proper object of sense or of consciousness." Referring to the declaration of Locke, that "all our ideas of the several sorts of substances, are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with the supposition of *something* to which they belong;" he proceeds:—

'Admitting none but ideas explicable by sensation or reflection, and being unable to explain the idea of substance either by the one or the other, he was necessarily led to deny it, to resolve it into a combination of the simple ideas of *qualities*, which are easily attained by sensation or reflection, and which his system admits and explains. Hence the systematic identification of substance and qualities, of being and phenomena, that is to say, the destruction of being, and consequently of beings. Nothing exists in itself, neither God, nor the world, neither you nor myself.' p. 78.

Now, although according to the limited definition which modern logicians have chosen to give to the term consciousness, we are not strictly conscious of our own existence; yet the idea of our own existence, is immediately and necessarily *implied* in every act of consciousness. A man is not merely conscious of thoughts and feelings,—of thoughts and feelings which have proceeded from nothing,—which belong to no being. He is conscious, that they are *his own* thoughts and feelings; that they are acts, or states of his own mind. The thinking being, *the self*, is as much implied in every act of consciousness, as the thought itself: only, the one is called the direct *object* of consciousness, while the other is not. It is still true, that we obtain the idea of our own existence, *by means* of consciousness. Mr. Locke says expressly, that "we are conscious to ourselves of our own being;" evidently showing, that he does not limit the term to what is called, at the present day, the direct *object* of consciousness; but includes what is necessarily *implied* in this faculty. So, also, as every notice of a

collection of *qualities*, implies "a supposition of *something* to which they belong;" we obtain our ideas of *material* substances, by means of the senses. This is admitted, even by Cousin:—

'It is indubitable that we know nothing of mind but what its operations teach us concerning it, and nothing of matter but what its qualities teach us of it; just as we have already granted that we know nothing of time save that which succession teaches us of it, nor of space, save that which body teaches, nor of the infinite, save that which the finite teaches, nor of self, save that which consciousness teaches. * * * * But because we do not know any thing of a thing except what another thing teaches us concerning it, it does not follow that the former thing *is* the latter. Because it is only by the aggregate of its qualities that substance manifests itself, it does not follow that substance is nothing but an aggregate of those qualities.' pp. 76, 77.

Cousin is very explicit, in stating the fundamental law of belief respecting *causation*; that every change necessarily implies a cause:—

'Not only is there in the human mind the idea of cause; not only do we believe ourselves to be the causes of our own acts, and that certain bodies are often the cause of the movement of other bodies; but we judge in a general manner that no phenomenon can begin to exist, whether in space or in time, without having a cause. There is here something more than an idea, there is a principle; and the principle is as incontrovertible as the idea. Imagine a movement, any change whatever, and the moment you conceive of this change, this movement, you cannot help supposing that it was made in virtue of some cause.' p. 85.

'This principle is real, certain, undeniable. What now are its attributes? First, then, it is universal. Is there a human being, a savage, a child, an idiot even, provided he is not entirely one, who, in the case of a phenomenon beginning to exist, does not instantly suppose a cause of it?' p. 86.

'Still more: not only do we thus decide in all cases, naturally and in the instinctive exercise of our understanding; but to decide otherwise is impossible; a phenomenon being given, endeavor to suppose there is no cause of it. You cannot. The principle, then, is not only universal; it is also *necessary*.' p. 87.

'Make the attempt to call this relation in question. You cannot; no human intelligence can succeed in the attempt. Whence it follows, that this truth is an universal and necessary truth. Reason, then, is subjected to this truth. It is under an impossibility of not supposing a cause, whenever the senses or the consciousness reveal any motion, any phenomenon. Now this impossibility, to which reason is subjected, of not supposing a cause for every phenomenon revealed in sense and consciousness, is what we call the principle of causality.' p. 101.

But our author controverts the position of Locke, that our idea of the principle of causation, is obtained by *sensation* and *reflection*. He admits, that consciousness and perception are necessary, to give us ideas of the *changes* which take place, in our own minds, and in the world around us. But the necessity of a *cause* of these changes, is an additional principle, not suggested by the senses. "Reason," he says, "is under an impossibility of not supposing a cause, *whenever the senses* or the consciousness reveal any motion, any phenomenon." p. 101. It is correct, then, to say, that the principle of causation is first brought before our minds, by *means* of sensation; but not by these *alone*. Causation is not a direct *object* of sensation, or of consciousness.

Of the volume before us, the first four chapters, to which our attention has now been directed, comprising about one third of the whole Examination of Locke's Essay, are mainly occupied in endeavoring to show, that *all* our ideas are not derived from sensation and reflection; and in illustrating this position in its application to *space, time, infinity, personal identity, and causation*. After considering, in the fifth chapter, the distinction between *right and wrong*, the author observes:—

'The theories which we have brought forward and discussed, occupy three fourths of the second book of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. * * * * On our part, the most important portion of our task is accomplished. It was necessary to accompany the exposition of the grounds of Locke's system with a profound and thorough discussion. Now that these grounds are overthrown, we can proceed faster.' p. 125.

What, now, is the amount of the difference between Locke and Cousin, on these points? Locke asserts, that sensation and reflection first bring before our minds the ideas of time, space, etc. Cousin claims, that sensation and reflection introduce certain *other* ideas, which are necessarily *accompanied* or followed by the ideas in question. The direct and proper *objects* of the senses and of consciousness, he considers the *occasion* or *condition* of the ideas of time, space, etc. He has apparently gained some little advantage over Locke, by bearing heavily upon the more vulnerable points of his theory; upon what may be considered rather as an *appendage* of his system, than any necessary part of it. The fundamental principle, that all the elements of our knowledge, so far as we are able to observe, are originally introduced into the mind, *by means* of sensation and reflection, remains unshaken. The main ground upon which Cousin has advanced *beyond* Locke, is, in a more finished *analysis*. For this, he has evidently a superior talent. He has also the benefit of the labors of philosophers for

more than a century and a half, carrying forward, to their remote results, the principles which Locke had proposed.

After all, the difference between Locke and Cousin, on the points now under examination, may be considered as little more than a difference of *classification* and phraseology. There is no imperative law of nature, according to which the mental faculties must necessarily be classified. This is a matter of convenient arrangement, for the purposes of philosophy, and for communication in the business of life. All classification is formed according to *resemblances* or *differences* in the objects to be classified. Things are put in the *same* class, on the ground of some real or supposed *resemblance* among them. They are distributed into *distinct* classes, on account of some *difference* between them. Different points of resemblance or dissimilarity, may be fixed upon, according to the particular purpose of those who make the distribution.

As we know nothing of the *powers of the mind*, but from its *operations*, the classification of its faculties must be made according to observed differences in its acts. Strictly speaking, there are as many mental powers, as there are diversities of thought and feeling. We embrace, however, under a general name, those which more or less resemble each other. That is the best classification, which is founded on the *most prominent* resemblances and differences. If the mental faculties were so many different *agents* or *beings*, which we could distinctly observe, there would be more reason for adhering invariably to a particular mode of classing and naming them. But as they all belong to one and the same mind, acting in different ways, they may be distributed, for different purposes, into a greater or less number of classes.

It would seem, that in the time of Locke, no great attention was paid to the classification of the mental faculties. He appears to have acquiesced in the ancient division, however imperfect, into two great powers, the *will* and the *understanding*. He evidently did not use the terms sensation, perception, and consciousness, with all the limitations which they receive in the definitions of the present day. The difference between Locke and Cousin, with respect to the origin of our ideas, may be reduced to this, that they are to be ascribed, according to the one, to the powers of sensation and reflection; according to the other, to these two faculties, *together with a third*, called *reason*, or *the reason*. According to Locke, we obtain our ideas of the mind, and its operations, by reflection, including consciousness, attention, contemplation, and memory. According to Cousin, we learn our mental *operations* by consciousness; but the *mind itself* by the reason. According to Locke, we obtain our ideas of *material* things by the senses. According to Cousin, we learn their *qualities* by the

senses, but their *substances* by the reason. According to Locke, a man is not only conscious of thinking, but also, that it is *he himself* that thinks. According to Cousin, the thinking only is the object of consciousness, but the *he*, the person, is the object of the reason.

Now we do not feel very much inclined to quarrel with the classification of Cousin. Perhaps it may have some advantages over that of Locke. But classes are to be formed according to prominent differences. And we do not clearly see, that there is any greater difference between a man's thoughts and himself, than between time, space, substance, personal identity, infinity, and causation; all of which are put in the same class by Cousin, as belonging to the province of reason. How would the language of Cousin apply to our common notions of perception? We are accustomed to speak of *seeing* things. But according to his philosophy, we never see *any thing*. We may see the *qualities* of a thing. But a *thing itself*, a *substance*, is not an object of sense. Seeing the qualities, is the *occasion*, the *condition* only, on which the *reason* suggests the substance. If a man runs against a post in the night, and *feels its qualities*, this is the *condition* on which the reason informs him, that a post is there. Thinking is the *occasion* on which we learn from the reason, that we ourselves exist. Would M. Cousin undertake to say, that all the common theories of vision are groundless, because sight alone, without the reason, can show us only the *qualities* of objects, and not their substance? When Mr. Locke speaks of consciousness, as including an idea of our own existence, does he give to the term a more unwarrantable latitude of meaning, than we all do to vision, when we speak of seeing a mountain or a river?

In M. Cousin's examination of Locke's chapter on *Moral Relations*, we find much to approve. He points out the error common to Locke, Paley, and others, of confounding moral obligation with the influence of rewards and punishments assigned by law. We believe, that there is an essential and immutable distinction between right and wrong; that an action is right, not merely because it is *commanded*, but because the command which enjoins it is itself right; that under a wise and good administration, certain actions are required, *because* they are right, and others forbidden, because they are wrong; that the man who steals, not only is *liable* to punishment, but that he *ought* to be punished.

'The most superficial observation, provided it be impartial, easily demonstrates, that in the human mind, in its present actual development, there is the idea of right and of wrong, altogether distinct the one from the other. * * * Not only is this distinction universal, but it is a necessary conception. In vain does the reason, after having once received, attempt to deny it, or to call in question its truth. It can-

not. One cannot at will regard the same action as just and unjust. These two ideas baffle every attempt to commute them, the one for the other. Their objects may change, but never their nature.—Still farther: reason cannot conceive the distinction between right and wrong, just and unjust, without instantly conceiving that the one ought to be done, and the other ought not to be done.' pp. 112, 113.

'Moral order has its foundation not in punishment, but punishment has its foundation in moral order. The idea of right and wrong is grounded only on itself, on reason which reveals it. It is the condition of the idea of merit and demerit, which is the condition of the idea of reward and punishment; and this latter idea is to the two former, but especially to the idea of right and wrong, in the relation of the consequence to the principle.' p. 118.

'Let us now apply to this subject the distinctions we have before established. We have distinguished the logical order of ideas, from the order of their acquisition. In the first case, one idea is the logical condition of another, when it explains the other; in the second case, one idea is the chronological condition of another, when it arises in the human mind before the other. Now I say in respect to the question before us, that the idea of justice, the idea of the moral law obeyed or broken, is: 1. the logical condition of the idea of merit or demerit, which without it is incomprehensible and inadmissible: 2. the antecedent, the chronological condition of the acquisition of the idea of merit and demerit, which certainly never would have arisen in the mind, if previously it had not received the idea of justice and injustice, right and wrong, good and evil. Now, Locke, after having frequently confounded, as we have seen, the logical condition of an idea with its chronological condition, confounds at once in regard to this subject, both the logical and chronological condition of an idea with the idea itself, and even with a consequence of that idea; for the idea of reward and punishment is only a consequence of the idea of merit and demerit, which in its turn is only a consequence of the idea of right and wrong, which is here the supreme principle, beyond which it is impossible to ascend. Thus, instead of laying down first the idea of right and wrong, then that of merit and demerit, and then that of reward and punishment; it is the reward and punishment, that is to say, the pleasure and the pain that result from right and wrong, which, according to Locke, is the foundation of moral good and evil, and of the moral rectitude of actions.' pp. 119, 120.

"The second book of Locke," as Cousin says, "closes with an excellent chapter on the association of ideas." He also passes an encomium on the *third* book.

'Locke, having clearly perceived what is the relation of words to ideas, and that words are a fruitful source of errors for the understanding, has previously devoted an entire book, his third, to the discussion of the great question concerning signs and language.

You know that this is again one of the points in which the school of

Locke has been the most faithful to their master. It is the favorite subject with his school, and I cordially acknowledge that in regard to this question, together with that concerning the association of ideas, it has deserved best of philosophy. I acknowledge with great respect a multitude of sound, ingenious, and even original ideas, scattered through the whole of Locke's third book. Locke has admirably perceived the necessary intervention of signs, of words, in the formation of abstract and general ideas; the influence of signs and words in definitions, and consequently in a considerable part of logic. He has noticed and signalized the advantages of a good system of signs, the utility of a well-constructed language, the danger of an ill one; the verbal disputes to which a defective language too frequently reduces philosophy. Upon all these points he has opened the route which his school have entered and pursued.' pp. 130, 131.

The examination of the third book, closes with some valuable observations on *disputes about words*.

'Every where Locke attributes to words the greatest part of our errors; and if you expound the master by his disciples, you will find in all the writers of the school of Locke, that all disputes are disputes about words; that science is nothing but a language, (which is indeed true, if general ideas are nothing but words,) and of course, a language well formed, is a science well constructed. I wish to point out the exaggeration of these assertions. No doubt words have a great influence; no doubt they have a very large share in our errors, and we should endeavor to make language as perfect as possible. Who questions it? But the question is, whether *all* error is derived from language, and whether science is *merely* a well-formed language? And I answer, no. The causes of error are very different; they are both more extended and more profound. * * * * Certainly every science should seek for a well-constructed language; but it were to take effect for the cause, to suppose that there are well-established sciences, because there are well-formed languages. The contrary is true. Sciences have well-formed languages, when they themselves are well-formed. Mathematics, physics, chimistery, are sciences well established, and they have very well-constructed languages. It is because in mathematics the ideas have been perfectly determined, that the simplicity, strictness and precision of the ideas have produced, and necessarily do produce, strictness, precision, and simplicity of signs.' pp. 138, 139.

'It has been incessantly repeated, that the structure of the human mind is entire, in that of language, and that philosophy would be completed the day that a philosophical language should be achieved. And starting from this point, some have endeavored to arrange a certain philosophical language more or less clear, easy and elegant; and they have believed that philosophy was completed. But it did not answer; it was very far from answering the purpose. This prejudice has even retarded its progress, by taking off the mind from experiment. Philosophical science, like every science of observation and of reasoning, lives by observations accurately made, and deductions rigorously strict. It is

there, and not elsewhere, we are to look for all the future progress of philosophy.' p. 140.

We now come to the examination of the fourth and last book of Locke's Essay, that to which the others are preparatory. We here meet with some startling conclusions of Cousin. He undertakes to prove, that according to Locke's theory, we have no knowledge of matter or its qualities, of time or space, of finite minds or the Infinite Spirit, nor even of our own existence.

'Having found all the ideas which are in the human understanding, their origin, their genesis, their mechanism and character; the signs also by which we express, exhibit and unfold them;—the next thing is to inquire what man does with these ideas, what knowledge he derives from them, what is the extent of this knowledge, and what its limits. This is the subject of the fourth book of the *Essays on the Human Understanding*. It treats of Knowledge, that is, not merely of ideas taken in themselves, but in relation to their objects, in relation to essences. For knowledge in its humblest degree, as well as in its highest flight, reaches to that; it evidently attains to God, to bodies, and to ourselves. Now here at the outset a previous question comes up. Knowledge extends to beings; the fact is unquestionable: but how does this take place? Departing from ideas which are within it, how does the understanding arrive at beings which are without it? What bridge is there, between the faculty of knowing, which is within us, and the objects of knowledge which are without us? When we shall have arrived on the other side, we will take counsel what course we ought to follow, and where we can go: but first it is necessary to know how to make the passage. Before entering upon ontology, we must know how to pass from psychology to ontology, what is the foundation, and the legitimate foundation of knowledge. It is this preliminary question which we shall first impose upon Locke.

The fourth book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding* begins by recognizing that all knowledge depends upon ideas:

B. IV. *Of Knowledge*; ch. i. *Of Knowledge in general*. § 1: "Since the mind, in all its thought and reasoning, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them."

* * * * *

Where, then, can error begin, and where does truth reside? Both the one and the other evidently reside, and can reside, only in the supposition of the mind that the idea does, or does not refer to an object, to such or such an object really existing in nature. It is in this reference or relation that truth or error lies for the human mind. If this relation can be found out and fastened upon, human knowledge is possible; if this relation cannot be apprehended, human knowledge is impossible; Now supposing that this relation is possible, what is it, and in what does it consist? On this point it is our task to interrogate Locke with precision and severity; for here should be the foundation of the theory of the

true or false in regard to human knowledge, that is, the foundation of the fourth book which we have to examine.

Throughout the whole of the fourth book, as the close of the second, Locke expressly declares that the true or false in ideas, about which all knowledge is conversant, consists in the supposition of a relation between these ideas and their object; and every where also he expressly declares that this relation is and can be nothing but a relation of agreement or disagreement. The idea is conformed to its object, or it is not conformed. If conformed, knowledge is not only possible, but it is true, for it rests upon a true idea, an idea conformed to its object; if the idea is not conformed to its object, the idea is false, and the knowledge derived from it is equally false.' pp. 143, 144.

The foundation of Cousin's boasted argument against Locke's theory of *knowledge*, is laid, as we conceive, in a misapprehension of the meaning which the latter gives to the term *idea*. Cousin speaks of the *objects of ideas*, of the conformity or non-conformity of ideas to their objects, etc. This is not the language of Locke. We find no such expressions in the passages referred to. He speaks of *objects of thought*, but not of *objects of ideas*. According to him, as we think we have sufficiently shown, an idea is *itself* the object of thought, or of the mind, in thinking. What then is the object of an idea? Is it the *object of an object*? Or if an idea is an *image*, what is the object of an image? Locke does indeed speak of the conformity or non-conformity of our ideas to the *reality of things*. The objects of our thoughts may be either real or imaginary beings. What then, it may be asked, is the *difference* between an *object* and a *thing*? A thing *may be* or *may not be* an object of thought, that is, an idea. If a thing is viewed by the mind *exactly as it is*, that is, in the language of Locke, if we have an *adequate* idea of it, then the thing *is* the idea, the object of thought. If the idea which we have of a particular thing is *inadequate*, but correct so far as it goes, the thing differs from our idea of it, as the whole from a part. If our idea of a thing includes only some of its qualities, and blends with them others not belonging to it, then the idea, in part, differs from the thing, and partly coincides with it. For what purpose has Cousin, in quoting Locke, rendered "*any thing*" by "*un objet*," and "*the reality of things*" by "*leurs objets*," if not to justify his own peculiar phrase, the *objects of ideas*? (See the original, vol. ii. p. 321.)

That the term *idea* is used by Locke, to signify the *thing* thought of, or *so much of it* as is before the mind, and not a mere philosophical *image*, is evident, from the very chapters from which Cousin has taken his quotations, in laying the foundation of his argument. He there speaks of "*ideas* that are united in *things themselves*," "that co-exist in *things without us*," "that have a real

existence *without the mind*." What occasion was there, then, for the inquiry of Cousin,—“Departing from *ideas* which are *within it*, how does the understanding arrive at *things without it*?”

But it is said, that Locke makes all our knowledge *depend on ideas*. Now what more does this imply, than that all our knowledge of things depends upon making them the objects of our thoughts; in other words, *thinking of them*? Has M. Cousin discovered a method of obtaining a knowledge of things *without thinking of them*?

But the most marvelous part of Cousin's argument is yet to come. It indicates a resolute purpose to carry a point. He asserts, that if an idea *resembles* its object, it must be an *image*; and more than this, that it must be a *material image*.

‘If the conformity of the idea to its object is nothing but the resemblance of the copy to its original, to its archetype, I say that in such a case, the idea is taken solely as an image. The idea must evidently be an image in order positively to resemble any thing, in order to be able to represent any thing. See then the representative idea reduced to an image. Now reflect closely, and you will see that every image implies something material. Can an image of any thing immaterial be conceived? * * * * All knowledge, then, is involved in the following question: Have we, in respect to beings, the ideas which represent them, which resemble them, which are the images, and the material images of them; or have we not such images? If we have, knowledge is possible; if not, it is impossible. Now in point of fact, human knowledge embraces both the external world, and the soul, and God. If, then, knowledge of these objects is possible and real, it is only upon the condition just laid down, namely, that we have of these beings, ideas which represent them, which resemble them, which are images of them, and once again, material images. Have we, then, or have we not, idea-images, material images, of God, of the soul, of the external world? This is the question. Let us first apply it to the external world. It is there, above all, that the theory of Locke would appear most admissible. Let us see what is the soundness and value of it even upon this ground.’ pp. 147, 148.

Now where has Locke said, that ideas are *images*, in the sense here represented. Did *any one* ever before say, that every instance of *resemblance* is a *material image*? Cannot one *thought* resemble another? Do M. Cousin's feelings, one moment, never resemble feelings which he has before had? Did he never hear of two men thinking alike? When he lectures to his two thousand listening auditors, is there no resemblance between their different thoughts? When a Chatham, a Whitefield, or a Webster, sends through an assembly an emotion of terror or of joy, is there no resemblance in the feelings of those who are present? And is every thought which resembles another, a *material image*?

M. Cousin's argument is this: "An idea, in order to resemble any thing, *must be an image*. And every image implies something *material*. Every idea, therefore, is a material image." He asks: "Can an image of any thing immaterial be conceived?" *We ask*, Can there be no *resemblance* of any thing immaterial? Cannot one thought resemble another? If it can, our author's argument is a nullity. Yet upon this brief syllogism, is founded a great part of his reasoning, through two entire chapters. He applies it first to our knowledge of an external world.

'The idea of the external world is the idea of body. Bodies are known to us only by their qualities. These qualities are primary or secondary. By the secondary qualities of bodies is understood, you know, those which might not exist, and yet the body itself not cease to exist; the qualities of which we acquire the idea by the sense of smelling, of hearing, and of taste, by all the senses, in short, except unquestionably that of touch, and perhaps also that of sight. The primary qualities of bodies are those which are given to us, as the fundamental attributes of bodies, without which bodies could not for us exist. The eminently primary quality is solidity, which implies more or less extension, which directly implies form. We have the conviction that every body is solid, extended, has form. We are moreover convinced that bodies have the property of causing in us those particular modifications which are called savor, sound, odor, perhaps also the modification called color. Locke agrees to all this; it is he who chiefly contributed to extend in science the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies. It is not our object to go any farther in this distinction. Let us now see how Locke explains the acquisition of ideas of the primary and secondary qualities.' p. 148.

The following quotation is then made from Locke:—

"B. II. ch. viii. § 11: *How primary qualities produce their ideas*. The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we conceive bodies to operate in."

"§ 12. If, then, external objects be not united to our minds, when they produce ideas therein, and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident, that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies to the brain or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them." p. 148.

There is perhaps no passage, throughout the *Essay* of Locke, which has more the *appearance* of favoring the Peripatetic doctrine of perception, than this. We do not deny, that he may have believed in that theory. But he has very little to say of it. Nearly all which is asserted in the passage now quoted, would be admitted, we presume, even by Dr. Reid, who claims the merit of having entirely demolished the theory of Aristotle. It is now

generally believed by philosophers, that in the case of perception, "some motion," occasioned by the external object, "is continued by the nerves to the brain, or the seat of sensation." Mr. Locke, however, says nothing here about *images*,—*material* images. The only difficulty relates to the word *impulse*. Does he mean impulse of particles of matter upon our *bodies*, upon the external organs of sense; or impulse of something in the brain, upon the *mind*." On either supposition, impulse is not a necessary element in his theory of knowledge. In another place, he distinctly intimates, that it is not "the design of the present undertaking, to inquire into the *natural causes and manner of perception*." B. II. ch. viii. § 4. In his letter to the bishop of Worcester, referring to the passage quoted above, he observes:

'Tis true, I say, that bodies operate by *impulse*, and nothing else. And so I thought, when I writ it, and can yet *conceive* no other way of their operations. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power in this point, by my narrow conceptions. And therefore, in the next edition of my book, I shall take care to have that passage rectified.'

Cousin, in applying his argument to our knowledge of *bodies*, begins with their *secondary* qualities.

'Recollect that according to Locke, all knowledge depends upon ideas, and that there is no knowledge except as far as the idea resembles its object. Now by the acknowledgment of Locke himself, the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble these qualities; therefore these ideas do not contain any knowledge. * * * * Recollect distinctly that the condition of conformity is nothing less than that of resemblance, and that the condition of resemblance is nothing less than that of being an image, a sensible and material image; for there is no immaterial image. The question, then, resolves itself to this: whether you have, or have not a material image of the secondary qualities of bodies, that is to say, of those properties of bodies which cause in you the sensations of color, sound, taste and smell.' pp. 151, 152.

Locke does indeed say, that all our knowledge of things depends upon our *having ideas* of them; that is, upon our *thinking* of them. But so far is he from supposing, that in the case of the secondary qualities, our ideas are *resemblances* or *images* of them, or that *conformity* to their archetypes implies this, that he expressly says the contrary. "By real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a *conformity* with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. Our simple ideas are all real; all agree to the reality of things. *Not* that they are all of them the *images* or *representations* of what

does exist ; the *contrary* whereof, in all but the primary qualities, hath been already showed." B. II. ch. xxx. § 1, 2.

Cousin's argument, from the secondary qualities, turns altogether upon manifest violence done to the statements of Locke. He would fully subscribe to the following conclusions of Cousin, substituting, however, archetype for object. "The ideas of secondary qualities do *not* resemble their objects, in any way, and nevertheless they contain a certain knowledge ; it is not therefore true, that all knowledge supposes the resemblance of the idea to its object." p. 153. Cousin very justly observes : "The secondary qualities of bodies, smell, sound, taste, and color, are for us decidedly real properties in bodies, to which we attribute the power of exciting in us certain modifications, or *sensations*. We are not only conscious of these sensations, but we believe, that they have *causes*, and that these causes are in the bodies. We know them, I grant, only as causes of our sensations, while we are ignorant of their intimate essence." p. 151. These *sensations* are distinct objects of consciousness, and therefore are called, by Mr. Locke, ideas. But the properties which occasion them, being known, as Cousin says, *only as causes*, are simply called qualities. The *sensations* are affections of the *mind*. The *qualities* which occasion them are properties of *matter*. Mr. Locke says, "The ideas produced in us, by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are only a power of producing these *sensations* in us." B. II. ch. viii. § 15. And what is this, but the philosophical paradox, that there is no heat in fire, no color in the rainbow, no sound in an organ ? The meaning of which, in plain English, is, that although the *sensations* of heat, color, etc., have the *same names* with the external qualities which produce them, yet we have no reason for believing, that the *mental affections* have a resemblance to their *material causes*. The fire does not *feel* its own heat. Sugar does not *taste* its own sweetness. A bell does not *hear* its own sound. So much for the assertion, that "the theory of Locke breaks to pieces, on the secondary qualities of bodies."

In treating of the *primary* qualities, Cousin, as before, goes upon the groundless assumption, that according to Locke, there is a *material image* intervening between the mind and the object, analogous to the image on the *retina*, in the case of vision, intervening between the object seen and the brain. But as we understand Locke, the *object itself*, when in view of the mind, at least so much of it as is before the mind, is the idea. Why then, it may be asked, does he say, that the idea *resembles* the object ? Because the idea is *imperfect*. It does not coincide with every portion, and particle, and quality of the object.

We think M. Cousin is correct, in placing *solidity* on the same ground with the *secondary* qualities, in respect to the resemblance between the qualities and our ideas of them. Locke had classed solidity with extension, because these two qualities are essential to the very existence of matter. But in reference to the point now under examination, solidity should be classed with the *secondary* qualities, as Dugald Stewart has clearly shown. Essay II. ch. ii. § 2. When we observe the figure of a body, we apprehend distinctly what this figure is. Our idea of it, if not exactly coincident with the real figure, at least resembles it. But in the case of *solidity*, we have only an obscure idea of *something* which resists. A marked ground of distinction between the secondary qualities, and extension, one of the primary qualities, is this:—that in the case of extension, we observe distinctly the *quality in the object*, but scarcely notice the *sensation* which it produces; whereas, in the case of the secondary qualities, the sensation is much *more distinct* than the external cause. In reading a book, we see distinctly the figure of the letters. Each of these letters undoubtedly produces a sensation. But it is so faint, that it is difficult to observe it. In the case of extension, the external quality, the object of *perception*, as being principally noticed, is called, by Mr. Locke, the idea. In the case of the secondary qualities, the sensation, the object of *consciousness*, is called the idea. This, to our apprehension, explains the mystery of applying the term resemblance, as Locke does, to the one class of ideas, and not to the other.

Cousin proceeds to apply his favorite argument, drawn from a *material representative image*, a phantasm of his own creation, to *space* and *time*. It is unnecessary to repeat, here, the reply which we have already made. But this wonderful material image has not yet done all its execution. Its magic power, under his skillful guidance, has not only swept away matter, with its qualities, and annihilated time and space, but proceeds to spread desolation over the world of minds, and thoughts, and volitions, and feelings. It is affirmed, that, according to Locke's theory, we can have no knowledge of these, because he has said, that knowledge depends upon *ideas*; and *real* knowledge, upon ideas *conformed* to the reality of things: and Cousin says, that conformity, in all cases, implies *resemblance*, and that resemblance implies a *material* image. This is the sum and substance of the argument so often reiterated, and expanded, through forty or fifty pages. Nor has Cousin yet done with his "material representative image." By dexterous management, he proceeds, in the seventh chapter, to derive from it the idealism of Berkeley, the materialism of Hartley, and the scepticism of Hume. This must be a wonderfully prolific idea. "We know things *directly*," says Cousin, "and

without the medium of ideas, or of any other medium." pp. 176, 177. If by "knowing things directly," he means, that we know *things themselves*, and not mere representative ideas, Mr. Locke surely agrees with him in this opinion. His fourth head of the sorts of knowledge, is that of *real existence without the mind*. B. IV. ch. i. § 7. "I can no more doubt," he says, "whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and that *something really exists*, that causes that sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand. I think no body can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be *uncertain* of the *existence* of those *things* which he sees and feels. If our dreamer pleases to try, whether the glowing heat of a glass-furnace be barely a wandering imagination, in a drowsy man's fancy; by putting his hand into it, he may, perhaps, be wakened into a certainty, greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination." B. IV. ch. ii. § 2, 3, 8.

But Cousin says, "We know things *without* the medium of *ideas*." Does he mean by this, that we know things *without thinking of them*? If we think of them, and think of them as they are, then they are the very objects of our thoughts, which Mr. Locke calls ideas. Again, Cousin says, "We know things directly, without the medium of ideas, or of *any other medium*." Does he mean, that we know external things *without the use of the senses*? Does a man, born blind, first observe colors and visible objects by intuition; and afterwards, when his eyes are opened, see those things only which he had previously known without the use of his eyes? Perhaps Cousin would say, that sensation is the *occasion* or *condition*, rather than the *medium*, of perception. The *term* is immaterial, if we are agreed, that the use of the senses is a pre-requisite to a knowledge of external objects. The *reality* of our knowledge, is a point of inquiry not necessarily dependent on the *means* of knowledge. Mr. Locke justly observes, that "it takes not from the *certainty* of our senses, and the ideas that we receive by them, that we know not the *manner* in which they are produced." When a man first learns, that an image on the retina is the *means* or *condition* of vision, this adds nothing to the strength of his conviction, that he sees distinctly.

Cousin very properly considers it a defect in Locke's Essay, that he has so little to say on the *inductive* process, so important a department of logic.

'It is to induction that we owe all our conquests over nature, all our discoveries of the laws of the world. For a long time natural philosophers contented themselves with very limited observations which furnished no great results, or with speculations which resulted in nothing but hypotheses. Induction for a long time was only a natural process of the human mind, of which men made use for acquiring the knowledge they needed in respect to the external world, without explaining it, and

without its passing from practice into science. It is to Bacon, chiefly, we owe, not the invention, but the discovery and scientific exposition of this process. It is strange that Locke, a countryman of Bacon, and who belongs to his school, should in his classification of the modes of knowledge, have permitted precisely that one to escape him to which the school of Bacon has given the greatest celebrity, and placed in the clearest light.' pp. 190, 191.

We fully concur with Cousin, in the opinion which he has expressed, of the inexpediency of limiting the term *knowledge*, as Locke has done, to absolute certainty, to *intuition* and *demonstration*, and of restricting the term *judgment* to cases of *probable* evidence. This is departing from customary usage, without evident necessity. The word judgment is employed by logicians, to signify that act of the mind, which, expressed in language, forms an affirmative or negative proposition, whether the truth of it be certain or only probable.

'We either know in a certain and absolute manner, or we know merely in a manner more or less probable. Locke chooses to employ the term knowledge exclusively to signify absolute knowledge, that which is raised above all probability. The knowledge which is wanting in certainty, simple conjecture, or presumption more or less probable, he calls judgment.

* * * * *

But the general usage of all languages is contrary to so limited a sense of the word knowledge; a certain knowledge, or a probable knowledge, is always spoken of as knowledge in its different degrees. It is so in regard to judgment. As languages have not confined the term knowledge to absolute knowledge, so they have not limited the term judgment to knowledge merely probable. In some cases we pass certain and decisive judgments; in others we pass judgments which are only probable, or even purely conjectural. In a word, judgments are infallible, or doubtful in various degrees; but doubtful or infallible, they are always judgments, and this distinction between knowledge as exclusively infallible, and judgment as being exclusively probable, is verbal distinction altogether arbitrary and barren.' pp. 191, 192.

This distinction has not been generally adopted by succeeding writers. But, as Locke himself adheres to it, it is necessary to keep it in mind, while reading that part of his Essay, the fourth book, which treats of knowledge and judgment.

But Cousin has a more weighty objection to Locke's account of knowledge; that he makes it to consist altogether in the *agreement* or *disagreement* of our *ideas*. We have no partiality for the terms agreement and disagreement, used in his definition. When we affirm, that Robert abhors lying, do we mean to be understood to say, that Robert and lying *agree*? Yet this must be the construction, according to Locke's application of the term.

For he uses the expression agreement and disagreement, as synonymous with *affirmation* and *negation*: or, more exactly, *agreement*, according to him, is that relation which is verbally expressed in an *affirmative proposition*; and *disagreement* is that relation which is expressed in a *negative proposition*. B. IV. ch. v. § 5; and ch. vii. § 2. "Truth and falsehood being never without some *affirmation* or *negation*, express or tacit, it is not to be found, but where signs are joined or separated, according to the *agreement* or *disagreement* of the things they stand for." B. II. ch. xxxii. § 19. See also, B. II. ch. xxxii. § 3. B. IV. ch. i. § 3; and ch. iii. § 7. And Cousin himself says, that "all our knowledge is resolvable, in the last analysis, into affirmations of true or false, into judgments." p. 215.

But the great objection of Cousin, is, that this affirmation or negation is represented by Locke, as expressing the agreement or disagreement of our *ideas*; nothing but ideas. This renders all our knowledge ideal. And to what does this amount, when interpreted according to Locke's meaning of idea? Simply to this, that we have no knowledge of things, *without thinking of them*. Does Cousin show us in what *other* way we obtain any knowledge? He admits, that in the *abstract sciences*, arithmetic and geometry, "the theory of Locke is perfectly sound." pp. 193-6. But it breaks down, in its application to real existence. It does not even account for our knowledge of the primary truth, *I exist*. Why not? Because that, in order to know it, we must *not take it for granted*. We must "seek to find it." We must "search after it." To obtain it, we must first *separate* the two logical terms, *I* and *existence*, that we may bring them together again, and observe their agreement. But the term *I*, disjoined from existence, is not the real living self, but a mere abstraction. And the term existence, disjoined from myself, is not *my* existence, but a mere abstraction also. Now the relation between two abstract terms, must be an *abstract relation*. And by putting the terms together, we obtain an abstract agreement between an abstract self and abstract existence; not the *concrete* proposition, *I exist*. pp. 196-8.

This, if we understand the writer, is the substance of what he considers a "somewhat subtle" and "prolonged discussion," extended, in its different applications, through twelve or fifteen pages. Now we would ask, what is there, in all the writings of Locke, to furnish the slightest apology for this absurd representation? Does his theory imply, that we must go through a *process* of abstraction, and comparison, and deduction, to *find* the knowledge of our own existence? Can we never see the agreement between two ideas, till we have first considered them as *separated*, disjoined from each other? Does Locke say, that to obtain the knowledge of our own existence, we must first consider it as un-

known, for the sake of *proving* it? He states, that we know it by *intuition*. And what is intuition? "This part of knowledge," he says, "is irresistible, and like bright sunshine, forces itself to be perceived, *as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way.*" Does M. Cousin refer us to any knowledge *more* direct than this? Here is no logical process of disjoining, and abstracting, and comparing, and inferring.

But Cousin says, "The theory of Locke not only makes the human mind begin with abstraction, but also to derive the *concrete* from the abstract; while in point of fact, you could never have had the abstract, if you had not previously had the concrete." pp. 202, 203. Now what does Locke say? Speaking of abstract general maxims, he says, "That they are *not* the truths *first known* to the mind, is evident to experience." "Such self-evident truths must be first known, which consist of *ideas*, that are first in the mind; and the ideas first in the mind, 'tis evident, are those of *particular* things; from whence, by slow degrees, the understanding proceeds to some few general ones." "For *abstract* ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones." B. IV. ch. vii. § 9. If in the concrete proposition, I exist, the terms I and exist are so distinct, that we can understand the *meaning* of the expression; no farther abstraction is necessary, to enable us to see the *truth* of it. Seeing the agreement between our ideas, is not, according to Locke, a method by which we are to *arrive* at knowledge, but it is that in which knowledge *consists*.

The "subtle" argument, in the commencement of the ninth chapter of Cousin, is of the same character with that which we have now been examining. He says, that according to the theory of Locke, every judgment implies *comparison*; a comparison between *two terms*. But in cases of real existence, at least, terms must be known, *before* they can be compared. There must, therefore, be some knowledge before any act of comparison; that is, before any judgment. pp. 213—216. But, in the judgment which Cousin calls *primitive*, are there not the two terms which constitute the subject and the predicate of a proposition, as in his own example, I exist? And does Locke's theory require any other comparison between these, than what is implied in seeing intuitively the truth of the proposition?

We fully agree with Cousin, that "one of the best chapters of Locke, is that on Faith and Reason." "Locke assigns the exact province of reason and faith. He indicates their relative office, and their distinct limits." p. 232.

It is one of Cousin's favorite principles, that every scheme of philosophy contains *some truth* and *some error*, and that error retains its hold on the human mind, only by being intimately blended with truth.

‘Men, individuals and nations, men of genius and ordinary men, unquestionably give in to many errors, and attach themselves to them; but not to that which makes them errors, but to the part of truth which is in them. Examine to the bottom all the celebrated errors, political, religious, philosophical; there is not one which has not a considerable portion of truth in it, and it is to this it owes its credence in the minds of great men, who introduced it upon the scene of the world, and in the minds of the multitude, who have followed the great men. It is the truth joined to the error, which gives to the error all its force, which gives it birth, sustains it, spreads it, explains and excuses it. Errors gain success and footing in the world, no otherwise than by carrying along with them, and offering, as it were, for their ransom, so much of truth, as, piercing through the mists which envelop it, enlighten and carry forward the human race.’ p. 240.

The last point discussed, in the volume before us, is the evidence of the being of a God.

‘There are various and different proofs of the existence of God. The gratifying result of my studies in this respect, is, that these various proofs have different degrees of strictness in their form, but that they all have a foundation of truth, which needs simply to be disengaged and put in clear light in order to give them an incontrovertible authority. Every thing leads us to God; there is no bad way of arriving thither; we may go in different ways. In general, all the proofs of every sort of the existence of God, are comprehended under two great classes, namely: proofs *a posteriori*, and proofs *a priori*.’ p. 264.

After various introductory observations, our author expresses, very briefly, the substance of the *a priori* argument. “The simple fact of the conception of God, by the reason, the simple idea of God, the simple possibility of the existence of God, implies the certainty and necessity of the existence of God.” pp. 266, 267. On the demonstration of Locke, Cousin observes:—

‘Locke believes in the existence of God, and he has given an excellent demonstration of it. But he comes from the Sensual school, he therefore repels arguments *a priori*, and admits scarcely any thing but arguments *a posteriori*. He does not wish to employ the argument of Descartes, which proves the existence of God from the idea of him, from the idea of infinity and perfection.’ p. 270.

In succeeding observations, Cousin intimates, that Locke’s demonstration “grounds itself, specially, upon *sensible and external experience*.” Now the fact is, that the single point which Locke assumes, as the basis of his argument, is *our own existence*. “To show, that we are capable of knowing, that is, *being certain*, that there is a God, and how we came by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than *ourselves*, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence.” B. IV. ch. x. § 1.

At the close of his work, Cousin says, that in combating Locke, he has borrowed many of his arguments from Reid and Kant. He proposes, at a future day, to make an attack upon "the sublime errors and mystic tendencies" of the spiritual school of Kant. How great a portion of the labors of philosophers, is employed in endeavoring to overthrow the positions of preceding writers! Aristotle is attacked by Descartes, Descartes by Locke, Locke by Reid, Reid by Kant, and Kant by Cousin. How far this demolishing process may be carried, it is not easy to determine. It may not stop with Cousin. His philosophy, built on the ruins of other systems, may last till the next popular lecturer appears in Paris. The sexton, who digs his thousand graves, may well consider, that some one may soon be at hand, who will dig *his* grave.

While endeavoring to do justice to the principles of Locke, we have not undertaken an examination of Cousin's *own* system of philosophy. We doubt whether its features could be accurately drawn, from the occasional glimpses which we have of it, in perusing the work under review. We should not choose to incur the risk of misrepresenting him, as much as he has misapprehended Locke. The translator, in his introduction and appendix, has given us brief sketches of our author's theories. Some of our friends complain, that these *explanations* need to be explained. And we were about proposing some queries ourselves, respecting the "higher metaphysics," the "transcendental logic," the "subjective primitive," "objective intellections," and "self-reduplication," together with the "antithetic synthesis," the "hyper-physical determination," the "spontaneity of reason," and "egoistical idealism," of the article in the *Edinburgh Review*, pronounced, by Mr. Henry, to be "one of the best specimens of philosophical criticism, which has recently appeared in the English language." But we have thought it prudent to pay some regard to our own reputation, taking to ourselves a caution from the sage remark of Dugald Stewart: "I am fully aware, that whoever, in treating of the human mind, aims to be *understood*, must lay his account with forfeiting, in the opinion of a very large proportion of readers, all pretensions to *depth*, to *subtlety*, or to *invention*." *Phil.* vol. ii. We are inclined to think, that the obscurity of which some complain, in the introduction and appendix, are to be ascribed, not the editor, but to his subject. He appears to have caught the spirit and manner of his originals. This is no *vulgar* philosophy. It is transcendental. The profound, as well as the sublime, are nearly allied to the obscure. The examination of the *Essay on the Understanding*, is more perspicuous than any of the other writings of Cousin which we have read. His criticisms are rendered distinct, by the light reflected from the luminous

pages of Locke. We have been repeatedly told, by those who profess to know something of the German philosophy, from which Cousin has borrowed so largely, that it is impossible to translate it into English. If this is so, we ought not to complain of the failure of any attempt to teach us its mysteries. We may congratulate ourselves, however, that we are not subjected to the restriction, which, according to Cousin, prevented the entire development of Locke's philosophy in England, that it was put forth *on an island*! There must be *room*, we think, in America, for the expansion of the most ample philosophical system. "There is no subject," says Fontenelle, "on which men ever come to form a reasonable opinion, till they have *exhausted* all the *absurd* views which it is possible to take of it." From the history of philosophical opinions, there is ground to hope, that the catalogue of all possible absurdities is nearly complete; and that, hereafter, we may look for some other results, than the conclusion at which the poet arrives,—

‘That metaphysics, rightly shown,
But teach how little can be known.’

ART. VI.—CHARACTER AND WRITINGS OF HANNAH MORE.

IN the closing article of our last number, we gave a rapid sketch of the principal incidents comprised in the *Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Mrs. Hannah More*. Our limits not then allowing us to enter upon such an estimate, we now resume the subject, with the intention, and in the hope, of paying an appropriate tribute to the superiority of her intellect, the beauty of her character, and the useful tendency of her writings. Much of the interest of *literary* biography, is derived from delineations of this sort, provided they are true to the reality; since we often meet with the remark, that the lives of authors are destitute of incident and adventure,—the chief attraction of other kinds of biography. Not that such a remark is applicable, in its full extent, to the life of Mrs. More. During the greatest part of a century, she experienced the usual vicissitudes which affect human beings; for many years, she was actively engaged in the most spirit-stirring scenes,—helping to form an age which had begun to be benevolent; and her correspondence, which included many persons of rank and talent, the most illustrious in the British empire, is full of enlivening details of opinions, respecting the leading characters and absorbing events of the times,—to say nothing of its no less interesting pictures of domestic life and manners. The whole work forms a body of anecdote and sentiment, compared with which, according to our taste, the rarest adventures, whether of fictitious or

real life, can claim no superiority of interest. Still, over this mass of informal, though awakening narrative, we love to see the movement of the presiding mind,—the spirit which infused into it its vitality,—the genius which threw over it its colors of light and beauty. It is the just delineation, if it can be done, of this interior principle, which can excite fresh interest in the admired subject of the present biography, and in the productions, that have rendered her name precious to the wise and the good. We venture, then, to present a condensed view of those intellectual and moral characteristics, which, as exhibited in the life and writings of this celebrated woman, have, for so many years, charmed and improved so many minds, both in Europe and in this country.

Here, however, at the very outset, we feel the difficulty of portraying excellence, when all that can be said of it, is more than admitted, by the greater portion of those who may take the pains to read this article. It may add to their gratification, to find their views confirmed, but scarcely to their knowledge. The most material facts respecting Mrs. More, have, for a long time, been before the public : her writings, as they have appeared in succession, belong to the standards of the didactic religion and literature of her country. Both the facts and the writings have already made their impression ; and it is an impression not easily to be deepened by any eulogium ; though we have no intention of making the mere eulogium of this lady. Every reader of taste and piety, who reads the Shepherd of Salisbury Plain, or Cœlebs, or Practical Piety, has in his mind an image of moral beauty, which it would be difficult to improve by any abstract representations, or by any thing short of extended comments on those productions. Her praise is the delight, the improvement, the religious, subdued feeling, which she effectually conveys to the mind of her reader. Although we despair, then, of adding much, if any thing, to the sentiment of admiration, in the minds of those who are acquainted with her history and works ; yet we may experience a pleasure, in giving utterance to our own admiration of such excellence. Or it may happen, that a few of our readers, if there be a few who are little acquainted with her character and writings, would be led to bestow a greater attention upon them, by means of a sober estimate of their constituent excellences.

A fanciful writer has remarked, that the vulgar are wiser than philosophers. We will not pretend to fortify or explain this paradox, by insisting upon another, and that is, when we say of Mrs. More, comparing her with her literary cotemporaries of the opposite sex, that she is the wiser *man* of them all. We have sometimes been tempted to pay such a homage to this female genius, as an offset against her own modest admission of the superiority of the men,—an admission which so aroused the gentle indignation of one of her

fair friends, that the latter longed to take up the pen against her, on that subject, and assert the full equality of the sex. Had ink been spilled in this encounter, it would, in the opinion of one of Mrs. More's correspondents, have given a fatal advantage against her; for the more she wrote, the more evident it would be, that her opponent was in the right!

Of Mrs. More's abilities, both natural and acquired, there can be but one opinion among those who are acquainted with her works. Her genius was of a high order. Few writers, in our day, have equaled her in a clear and comprehensive understanding, and in a correct and refined taste. She came from the hands of her Creator, a prodigy. So she seems to have been regarded from her early childhood, by her immediate relatives. As she grew up, all of them paid deference to her, and were proud of her superiority. The admirers of her genius, and the associates of her leisure hours, were a class of persons, that must have conferred honor on the most distinguished abilities. With Johnson, Garrick, the two Sheridans, the two Burkes, Walpole, Kennicott, Porteus, Wilberforce, and other great and brilliant men of those times, as well as the literary champions of her own sex, she took her equal place, and played her equal part, in the sallies of wit and humor, in the effusions of fancy and sentiment, or in the communications of wisdom and truth. All appeared to regard her as a favorite. Nor were rank, and wealth, and fashion, unwilling to merge the consideration of plebeian birth, mediocrity of possessions, and plain attire, in their admiration of genius. Even royalty condescended to be gracious to so much wisdom and worth. The circles of wit and fashion in which she mingled, during many of the earlier years of her womanhood, were enlivened by the choice combination of intellectual qualities which she brought to them; not here to say, were, in a sense, hallowed by her decent and able defenses of serious religion. It was an uncommon proof of the estimation in which her talents were held, that she was suffered, with so much freedom, to reprove the follies and vices of the great; while, at the same time, she continued to be an object of their attention and favor.

The native energy, as well as the exquisite culture, of her understanding, was attested, both on such occasions, and in the more private interchanges of friendship, by means of her tact in *conversation*. She appeared to no disadvantage, even by the side of Johnson, in his own peculiar province, "full of wisdom and piety" as he was, and also, when he chose to be, "the greatest sophist, that ever wielded an argument in the schools of declamation." In Mrs. More, conversation possessed that fine, easy, ready, lively character, which she has herself described as the peculiar feature of London conversation, among its higher and literary classes. In her youth, one of her earliest friends, Dr. Stonehouse, it is record-

ed, "was unbounded in his admiration of the freshness and originality of her powers in conversation, in which her modesty and judgment contended with her fancy and fertility." What must she not have been, in this respect, in the maturity of her powers, when she was the pride of the fashionable and literary circles of the British metropolis!

In her letters, as introduced into the memoirs of her life, or rather as constituting them, we have a strong additional proof of her great and various talents. Without choosing to point out, here, their particular characteristics, we shall be disappointed in our expectations, if, by general consent, they are not hereafter ranked among the first productions of their kind in English literature. Among her numerous, learned, and ingenious correspondents, she appears not at all inferior to the best; nay, we fancy, that her epistolary effusions surpass, in the peculiar attributes of that class of writings, the generality of those, which, together with her own, contribute to swell these fascinating volumes. This we know is saying a great deal, considering who her correspondents were. In ease and sprightliness of manner, in cunning turns and winning forms of address, woman-like, she strikes us as superior to all her correspondents, except the females; while in correctness of taste, beauty of allusion, richness of sentiment, and originality of thought, she is behind none of them, male or female. There are, it must be confessed, elegant specimens of the epistolary style, in these volumes, taking the principal contributors. Mrs. Boscawen has ease and humor; Mrs. Montagu is correct and sensible; Garrick, in the few letters of his, which appear in this work, exhibits sprightliness and wit; Walpole pleases us with his playfulness and sagacity; Pepys is rich in classical allusions, and is a model of classical neatness; Porteus displays the amiability of his temper, and is descriptive and sentimental; and Newton, though careless in expression, is delightfully spiritual and instructive. The several writers in the book, seem to us to have done their best, in their communications to Hannah More, as being aware of the character of the intellect with which they were coming in contact: and if, as some one remarks, we naturally graduate our letters to the intelligence of our correspondents, according to our own conceptions of it, there can be no doubt of the very sincere and profound respect, which they all entertained for her talents and worth. But the published works of this lady, afford the most direct indications in respect to the character of her intellect. They have long been before the public; and the settled and often-expressed opinion of the wise and good,—the sway, which, for more than half a century, she has exercised over minds of every order, in productions designed for every order of minds, has placed her in the foremost ranks of capacity and genius. In a different part of this article,

we shall offer a few remarks on her works in general: we will, therefore, only add here, that the circumstances attending their publication, indicated the high estimation in which Mrs. M. was held, as an able and accomplished writer. Not only were the most ardent expectations expressed, in regard to forth-coming works; not only were compliments most profusely poured upon her, by her literary associates, and scholars of the age, both at home and abroad; (though these, we know, are sometimes only the offerings of friendship or flattery,) but she had the more substantial proof of favor, in the boundless circulation and innumerable editions of her books. Her popularity, as a writer, was more particularly indicated by those tracts, published under the title of the *Cheap Repository*, which have probably influenced more minds for their good, than is the case with any other series of modern christian writings.

The mind of Mrs. More, originally so superior, was disciplined, and if not with all the exactness of genuine scholarship, was yet effectually disciplined. It was highly and richly cultivated, with whatever might seem befitting to a female understanding, whether as to ornament or use, in the common walks of life, or in literary composition. She ever modestly estimated her learning, strictly speaking, at a low rate; and though it was not considerable in the classics, and in mathematical science, it was not otherwise small. What she was capable of attaining, even in these branches, may be inferred from the fact, as recorded by her biographer, that her father, who had "a strong dislike of female pedantry, having begun to instruct his daughter in the rudiments of the Latin language and mathematics, was soon frightened by his own success." With the Latin classics she continued to cultivate her acquaintance; nor was her knowledge of mathematics without a sensible benefit to her intellectual progress. Of several modern languages she had a good knowledge. The French she understood perfectly, and spoke with admirable grace. The Spanish and Italian she translated with ease. Her acquaintance with English literature, particularly with criticism and poetry, was uncommonly extensive and accurate. Indeed, her general information was extremely rich and various; derived, as it was, not only from books, but from the living world. Few persons have been more conversant with different modes of life, and mingled to a greater extent among the various ranks of mankind, than Mrs. More. For the charms of her intellect, she was courted by the learned and noble; while her christian benevolence drew around her, for their relief and instruction, the children of poverty and ignorance. As she ranged through the region of fancy, sentiment, and taste, or walked the thorny way of benevolent self-denial, her observant and reflecting mind noticed all the forms of conduct, and every shade of

character, and gathered from a thousand sources the lessons of wisdom and propriety. From her London excursions of recreation, and her Cheddar travels of charity, she returned laden with the ripest fruits of experience, to her own Cowslip Green, or Barley Wood ; the latter, above all other spots on earth, the modern mount of the muses. From this varied manner of passing her time, she learned every thing connected with life and manners, and the springs of human action; and this important knowledge she consecrated to the best of purposes. It qualified her for writing on the immense variety of subjects which she undertook, and points of illustration, or proprieties of allusion, which none could furnish, who had not been favored with her advantages, she brought to bear with great effect on the creations of her genius. Her learning, on the whole, connected with her native strength of mind, disciplined taste, and habits of observation, was amply sufficient for the purposes she sought to answer, in the moral productions of her pen.

The superiority of the intellect of Hannah More, was particularly indicated by its fair proportions. It possessed both strength and grace. The reader of taste and discernment, perceives a sort of perfection in its structure and developments. Like the Grecian architecture, it unites the qualities of the greatest stability, with the greatest beauty. It possessed an elegant simplicity, and just balance of the different faculties. No one power so predominated, as to mar the appearance, or impede the operations, of the others. All, as they were separately or unitedly called into exercise, seemed to perform their part with perfect ease, and according to the object contemplated, in the highest style of excellence. Whatever it elaborated, was chaste, neat, elegant, and finished. Ardor of feeling, richness of imagery, and facility of composition, seldom betrayed her into carelessness, into faulty constructions, or confused, indefinite, and over-wrought descriptions. If her power of amplification, and her vast materials of thought, tempted her not unfrequently into an unusual variety of views, she was able to make the line of demarkation between them perfectly distinct, and to give to each an appropriate significance and grace. Without descanting, here, upon the particular features of her style, we may advert to this general quality of it, which every one discerns, as an illustration of the fair and elegant proportions of her mental powers.

This characteristic beauty of her intellect was strikingly displayed, if not essentially constituted, by her lively admiration of genius, and the beauty of other minds ; by its congeniality with every kind of excellence, natural, intellectual, and moral ; and by its capacity of molding every thing which was admitted into it, into pure and enchanting forms of sentiment and fancy. Her ad-

miration of genius, as her biographer remarks, belonged to the structure and constitution of her mind ; and we may add, that we have always thought it incident to fine minds, to relish keenly the beauty of other minds. It is one of its earliest, most natural, and spontaneous manifestations. How animated was Mrs. More's participation of the beauties of thought, as they are elicited in the works of elegant genius, we need not tell. Her writings have always evinced the fact ; and now, her correspondence with her intimate friends, in their mutual, unrestricted effusions of taste and feeling, brings it more fully into view. The congeniality also of her mind with every kind of excellence, shows it in its features of loveliness, in no ordinary degree. Nature and art, mind and morals, in their characteristic perfection, found, in the deep recesses of her soul, a lively feeling mingling itself with that perfection,—an associating principle, by which the most delightful trains of thought were evolved. Her biographer again remarks, that “the fairest forms of truth and sentiment were beautifully inscribed on her mind.” And not only so, but we say further, as another evidence or instance of the beauty of her intellect, that it was capable of molding every thing which was admitted into it, both of sentiment and fancy, into peculiar shapes of loveliness. Every thing on which her mind ruminated, came forth from it sparkling with light : it seemed to be transmuted, as by a moral alchymy, into elemental purity and grace.

There were, indeed, other intellectual characteristics in Mrs. More, such as the refinement of her taste, the exuberance of her fancy, and the sprightliness of her wit ; modes, we may rather say, in which her mental power was developed, that might furnish the basis of extended remarks : but we can only add a thought respecting the last named particular. In regard to the powers of wit, and indeed the general vivacity of her mind, we have received impressions from her correspondence, much in advance of those we have before entertained. It appears, however, that the dangerous faculty of wit was perfectly controlled, by a judgment of the soundest kind, and rendered innoxious, by distinguished good-nature. Indeed, so entirely did she get the better of the propensity to employ it in its severity,—in the form of sarcasm and raillery,—that the first attempt in which she openly and professedly gave utterance to it, in a review of a coteremporaneous publication, became her last ; since she found so much pleasure which she deemed of a wicked kind, in indulging such a vein, that she determined never again to offend in that manner : a magnanimous determination, to which she rigidly adhered ! Her general vivacity of mind, while it imparted an indescribable charm to her social intercourse and correspondence, and furnished many of the lighter beauties of her writings, was tempered and corrected by a well-

timed seriousness, proceeding from christian principles ; so that it never degenerated into frivolity and excess.

These attributes of her mind, regulated by the light and love inspired by the holy religion of the gospel, were brought into habitual exercise in those serious effusions of her pen, which constituted her one of the greatest moral teachers of the age. She chose such a field of exertion, as we could wish a strong, well-disciplined, beautiful, and sprightly intellect, should have selected, to employ its powers in consecrated labors for the good of mankind. Plutarch relates, that Numa feigned, for the purposes of rule and religion, that he was favored with the society of Egeria, a goddess or mountain-nymph, who made to him important revelations. That king was far more favored, who actually enjoyed, for the good of his subjects, the brighter illumination, and the more sacred influence, of a mind like that of Hannah More. She was the better muse of George's days,—“heavenly,” by means of a sanctified genius: the other was “an empty dream.” It is certain, from the result, that God endowed her with brilliant capacities of mind, that she might be enabled to act an important part, and fill a wide space, in his providential and gracious economy on earth. We have now considered her in the superiority of her intellect.

The excellence, the *moral* beauty of her *character*, is a still more important concern. We have necessarily adverted already to some of the qualities of her heart, in conjunction with those of her understanding. But it may be satisfactory and useful, to dwell on several distinct and prominent traits of her character, involving the feelings and exercises of “the hidden man of the heart,” as well as the acts of the exterior life.

She possessed, in no ordinary degree, that enthusiastic feeling, connected with perseverance, which enables one to undertake and accomplish great designs. In her opinion, she was not apt to be sanguine in her expectations. But while this may have been the fact, she manifested that ardor and determined spirit, in whatever she attempted, which are generally the concomitant of a great and vigorous mind. As an indication of this trait of character, it is obvious, of course, to cite the numerous and spirited productions of her pen, continued from the age of seventeen to eighty years, amidst many infirmities, and frequent and severe sicknesses,—productions which have spread to the extremities of the civilized world. Her ardor in composition, seemed scarcely to yield to the effects of age. The results of this spirit of enthusiasm and perseverance, in drawing so largely upon her intellectual resources, for the good of her country and kind, were, in age, only the riper and mellowed fruits of experience and wisdom. It was, also, equally in the active labors of benevolence, that this same spirit

was displayed. We refer to one instance, in particular, already mentioned in our account of Mrs. More, viz., the establishment of her charity-schools, in Cheddar, and the adjoining villages, amidst discouragements, that would have shaken ordinary minds, and even a virulence of opposition, that would have driven from the field, any one who was not a hero, or rather a heroine; for it could be only a woman's spirit of zeal and endurance, that was able so to triumph. Her long-continued prosecution of this object, is one of the most pleasing instances of the effects of the temper of which we are speaking, that are to be found in the history of modern philanthropy. This trait in Hannah More, had it not been directed by divine grace, would have shown itself in the unwearied pursuit of literary pleasures and distinctions,—the eager chase of fashion, taste, and splendor,—a course of life on which she once entered, though under the influence, at the same time, of many moral restraints. Or, had she yielded to her inborn love of the country, and retirement, this same vigor of character would have appeared in prolonged devotion to the muses,—in the idolatries of a heart, expending its energies on the decorations of a garden, or in the passionate hankering after an ideal perfection. The fondness with which she panted after the quiet and pleasures of retired life, was, at length, actually indulged, so far as it could be consistently with the interruptions of company, the consequence of her wide-spread fame. Yet, governed as she was by a heavenly principle, she could not be contented with the gratification of these lower, though innocent wishes of her nature. She was uneasy, after having attained the summit of earthly good. Mere speculation had no charms for her; and she felt, that she must fulfill the better and nobler purposes of religion: or, as her biographer expresses himself, “there was no rest for her, but in the consciousness of being useful.”

It has given us pleasure, in reading the life of this christian lady, to notice her firm and decided spirit. It was a trait of character which she often had occasion to manifest. Few, with her susceptible feelings, could have pursued so independent a course of moderation and integrity, amidst the worldly fascinations which surrounded her, particularly in the early and middle period of life. Gratified she must have been, with the flattering attentions, that were paid her, by the learned and the great; nor with all her humility, could she have remained wholly unconscious of her influence: yet, she was too firm to be corrupted,—too decided to be seduced from the path of duty, either by the examples that were placed before her, or by the adulations that were addressed to her heart. She practically adhered to her own notions of right, amidst these brilliant scenes,—the theater of literary glory,—at the hazard of being accounted singular; and her firmness, as might

justly be anticipated, commanded respect. On fitting occasions, also, both in her correspondence and in her social intercourse, she bore her decided testimony in favor of correct principles and evangelical religion, and against error and impiety, of whatever name or degree. In her published works, notwithstanding the tenderness of her feelings, and the consideration which she must have felt to be due to many of her friends in high life, on account of their courtesies and kindness, she spoke boldly and plainly, in concerns which affected their spiritual welfare, the prosperity of the gospel, and the honor of God. Her *Thoughts on the Manners of the Great*, and her *Estimate of the Religion of the Fashionable World*, especially the latter work, was a message of faithfulness to those classes of people, whose vices were reprov'd, and whose righteousness was weighed in the balance, and found wanting: and yet, such were the reputation of genius, and the influence of inflexible principle, that, though those classes were never before so completely exposed, in their corruptions and deficiencies, they never before so patiently submitted to the censure. Her independent and decided turn was conspicuously displayed, in the purpose which she formed and executed, of quitting the theater of her fame, and the allurements of fashionable life, and of consecrating herself, in a more secluded situation, to the service of God, "to be used as an instrument in the work of grace upon the soul, and the extension of the Savior's kingdom." This was a most important era in her life, in its consequences, both to herself and to the world. This scheme, however, was not suddenly formed and matured,—she had long revolved it in her mind; but having resolved to adopt it, she cheerfully submitted to the self-denial which such a step required. Like the Roman consul, who ordered his magnificent private dwelling to be pulled down, because he would not have the citizens surmise, that he was affecting the state of a king; so this favorite of refined and fashionable society, abjured distinctions, the acceptance of which, the enemies of vital piety might naturally have supposed, as implicating her in their own worldliness: and she thenceforth sought the obscurities and labors of a far different scene.

Scarcely any thing can have impressed the mind of the reader more forcibly, than the low estimate which Mrs. More placed on herself, and her performances. Her humility was equal to her other extraordinary qualities. We have seldom noticed, in literary history, so fair an example of this virtue. The vanity of authors is proverbial,—to say nothing of what has been often flippantly asserted, respecting the female character in particular, on this subject. The greatest minds only are exempted from such an infirmity. According to a sensible writer, one infallible characteristic of genuine magnanimity of soul, is unalterable modesty or humility.

It is a feeling which arises from the comparison, which such a mind makes between itself and abstract excellence. We will not say, that Mrs. More had no spice of vanity in her constitution; but we are constrained to say, that she manifested a far smaller portion of it, than literary biography has been wont to record. It may seem incredible, to ordinary minds, that, with all the notice which she received at home and abroad, and the immense circulation of her works, she could persist, (to use her own familiar expressions in her correspondence,) in calling herself a *nobody*, and her performances *nothings*, mere trifles. This was not affectation. She was too honest, too scrupulously conscientious, to employ such a method, for the purpose of having her humility itself panegyriized by her friends. She evidently acted agreeably to her own noble precept, that "humility is the foundation of virtue, and that pride is as incompatible with piety towards God, as it is with the repose of our own hearts." A practical exemplification of this trait of her character, incidentally appears in her correspondence. It was a case, in which some one attempted to impose a work on the public, as though it had been Mrs. More's own work. Contrary to the advice of her friends, she took no public notice of the imposition; only remarking to her correspondent, "it is the humblest of all possible deceits, in *any* author, to wish to pass for *me*; and I would not expose any body, for such a meritorious act of humiliation."

Mrs. More's industry deserves all commendation. The full employment of time, in useful labors or studies, was a principle which she held to be sacred, as well as a habit which she found to be delightful. Whatever of reputation, attainments, influence, and usefulness, she realized, was owing, perhaps, as much to diligence as to genius. With some persons of superior endowments, she did not feel, that native capacity was any reason why the powers should not be tasked and strengthened, by constant and persevering exertion. She was, accordingly, a wonderful example of industry. In all her pursuits, whether secular, literary, or religious,—in her household cares, in the decorations of her dwellings and grounds, in the management of her charity-schools, in the prosecution of benevolent objects, in the cultivation of her understanding, and in the productions of her pen, she showed a constancy, as well as an energy of application, which has rarely been equaled. The number of her books alone, produced amidst large demands of time, occasioned by circumstances already adverted to, is a striking proof of the success with which she learned economy in the use of that invaluable trust. This, and every other monument which she reared to the glory of God, attested the strength of her conviction on this subject, and the unabated diligence with which she pursued her high and holy aims.

It appears to us an admirable quality in Mrs. More, that she

was characterized by a peculiar spirit of self-control, and self-denial, united to a wise and tender consideration of others. That consideration was directed, uniformly, to the ease, comfort, and especially the spiritual good, of her fellow-creatures; and was most successfully exercised through the control which she had over her own feelings, and the self-denial she was enabled habitually to practice. With a wonderful sagacity, she hit upon the most effectual and winning ways of doing good; and her spirit was equal to the labors, and even the drudgery, necessary for the accomplishment of the object. To this quality in Hannah More, we might give the single name of *benevolence*, did it not also include the idea of *management*. If the latter term is too nearly associated with duplicity, or disingenuousness, yet we may, arbitrarily at least, conceive of it in a better sense. Connected with a sanctifying principle, it is identified with the maxim of a living author, who has looked deeply into human life, viz.: "Manage yourself well, and you may manage all the world." In Mrs. More, it was a benevolent, holy management; it had benevolent, holy ends in view. According to her own account, naturally inclined to impatience and irritable feelings, she yet learned, through grace, to curb this out-going of our common depravity; having in view, at the same time, the influence, which, by means of her own self-possession, she might exert over others, for their best good. And has she not shown what an able tactician she was, in the worthiest sense of the word? Who, in modern times, has left more enduring monuments of holy skill, than this female, in molding to her own gentle and benevolent purposes, a mighty mass of minds? Among the ranks of beauty, and fashion, and greatness, as well as among the children of want and obscurity, and through all the gradations between them, her awakening and healing spirit insinuated its way, with a view to lead every order of mind to objects worthy of itself. In the time of Britain's greatest peril, from the inundation of revolutionary principles, and the doctrines of "an ambiguous scepticism," the single head and heart of this woman, caring for the ark of her God, her country, and her kind, was the principal means, under Divine Providence, as many were ready to acknowledge, of saving the constitution, if not the religion, of the empire. She seemed to be purposely raised up for a work of this kind, with an admirable genius and training, for touching the springs of action, in minds of every variety of taste and capacity.

But piety ruled the ascendant, in her character. It was her crowning excellence, as it is the crowning excellence of every one who has any moral worth in the sight of God. It was the root of all her virtues, the test of their genuineness, the bond of their union, and the principle of their permanency. It was deep, humble, experimental, practical piety, based on a correct belief, and exhibited

in a holy temper, and well-ordered life. Involving in its elements, as it does in every case where it really exists, love to God, faith in the Redeemer, benevolence towards men, a spirit of penitence, submission, prayer, and other fruits of the Spirit,—all proceeding from a renewed heart,—it shone, in Mrs. More, with unwonted purity, brightness, and constancy. It formed the basis of her activity, the incentive of her works of charity, the spring-head of her consolation, and the sheet-anchor of her hopes. Like the powers of her mind, her religion was well balanced ; it possessed a fine, scriptural proportion ; nothing was unsightly, distorted, or out of its place. She avoided, to a far greater extent than christians commonly do, those incongruities, those discrepancies, those shades, so ominous to religious character and influence, of which the history of piety, or its profession, has furnished so many examples. Her religion lived, and moved, and had its being, in principles drawn from the word of God, and rendered efficient by the Holy Spirit. It seemed to partake, in due mixture, of the opposite, yet compatible, properties of activity and study ; of zeal and contemplation ; of boldness and caution ; of the use of means, and dependence on God. She exemplified, in a remarkable degree, her own doctrine of consistency, as inculcated particularly in *Cœlebs*,—a doctrine, which, though held by her in contra-distinction from sinless perfection, is yet a desirable approximation towards it. It appears, from the account of her life, that her religious feelings and principles began to operate at a period somewhat early, though we are uninformed respecting the circumstances connected with their commencement. But they did not assume, for a considerable length of time, that decided character which they afterwards assumed, and by which her name has been rendered so illustrious. She was, more than most others, tempted, by the adulation offered to genius, to mingle in scenes and company, ill calculated to promote eminent spirituality of mind, and undivided consecration to God. Yet, through the whole period of her literary triumphs, while she was in the habit of going the round of the refined and fashionable society of London, it is evident, that her soul aspired after a higher good, if she had not indeed at times a taste of it. She was distinguished, among her associates, by her chastened spirit, the avowal of her religious sentiments, attention to public worship, and observation of the sabbath. The theater she visited but a short time, having quitted it in the height of her success as a writer of plays ; and, by degrees, the estimate which the gospel puts on all the objects of human pursuit, was admitted, in her own mind, as the criterion of truth, and the regulating principle of life. Portions of a diary which she kept, as selected by her biographer, are affecting sketches of a heart alive to every holy and benevolent work, and yet deeply sensible of native corruption, and con-

stant need of divine grace. They show the humble, hidden, world-weaned life of a christian, amidst the thousand snares which are strewn in the path of worldly fascinations and literary fame. The feelings common to believers, alike in the humblest and most elevated walks of life; the sense of demerit and deficiency; the warfare within; the fear of temptation; the views of duty to God, and dependence on his grace; are depicted with entire simplicity, and prove, beyond a doubt, the reality of her deep and experimental knowledge of salvation. Mrs. More appears, from her writings and life, to have set her face against every sort of prevailing corruption. She kindly, yet fearlessly, reprov'd sin, and abounded in labors to reform the hearts and lives of the worldly and irreligious. She had a singular tact in pointing out, with unsparing fidelity, yet in a manner which could give no offense, the wrong schemes, and the fatal hopes, which the religious profession, particularly in high life, had too frequently embraced. Her vast opportunities in conversation, seem to have been worthily employed, in making religious impressions, even on the great; while the general drift of her remarks was more than commonly instructive to every class of minds. Her temper, she acknowledges, was more than naturally gay: she "carried," as she expressed herself, "too much sail." Yet the grace of God enabled her to consecrate her vivacity of mind to the best of purposes, in interesting those classes of people on the subject of religion, who would feel few attractions in it, except from its connection with the creations of genius. That her religion was eminently expressed in benevolent action, is sufficiently apparent, from what has already been said; nor was it less marked by features of genuine humility. Like every other believer, she felt, that salvation was eminently of grace,—that she was a sinner, dependent on the mercy of God through the atonement of Christ,—that her best services, so far from justifying her in the sight of God, were sufficient, on account of their sinful imperfection, to condemn her at last. But it may exalt our conceptions of the christian humility of Mrs. More, knowing the tendency of the human heart towards self-complacency, that she retained her integrity, not only amidst the flatteries of the gay and noble, and the universal homage paid to talent; but amidst the more substantial rewards of merit, in the homage and esteem of the wise and good: for she became, in later life, as much the center of religious influence, as she had been, in early life, of literary taste. Her opinions, both in literature and religion, were regarded almost as oracular; her approbation was sought, as a passport to favor, or a reward of merit; the distinguished philanthropists of Great Britain consulted her, respecting their schemes of benevolence; candidates for the ministry looked to her for counsel and direction; she was a known patron of poor

but meritorious clergymen; and even the rulers of the empire were not indifferent to the suggestions of her sagacity and wisdom. Nor was this all. In the opinion of some of the most enlightened men of the times, as has before been intimated, she was one of the principal instruments, under Providence, of perpetuating the constitution and liberties of Great Britain, and saving the nation from the vortex of French libertinism, by means of her popular tracts; and all were ready to admit, that the higher tone of morals and religion, among the various orders of people, for the last thirty or forty years, has been owing to her exertions. Or rather, perhaps, according to an opinion expressed by one of her correspondents, the credit of this moral and religious improvement, so far as human instrumentality is concerned, ought to be divided between Hannah More, as a writer, and Robert Raikes, as the projector of sabbath-schools. Once, then, in the history of human nature, we find an influence which we should naturally look for in one of the stronger-minded, or, at least, the rougher sex, centered in a woman. The moral teachers of the age must yield the palm to her, who, like her own Urania, in the earliest of her compositions, and the prognostic of her greatness, issued the precepts of wisdom and piety, from her elegant retreat of Barley Wood.

The scheme of religion, which she adopted and maintained in her writings, was, in our view, essentially correct, and supported by a fair and liberal construction of the scriptures. In its doctrinal features, it coincided, or rather was identified, with the tenets of the English church, as put forth in its articles; for she was a devoted member and ardent friend of the establishment. She was, however, joined, in principle and affection, to the evangelical party, or rather to the piety which that party chiefly embodied and exemplified: since it is not to be concealed, that she was most sincerely averse to the disputes which good men, in that church, carried on against each other, in regard to certain doctrinal sentiments. "Important as doctrines are," she observed to a friend, on one occasion, "yet, except the leading ones, for which we ought to be ready to be led to the stake, they yield much with me to the purifying of the inward, hidden man of the heart. Conformity to God, a walking in his steps, spiritual-mindedness, a subduing of the old Adam within us,—here is the grand difficulty, and the acceptable offering to God." Her notion of the distinctive character of christianity, we find expressed to a correspondent, in a single sentence. "I mean a deep and abiding sense in the heart; of our fallen nature; of our actual and personal sinfulness; of our lost state, but for the redemption wrought for us by Jesus Christ; and of our universal necessity of a change of heart; and the conviction, that this change can only be effected by the influence of the Holy Spirit." This, by implication, may include whatever is dis-

tinctive in the gospel ; but more might have been expressed. Her sentiments on religious subjects, it is said, accorded very nearly with those of Dr. Thomas Scott, who was one of her favorite preachers. Perhaps Mrs. More manifested too great a dislike of discussions, which were designed to place the principles of truth in a clearer light, even though these might not involve the essentials of christianity. To the latter, she could not, and did not, feel indifferent ; since it appears above, that she strongly held and maintained the vital, transforming doctrines of the gospel. Belief in these doctrines, and in Christ crucified, the sum of the whole, she every where inculcates ; but she was fond of viewing it in its effects : it was, with her, eminently the source and foundation of holy practice. She hated, as she remarked to one of her correspondents, the little names of Calvinist and Arminian. Christianity she considered as a broad basis, on which its common friends might meet without distrust, in the cultivation of personal holiness, and in the prosecution of benevolent objects. Her system, with its ramifications, might have shone with a brighter light, simply as a theory, had she oftener exhibited it by itself, and detached from its results in the life and conversation. But these she so identified in her mind with the system, that she could not long dwell on the speculative part. Indeed, she strenuously avoided the name and character of theologian and disputant, as unbecoming her station and sex. She hastened from the theory to the practice,—from the doctrine to the effects : or rather, in the view which she took of the theory and doctrines of religion, she included speculations, that were purifying, and principles, that were practical. As existing in the heart, if really there, she taught, that the true scheme of the gospel was essentially operative and transforming, from its earliest reception. Hence her biographer was led to remark, with singular beauty indeed, but with little caution, as to the impression which his remark might make on those who dwell much on the doctrines of christianity : “ Her religion was all text ; at once compendious and comprehensive,—*in its creed a span long*,—but in its moral dimensions as large as life, and all its charities.” This also accords with what Mr. Jay, her Bath minister, has said, about “ the moderation of her doctrinal sentiments,” and her “ dislike of the jargon of the schools, and whatever men had rendered metaphysical and exclusive, in the gospel of the God of all grace.” She was no otherwise moderate in her doctrinal sentiments, we mean in an accommodating sense, than as she looked for the reality of religion, rather in the performance than in the speculation.

Her dislike of the names Calvinist and Arminian, arose, therefore, not from the slight importance which she attached to a correct belief, but from the conviction, that, whatever this belief might be,

even in its subordinate topics, it would be immediately manifested in the temper and life, by which the question of correctness must be more certainly determined. If these were unchristian, it mattered not with her, whether it was Calvinistic or Arminian irreligion. The venerable John Newton, who understood her religious sentiments perfectly well, told her, on one occasion, that she was a Calvinist, though she was not aware of it. What she, and also what he rejected, as Calvinism in England, was not the real system, as taught by the Genevan reformer, but an exaggeration, or perversion of it. With the known views of Mrs. More, respecting evangelical religion, had she been our own countrywoman, and seen the practical differences of the two schemes, as held here, there can be little doubt in which division her name would have appeared. As the matter was, it may be thought deserving of regret, that, agreeing as she did, virtually, with the genuine Calvinistic belief, she was yet almost willing to repudiate the name. While, therefore, the high-Calvinists of England found in her scheme of religion, too much moderation, and the advocates of a false liberality, with still more cause, complained of her excessive strictness; while the enthusiast was displeased with her sober piety, and the mere nominal christian with her enlightened zeal; she seems practically to have hit the exact medium, in which truth produces its greatest effect, and the heart is formed after the purest model. As human nature is constituted, and especially as the soul becomes enlightened from above, her scheme of religion will recommend itself to the greatest number of minds,—the moderate, the reflecting, and the unprejudiced.

The standard of piety which she inculcated in her works, was high. She taught her readers to aim at the perfect rule of scripture. To one of her correspondents, she remarked: "I invariably maintain the same principle, that the *standard of religion should always be kept high*. The very best of us are sure to pull it down a good many pegs, in our practice; but how much lower is the practice of those who fix a lower standard than the new testament holds out?" That christians fail to reach the proper scriptural mark, must surely evince the necessity of the atoning blood of the Savior:—a truth to which Mrs. More bore ample testimony, while she endeavored to bring up the practice of christians to as high a degree of perfection, as if there had been no atonement on which to place dependence. While, therefore, her principle was strict, according to the gospel; yet at the same time, like the gospel, it encouraged humble, earnest inquirers after truth, so far as they are led to appreciate the proper ground of acceptance. Hence it is, that in reading her works, the feeling of dissatisfaction with one's self, is common to most serious persons, who take the pains to compare their own attainments in religion, with her ele-

vated standard. To this fact it happened, singularly, that Mrs. More herself was not an exception. Upon reviewing her *Practical Piety*, for a corrected copy, after several years, she observes: "How easy it is to be good upon paper. I felt myself humbled, even to a sense of hypocrisy, to observe, (for I had forgotten the book,) how far short I had myself fallen, from the habits, and principles, and interior sanctity, which I had found it so easy to recommend to others." This strictness of Mrs. More's religious system seems, however, to have been sometimes incorrectly apprehended, on the part of her friends; as if it had been designed to build up an imposing, but fragile, structure of self-righteousness, and to exclude from hope, all who come short of an uncompromising rule. One of them said to her, in a letter, "There is, however, an impression which I find it makes, upon some of the best and most religious characters, which is, that of despair of ever reaching such unattainable perfection; and a thorough disbelief, that the generality of their friends and acquaintances, who have been virtuously and religiously educated, and seem to be in the constant habit of 'doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly with their God,' can possibly be in such a state of reprobation, as to incur the final displeasure of the Almighty, and be destined to everlasting punishment." To this, in part, she replied, with her characteristic felicity: "Your friends, who, you say, are in the constant habit of doing justice, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God, have indeed reached high attainments. I believe I do wrong to judge others by myself; for I declare to you, I have such a constant sense of imperfection in my best thoughts, words, and actions, that I continually need the refuge of the Savior, and continually petition for pardon through him, and for the purifying and comforting assistance of his Spirit." She, however, believed, that a christian is one who aspires after sinlessness, and who, in the sense which he has of his imperfections, finds constant occasion for repentance, and for application to atoning blood. They certainly were in danger of a self-righteous spirit, who, as above described, were looking for acceptance, only as they did well, though they came short of perfection; and not as they trusted in that mercy, which can forgive the want of perfection, in its own instituted way.

The *writings* of Hannah More, are an imperishable record of her worth. With great propriety, they may be denominated *religious classics*, among the first in the English tongue. She wrote much; but with scarcely an exception, and that in the early period of her authorship, they treat of the high matters of morality and piety, interspersed, indeed, with a rich and varied literature. It had more than once occurred to us, before her decease, that an important service might be rendered to letters, and especially to

religion, should some one present to the public, a critical moral estimate of her principal publications. There is really less need of an attempt of this kind, at present, since her biographer has executed that part of his work with sufficient ability, and with good effect. In expressing our own opinion of Mrs. More, as a writer, and, through her writings, as a religious teacher, all we can think of doing, is, to make a few general remarks, with an occasional reference to particular pieces. If we may judge, either from their popularity or from their effects, they must be supposed to possess striking and substantial merit. No modern writings, probably, have been more widely diffused, or have been translated into a greater number of languages. And as to their effects, some intimations have already been given, but we might easily enlarge on this topic. It is recorded, that Pythagoras once tamed an eagle, so far, that by pronouncing certain words, he could stop it in its flight, or bring it down from the sky. The words of this accomplished female writer, have a charm more potent, than the talisman of the philosopher. The British lion, as she spoke, was soothed into gentleness and good nature, nor even dared to leap the inclosure which was guarded by the sanctity of law and religion. To speak less figuratively, the writings of Hannah More restrained a people,—in its higher orders, bent on luxury and dissipation; in its lower orders, goaded by suffering, and ripe for rebellion; and in all its orders, excited by the political changes, that were taking place on the continent,—from a course which threatened destruction to all right, virtue, and tranquillity. Her soft accents of persuasion, alike with her startling tones of reproof, seemed providentially to arrest the progress of political and moral ruin, among a great nation.

But we will not dwell on this particular effect, in a period of excitement and danger. The general and more permanent influence of her writings seemed to be, and it promises still to be, to a remarkable extent, propitious and happy. They are adapted to the production of a wide and lasting effect; for they speak to the common principles of human nature, in all ages and climes. They embody the suggestions of a mind, which, reading the human heart, as with intuition, and capable of expressing its views almost to perfection, carries other minds, yielding, chastened, and subdued, along in the current of its own meekness, and purity, and truth. Both in character and design, they are highly practical. Hannah More, neither in her poetry nor prose, speaks the language of soliloquy and abstraction; she has no moody, unsocial vein,—no dreaming notions; she makes no display of her powers, in order to draw attention to herself; she troubles her readers with none of her idiosyncrasies or whims. She seems never to have taken up her pen, on purpose to pass away her time,—to amuse

her mind by an elegant employment,—to ascertain how finely she could write,—or to gain the applause of men, not even of the wise and good. Her objects are evidently aside from such ephemeral and selfish gratifications. In every piece, and in every paragraph, she aims, apparently with honest feelings, to set in a clear and convincing light, some point of truth or duty. Her whole soul shows itself bent on some purpose of good. In the survey, that she took of human life, or the condition of her country, she saw some wrong which she wished to correct, some false principle which she considered it important to expose, some virtue which she wanted to inculcate, some interest which she desired to cherish, or some danger to souls or to society, which she was anxious to avert. Hence she went to work, with a determination to effect, if possible, her benevolent purposes: and, shaping her instructions to the tastes of different classes of readers, and giving those instructions the form of ballads, or allegories, or tales, or elaborate didactic disquisitions, as she deemed most suitable, she turned, successively, the attention of all orders of society, to the duties or to the dangers of their stations. So adapted were they to the spirit and wants of the age, that the effects were immediate; while the unchangeable principles of moral and religious truth, which she habitually inculcated, are fitted to be beneficial equally to every age. Our own age is the better for her wise and pious precepts; and though, among the new forms of evil which have begun to afflict society, we know not what will be the immediate issue, we cannot but think, that her writings will continue to exert their share of influence, in sustaining the institutions of religion and of society.

We have before spoken of that new class of her productions, which we find in her memoirs,—her letters. It may be added, that these effusions of friendship and sentiment, showing, as they do, her interior self, bringing out her feelings on an immense variety of subjects, and detailing her every-day habits of life, are a rich banquet to taste and piety. Besides all the fascinations of style, and classical allusions; besides all the interest of story, and anecdote, and wit; out of them might be extracted, we verily believe, almost every thing, that would go to make a manual of moral and religious duty, a compendium of prudential rules for the conduct of life, and a code of criticism. Presented in her easy and graceful diction, we can scarcely conceive any communications of the kind, to promise more improvement to the intellect and heart. The occasions and circumstances of her various publications, the opinions formed of them, the effects produced by them, and the interest which they excited in the literary and religious world, are so minutely recorded in her correspondence, that we are much mistaken, if attention is not turned, more eagerly than ever, to her works. Our own curiosity, we acknowledge, has

been greatly augmented, to refresh our memory with a reiterated perusal. We remark, too, with a melancholy interest, in the course of her long correspondence, how, one after another, the brilliant stars of literature or religion, disappeared from the heavens in which they had shone; and what comments genius and friendship made, on the mutability of the best temporal blessings.

Of the poetry which Mrs. More wrote and published, we have little to say, although much might be said. She began her literary career in a devotion to the muses,—a mode of intellectual effort and exhibition, in which genius most commonly first essays its powers. Not only professed poets have first written poetry, but likewise historians, mathematicians, philosophers, and legislators. And what those who have afterwards become eminent in other pursuits, might have proved to be in poetry, had they continued to cultivate the art, it would not, perhaps, be difficult to tell. Plato says of Solon, who was much addicted to poetry in his youth, that, if he had finished all his poems, and particularly his *History of the Atlantic Island*, which he brought out of Egypt, and had taken time to revise and correct them, as others did; neither Homer, Hesiod, nor any other ancient poet, would have been more famous. But it happens well, that few, comparatively, continue to deal in “Hesperian” or other “fables,” all their days,—the dreamings of fancy. It is certainly not to be regretted, that Mrs. More held the muse in subserviency to higher objects, and that she renounced the secular drama altogether, although in that she bid fair to rival the greatest masters. She occasionally, indeed, wrote poetry at every period of life; but the proportion of her poetic, to her prose compositions, is inconsiderable. She, however, produced several excellent pieces, especially in the earlier part of her life; and thus showed what she might have done, had she fully applied her mind to that species of writing. “*Bas Bleu*,” or *Conversation*, Dr. Johnson pronounced “a great performance.” “*Sensibility*,” the “*Slave Trade*,” and “*Reflections of King Hezekiah*,” are fine specimens of the art. She, however, wrote nothing, even in poetry, merely to please. With her, “the flowers of verse” were designed only to allure the reader to the truth,—often the humbling, evangelical truth, which she wished to impress on the conscience. Criticism, therefore, if it could detect faults, is disarmed by the sanctity of the “end and aim.”

Of Mrs. More’s prose publications, in particular, we ought to say more; and yet our limits preclude us from dwelling as much upon them as we could wish. They have laid the surest foundation of her claim to the admiration and gratitude of posterity, as they have already made her precious, wherever genius and virtue are revered. Among so many, that are excellent in various

respects, it is not easy to distinguish the more deserving productions. *Coelebs*, as a novel, rich, not in incidents, but in sentiments,—ingenious, not in the story, but in the delineation of the character,—is probably more universally attractive than any other. It is a beautiful exhibition, in the heroine of the work, of all that is really excellent in the female character, as formed on the model, and breathing the spirit, of the gospel. Her *Practical Piety*, and *Christian Morals*, as grave, didactic works, on the most serious subjects, and designed to effect a reformation, in the deep sources of human feeling and action, are invaluable productions, and rank among her best. Having been asked, by some one, to express her opinion, respecting the comparative merits of these two works, she gave the preference to the latter. She was certainly less mistaken, than some other eminent writers have been, in the judgments formed of their own works, as compared with each other. Her *Moral Sketches*, which was a continuation of the design of the two former works, possesses the same general character, and, by some, would even be preferred to either of the others, as a livelier and more discriminating work. A good judge, Dr. Wilson, the present bishop of Calcutta, it seems, considered neither of these works equal to her “*Strictures*,” or to her “*St. Paul*.” The last two are, doubtless, great works, especially the *Strictures*, which excels in originality, and in powerful, characteristic remark. Every reader, nevertheless, will decide according to his own taste, and, therefore, may decide differently. It is, on the whole, more a matter of curiosity than of usefulness, except for the sake of critical discrimination, to determine the comparative excellence of works, all of which are of a high order of merit, and can be commended, as among the safest human guides, in respect to the spiritual interests of men.

It is a striking quality of Mrs. More’s writings, taking them in the aggregate, that they are calculated to make distinct and deep impressions on the mind, almost in defiance of itself. Her thoughts arrest the reader, by their weight and importance. They have a point and appropriateness which are always felt, for they are never lost in generalities. Every sentence; almost, is an adage. Her illustrations possess an inexhaustible richness and variety; and her manner is at once lively and earnest, faithful and kind. Her clear and comprehensive understanding, always elicited distinct and enlarged views. She was skillful in bringing out points of contrast or agreement, in holding up an object in every variety of aspect, and, somewhat after the manner of Johnson, in separating the principal idea into its component parts; thus imparting an individuality to each conception, while the whole is grouped together in powerful combination. Every reader of Mrs. More, must

have noticed those detached, explanatory thoughts, each having a shade of difference, which she presents in continuity, for the purpose of giving force to the leading position. Hence it is, that she most clearly presents her ideas to the mind of the reader, while she fastens them there by the power of a discriminating reiteration. We are not aware, that this quality of her writings has been particularly noticed by the critics, though we think it must be obvious to every observant reader. We will quote a single short paragraph from her *Christian Morals*, to exemplify our meaning. "While it is the nature of scientific principles, to adapt themselves only to one particular bent of the mind, and of the inventive powers, to address persons of imagination only ; it is the character of christianity, and should be the aim of the christian writer, to accommodate their instructions to every class of society, to every degree of intellect, to every quality of mind, to every cast of temper. Christianity does not interfere with any particular form of study, any political propensity, any professional engagement, any legitimate pursuits. It claims to incorporate itself with the ideas of every intelligent mind which lies open to receive it ; it infuses itself, when not repelled, into the character of every individual, as it originally assimilated itself to that of every government, without sacrificing any thing of its specific quality, without requiring any mind of a peculiar make for its reception."

It is, also, an excellence of Mrs. More's writings, that they are highly convincing and persuasive in their character. She makes the reader feel, that she has right and truth on her side. She carries his heart and conscience along with her, in her representations and reasonings. She commends herself to the reflecting and candid, by her soberness and moderation ; and overcomes prejudice, by the evident honesty of her purpose, and the kindness of her spirit. Commencing with positions, that are fortified by plain reason, she leads her readers, step by step, to conclusions, which, though more removed from the application of ordinary principles, are yet inevitable. Such are some of the sublime truths of religion, which she has explained and inculcated in the happiest manner, and with excellent effect. With admirable skill, she touches the strings of the heart ; she mingles with the interior elements of our being ; she comes home to our very consciousness,—to our sense of right, and justice, and truth. Whoever has read her *Cheap Repository* pieces, will perceive in them, numerous examples, in a familiar way, of the quality we are describing. She convinces us, beyond the power of doubt ; and, perceiving how exactly she has hit the various characters introduced into those pieces, we feel, as if nothing could be better said, or even said differently. Her larger prose works are equally abundant in examples, on a higher

scale of her power of conviction and persuasion. This is the product of a far-reaching mind; the intuition of native genius; the aptitude of art; the perfection of practice.

The judgment which Hannah More has displayed, in these efforts of her pen, is equal to her genius. Every thing is seasonable; occupies its proper place; preserves its due proportion; and is suited to produce the desired effect. She seems to know how much should be said, and how little; on what motives it is best to operate; and to what extent she may push the advantages she has secured, over the prejudices or the fears of her readers. She is too prudent to hazard what she gained, by grasping more than would be willingly and discerningly accorded to her. She goes to no extremes; and always commands respect, by stopping short, not of truth, but of exaggeration.

Of her style, we must say, that it has the merit, generally, of perspicuity and fullness,—of neatness and elegance; although we think it too labored and artificial, for a perfect model. It is but little encumbered or enlivened by figures, and would be considered tedious and abstract, but for the charm of her thoughts, and the richness of her illustrations. We have remarked a very considerable degree of difference between the style of her letters and that of the works in question. The style of the one, is easy and graceful; that of the other, is stately and measured. In the one, she was familiarly conversing with her friends; in the other, she was professedly addressing the public. Her dignity here is nevertheless pleasant; it is not affected. It was a habit of thought early formed, in the school of highly polished and noble society. We think, however, she takes too much pains in balancing her sentences, and delights by far too much in antithesis. Hence to us, every paragraph of any length, simply as to style or manner, seems alike. We have to read but a few pages, to learn the extent of her powers, not as to her thought, but as to the forms in which she expresses it. She satisfies every reasonable wish of those who look for beauty of execution, but she never *more* than satisfies it: she never overpowers the reader; never transports him beyond himself, by surpassing sweetness or sublimity. We have in our own mind, a passage in her first important prose work, viz., the *Thoughts on the Manners of the Great*; which, perhaps, presents an average of the prominent features of her style and manner: and with this, we shall conclude our remarks on this topic. "Another cause, which still further impedes the reception of religion, even among the well-disposed, is, that garment of sadness, in which people delight to suppose her dressed; and that life of hard austerity, and pining abstinence, which they pretend she enjoins her disciples. And it were well, if this were only the

misrepresentation of her declared enemies; but, unhappily, it is the too frequent misconception of her injudicious friends. But such an over-charged picture is not more unamiable than it is unlike: for I will venture to affirm, that religion, with all her beautiful and becoming sanctity, imposes fewer sacrifices, not only of rational, but of pleasurable enjoyment, than the uncontrolled dominion of any one vice. Her service is not only safety hereafter, but freedom here. She is not so tyrannizing as appetite, so exacting as the world, nor so despotic as fashion. Let us try the case by a parallel, and examine it, not as affecting our virtue, but our pleasure. Does religion forbid the cheerful enjoyments of life, as rigorously as avarice forbids them? Does she require such sacrifices of our ease, as ambition? or such renunciation of our quiet, as pride? Does devotion *murder sleep*, like dissipation? Does she destroy health, like intemperance? Does she annihilate fortune, like gaming? Does she embitter life, like discord? or abridge it, like duelling? Does religion impose more vigilance, than suspicion? or inflict half as many mortifications, as vanity? Vice has her martyrs: and the most austere and self-denying ascetic, (who mistakes the genius of christianity almost as much as her enemies mistake it,) never tormented himself with such cruel and causeless severity, as that with which envy lacerates her unhappy votaries. Worldly honor obliges us to be at the trouble of resenting injuries, and worldly prudence obliges us to be at the expense of litigating about them; but religion spares us the inconvenience of the one, and the cost of the other, by the summary command to forgive: and by this injunction, she consults our happiness no less than our virtue; for the torment of constantly hating any one, must be, at least, equal to the sin of it. And resentment is an evil, so costly to our peace, that we should find it more cheap to forgive, even were it not more right. If this estimate be fairly made, then is the balance clearly on the side of religion, even in the article of pleasure."

Several reflections have been suggested to our minds, while preparing this article, and on which we intended to dwell; but we can only hint them to our readers. How much may be done, by the union of talents and piety! What an example and lesson is thus given to her sex! We see, that it is possible to be learned, without being vain; accomplished, without being worldly; admired and caressed, without being corrupted. What a polished, beautiful, holy character is it not possible to become, through the influence of the gospel! What a rebuke upon the disputatious, wrangling spirit which now prevails, was the manner of life and example of HANNAH MORE!

ART. VII.—“ACT AND TESTIMONY.”

To the Conductors of the Quarterly Christian Spectator.

GENTLEMEN :—I propose, with your permission, to notice, somewhat at large, in “THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR,” the document, whose title is recorded at the head of this article. Its *relative* value is much greater than its *intrinsic*. It is one of those numerous productions, thrown upon the world at the present day, which may serve the purpose of an ecclesiastical thermometer, to inform us of the temperature which prevails, at least, in one hemisphere of the church.

The remark has become familiar, bordering almost upon triteness, that the age in which we live, (and the “Act and Testimony” is contemporaneous with ourselves,) is marked by strong peculiarities. It is an age of excitement. The church and the world are impressed. Earth and heaven are in motion. The era of the steam-boat, the rail-road, and the loco-motive, we might well conclude, by a brief process of *a priori* reasoning, must be an age in which every great subject, whether political or moral, would become paramount and absorbing. And such is the matter of fact. Experience, the prince and paragon of teachers, confirms this position. Every thing has received a new impulse; and whatever moves, is hurried on by a kind of steam-power. High-pressure is the order of the day. These data will secure their own application in the sequel. The reader will be good enough to remember them. There is one feature, however, in this age of excitement and motion, which I do not remember to have seen distinctly noticed by any of our philosophers. It is this. The direct and onward movement of the church, seems to have produced a retrocession, as it regards a part of its members. The current has become so deep and rapid, that it has created, not a few rippling eddies merely, but a strong *counter-current*, which is hurrying on, with great velocity, in an opposite direction. Elements are at war with kindred elements. While one portion of the stream is hastening to mingle with congenial waters, in the bosom of the ocean; another portion of the same, is endeavoring to hide itself again in its native mountains. Different detachments of the same army, are marching in opposite directions. Open the eye upon one scene, and you anticipate the speedy erasure of the last line of sectarianism, and the happy union of all evangelical christians, in the great bible, tract, and missionary operations of the age: look upon another, and you begin to apprehend, that the churches are to be divided, and subdivided, till names of distinction, for new sects and parties, shall utterly fail. This contest will be variously defined, according to the mental associations of different individuals. Some

call it the resistance of *orthodoxy* to the encroachments of fundamental error; and they consider it a struggle for existence. It is the magnanimous, and perhaps the last, effort of truth, in the midst of a corrupt age, and in the bosom of a deteriorated church. Here is a fine opportunity for the display of spiritual heroism: and hence we have our modern Luthers, opposing the corruptions of our American Leos; our young Calvins, bidding defiance, in no measured accents, to the thunders of another Vatican; and our John Knoxes, inspiring not only queen Mary, but many others, and some of the sterner sex too, with no ordinary trepidation. There is a moral sublimity in the self-sacrifice with which many are ready to throw themselves into "the imminent deadly breach." There are others, the ecclesiastical antipodes of this class, who take a different view of the matter. They deem this warfare nothing more nor less than the proscriptions of *bigotry*, against the spirit of christian liberality. The tables are now turned; and your Luthers, and Calvins, and Knoxes, and Leos, and Marys, all continue to exist; and they meet upon the arena, and mingle in the conflict; but with this difference,—they have exchanged places in the arrangement. Neither of these statements can be admitted, without many qualifications. There is a conflict, it is true; and it is a fearful one. There is war in the earthly heaven. It is a struggle, not of Protestants against Romanism, nor of evangelical sentiment against latitudinarian liberality; but it is a conflict among those who, in many cases, are members of the same church, who subscribe the same creed, and who entertain kindred views, on almost every point, in relation to the character and purposes of God, and the condition and destiny of man. This position, strange as it may seem to some, and bold and hazardous as it may be pronounced by others, it is the object of this paper to illustrate, fortify, and defend. This will be done, not directly, but incidentally, in connection with the document under review.

What, then, is the "Act and Testimony"? It is a new "confession of faith," or a recently invented test of *orthodoxy*, agreed upon, subscribed, and published, by thirty-seven ministers, and twenty-seven ruling elders of the Presbyterian church, at the close of the last general assembly, in Philadelphia. It occupies, exclusive of the array of *sixty-four* names appended, a little less than two columns in a religious newspaper; and consists of an introduction, intended to form a justification of the measures adopted; three specifications, constituting the bone and sinew of the instrument, "as regards doctrine," "as regards discipline," and "as regards church order;" and closes with a "recommendation to the churches." The introduction does not abound in the qualities of conciliation, which some masters of rhetoric tell us, ought to be prominent in this part of a discourse. It is more in keeping

with the habits of a western huntsman ; for it takes the beast by the horns, at the very outset of the battle. Or, to pass by one bold stride from the wilderness to the ocean, these "Act and Testimony" brethren are no sooner embarked, than they nail the flag of nullification to the mast. It cannot for a moment be admitted, that the Presbyterian church, in this country, is in a condition to merit the sweeping denunciation which breathes, or rather *thunders*, in the first sentence of this manifesto. "In the solemn crisis to which our church has arrived, we are constrained to appeal to you, in relation to the alarming errors which have been hitherto connived at, and now, at length, have been countenanced and sanctioned by the acts of the supreme judicatory of our church."

But, as general assertions, on either side of the question, can be of little avail, I propose to show the real attitude in which the subscribers to this "Act and Testimony" stand before the public ; that some of the charges of heresy, embodied in this document, relate to sentiments which no one has avowed ; that others apply to a large proportion of the Presbyterian church ; and, in conclusion, advert to the true origin of this production.

1. The attitude in which these brethren stand before the public. This is truly novel, and very far, indeed, from being enviable. As ministers and elders of the Presbyterian church, they are bound by their own constitution and rules. One or two principles of their system, as set forth in their standards, it may not be improper here to present. "It is absolutely necessary, that the government of the church be exercised under some certain and definite form. And we hold it to be expedient, and agreeable to scripture, and the practice of the primitive christians, that the church be governed by congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies."* In accordance with these principles, the book goes on to specify the several kinds of church courts, or judicatories. These are church-sessions, presbyteries, synods, and the general assembly. Nothing is left to voluntary associations. All action upon the ministers and members of the church, by way of discipline, must be conducted through this organization, or the movement is *anti-presbyterial*. To spend time in proof of this position, would be something worse than trifling. It would be like striking up a *rush-light*, at noon-day, within the tropics, to enable men to see the sun shine. Let the "Act and Testimony," then, be arraigned at the bar of these principles, and have a fair trial, and receive a righteous sentence. The subscribers of this document begin by a practical renunciation of their whole system ; and if their solemn manifesto proves any thing, it proves, that,

* See Form of Government, chap. viii. sec. 1.

"*quoad hoc*," they are not Presbyterians. They have erected a new tribunal, unknown to their standards; and before this voluntary and irresponsible association, they arraign all delinquents, whether the peccant general assembly, or ministers suspected of heresy. And who constitute the new presbyterial court? The answer may be given in their own words,—"*The ministers, elders, and private members of the Presbyterian church of the United States.*" Are not these "*jure divino*" Presbyterians in some danger of falling into the much-dreaded vortex of Congregationalism? To this new tribunal they appeal, from "the supreme judicatory" of their church. And yet these brethren love "the good old way," and dread innovation! And this ground they have assumed, deliberately and systematically, throughout this whole document. In the face of the constitution of their church, they have called a convention to be held at Pittsburgh, on the second Thursday of May, 1835. Here, again, is an alarming stride towards Congregationalism. This is an *ex parte* council, called in direct contravention of the principles of presbyterial government. This convention is neither church-session, presbytery, synod, nor general assembly; and yet, it is intended to act upon, control, and overrule, the established tribunals of their church, not excepting "the highest judicatory," the last court of appeal and revision. This is nullification. This, so far as these persons are concerned, is a dissolution of the ecclesiastical compact. And, as if to render this act of dismemberment, in one of the most prosperous and efficient of the Protestant churches, the more prominent and noticeable, the convention is to take place on the very day when our American christendom, (Roman Catholics, and the exclusive orthodox in the Presbyterian church, excepted,) are to convene, in the city of New-York, for the purpose of giving the bible to the world.

But enough has been said, to show the attitude in which these brethren have presented themselves before the public, with the "Act and Testimony" as their *substratum*. In connection, however, with this work of prostrating their own forms of church government, and of introducing others, alien to the genius of the constitution, they make certain declarations, which I wonder they had not, for consistency's sake, suppressed. I refer to those strong and reiterated professions of attachment to the constitution of the Presbyterian church, with which the "Act and Testimony" abounds. The subscribers of this document avow their "*fixed adherence*" to their "*standards*" of ecclesiastical "*ORDER*;" while the very document in which they make this profession, is, both in essence and action, at war with the whole system. They acquit themselves of all responsibility, for the "*subversion of FORMS publicly and repeatedly approved*;" while they are subverting those

very "*forms*" themselves. They tell us, that they are laboring for the restoration of "*scriptural order*" to their church; and yet, they attempt that reformation by means which contravene their own notions of ecclesiastical organization. They intend, if possible, to exclude from the church, those who "*subvert her established forms*;" and yet, in compassing this end, they themselves perpetrate the act of subversion. If they have no task more herculean to perform, than to *exclude subverters* of Presbyterian forms of church government, they can accomplish their favorite purpose, by a single volition. They have only to lift the flag of secession, and call the "*Act and Testimony*" men around it, and the gigantic work is done, and the mighty agony is over. They "*believe, that the form of government of the Presbyterian church*" accords with the will of God, and deprecate every thing, that "*changes its essential character*;" while, in their practice, they are fast verging to Congregationalism,—a form of government at which they almost instinctively shudder. "*Some*" of them (the reputed writer is probably not of this number, as he is rather a recent convert to the gospel,) have "*long*" been jealous of the growing "*spirit of indifference to the peculiarities*" of their "*CHURCH ORDER*;" and now they have suddenly lost all their jealousy on this point, and have commenced the work of battering down all these "*peculiarities*," with their own engines. They have deplored "*the ingrafting of new principles and practices*" upon their "*church constitution*," when this operation was performed by others; but now, when occasion seems to require the introduction of a scion of foreign growth, they can ingraft among these native presbyterial branches, consisting of church-sessions, presbyteries, synods, and general assemblies, a congregational *ex parte* council,—to wit, the Pittsburgh convention. They fully believe the orthodoxy of the church can be restored in no other way, than by a "*strict and faithful adherence*" to their form of government; and yet, more adventurous than the boldest experimenters, they are endeavoring to prove their own theory fallacious, by attempting to accomplish this object by other means. They do "*love the constitution*" of their church, "*in word*," if not "*in deed*;" they "*venerate its peculiarities*," because they exhibit the rules by which God intends the affairs of his church on earth to be conducted"; but, as the "*peculiarities*" of this organization, embracing no other tribunals, advisory or compulsive, than church-sessions, presbyteries, synods, and a general assembly, do not quite answer their revolutionary movements, they intend to regulate the affairs of the church, at least till things assume a better posture, by another system.

But it may be alledged, that these brethren have been compel-

led, by the pressure of circumstances, to adopt this extraordinary course. On this point, let them speak for themselves.

‘From the highest judicatory of our church, we have, for several years in succession, sought the redress of our grievances, and have not only sought in vain, but with an aggravation of the evils of which we have complained. Whither, then, can we look for relief, but, first, to him who is made head over all things, to the church, which is his body, and then to you, as constituting a part of that body, and as instruments in his hand, to deliver the church from the oppression which she sorely feels?’

Here the fact, that they do appeal from the general assembly, to “the ministers, elders, and private members” of the church, from the majority to the minority, from the whole to “*a part*,” is admitted; and they attempt to justify this measure. Their disappointments and oppressions have driven them to it. Two inquiries may here be instituted. The first is, Have these brethren sought redress in a constitutional manner? And if so, and they have failed, are they justified in taking the position assumed in this “Act and Testimony”? In relation to the first point, a few remarks may suffice. Their ministers and elders say, that there are many heretics in their church, and the general assembly is disposed to shield them from justice. They have made many efforts to exclude them from the church, but they have not been able. But how have they done this? Have they obeyed the rule prescribed by Jesus Christ, and recorded Matt. xviii. 15—17? Have they adopted the course pointed out in their own book of discipline? Look at the two cases which have called forth from these brethren the most bitter complaints, and see whether their charges can be sustained. The first is the case of the Rev. Mr. Barnes. Was that a simple, straight-forward prosecution for heresy? Far from it. It was an indictment of a book; and before the case reached the assembly, it was incumbered with a multitude of constitutional questions, which greatly embarrassed a decision. And this was the fault of his opponents, who ought to have had the magnanimity to become, in a direct sense, his prosecutors. These are the persons who introduced the *novelty*, and, if you please, *absurdity*, of arraigning and trying a book, when the author was under their jurisdiction, and when they intended the judgment in the case should fall upon the man, and not upon his work. This procedure cannot claim the merit of consistency, which characterizes the course adopted by the Pope of Rome. He, too, institutes process against heretical books, and if they are found guilty, he burns them. This is as it should be. But to try a book, and punish a man, is an absurdity of which his Holiness has not been guilty. It may be farther remarked, that the case of

Mr. Barnes was fully and fairly acted upon by the assembly. It was submitted, by the consent of both parties, to a committee; and the report of that committee was adopted, with great unanimity, by the assembly. Was there any cause of complaint here? Certainly none. The other case, (if case it may be called,) is the famous Western Memorial. This instrument, which was intended to reach certain persons charged with heresy, is a twin sister, in character, to the prosecution mentioned above, though born somewhat later. Here was another attempt to affect the character and standing of ministers, under their own jurisdiction, indirectly,—to impeach their orthodoxy, in circumstances in which they could have no opportunity to answer for themselves. If Barnes, Beecher, Beman, and Duffield, have published heresies, why not try the *men*, and make use of their printed works, in order to convict them; and not resort to a mode of attack, in which the accused has no alternative left, but silence and submission? This is injustice in the extreme. It is downright circumvention. In the Presbyterian church, it is unconstitutional. In any government, it would be oppressive and tyrannical. Till regular process has been instituted, it is with an ill grace, indeed, that ministers and elders in the Presbyterian church complain, that they cannot obtain justice at the bar of the general assembly. Till this is done, they have no moral or legal right, to circulate the names of ministers, in good standing in their presbyteries, in newspapers, and other public journals, in connection with charges, which, if true, would depose them from the ministry. This, in the judgment of both earth and heaven, is slander. The bible, and the common-sense of mankind, long before our day, have settled this question. So much for the allegations of this “Act and Testimony,” against the general assembly.

But, suppose the charge were true, to the full extent in which it is preferred: what then? Would that fact justify the position taken by these brethren, in the document under consideration? The answer must be,—*No*. These gentlemen cannot denounce the acts of “the highest judicatory” of the Presbyterian church, and, at the same time, remain members in good and regular standing in that church. This would be the end of all compact, and all law. Have they no remedy then? Must they acquiesce in decisions which they believe to be unconstitutional? Must they be governed by heretics? The answer is easy. They may remain in the church, and labor to effect a reformation, in accordance with their constitutional forms, or they may throw themselves upon the events of a *revolution*. Selecting the former course, they have no right to do what they have done; choosing the latter, their first step should be, to secede, and form a church organization for themselves. But, doing neither one nor the other, and, at the same time, a little of both,—lifting the flag of revolution, and planting them-

selves within the battlements of the church,—has not a parallel since the memory of man. These brethren are certainly reformers of a peculiar stamp. So did not Luther and Calvin, whom they profess to imitate. They denounced the existing authorities and decisions of the church; but they remained no longer in its bosom. So did not our revolutionary fathers. They resisted the oppressions of the mother government; but they declared themselves independent, and reared a structure of their own. But here is a new thing for the world to look at. Here are men, who neither submit to their own ecclesiastical government, nor secede from it. But enough, and more than enough, has been said on this point. I will only add, that in reading this document, I cannot resist the conviction, that it was originally intended as a manifesto of revolution and secession; and that the connection of its subscribers with the Presbyterian church, has been preserved only by means of a few shreds of qualifications, which have been attached by way of amendment.

2. Some of the charges of heresy, embodied in the “Act and Testimony,” relate to sentiments which no one has avowed. This production specifies *seven* errors in doctrine, which are affirmed to be “held and taught by many persons” in the Presbyterian church. *Four* of these, it may easily be proved, form no part of the creed of those who are charged with heresy; and the remaining *three* are mere theological caricatures. Agreeably to this classification, the four points, viz., “our relation to Adam,” “regeneration,” “divine influence,” and “atonement,” belong to the present head of discussion: the other three, to wit, “native depravity,” “imputation,” and “ability,” will be considered hereafter. Take one of these specifications.

‘ERRORS.’

‘1. *Our relation to Adam.* That we have no more to do with the first sin of Adam, than with the sins of any other parent.’

It would have been a most desirable piece of information, if the gentlemen protesting against this error, had told us where, and when, and by whom, it had been “held and taught.” They certainly ought to know. Have any of those brethren who have been most bitterly accused of heresy, in the Presbyterian church, preached or published this sentiment? Such a charge cannot be supported; and to say, that it is *slandorous*, is to say somewhat less than it merits. The Rev. Mr. Duffield certainly does not hold and teach the error here recorded. We have his express disclaimer, in the following terms:

‘*Our relation to Adam:* That so far from believing, “that we have no more to do with the first sin of Adam, than with the sins of any other parent,” we believe, that Adam was the representative of our race; that

the sin of Adam has deranged the original moral constitution which God had ordained with our first parents, has made us sinners, rendered us liable to sufferings and death, and deprived us of all just hope of eternal life, by our obedience to the law.'

The professors of the theological institution of Yale College, have, with equal explicitness, rejected this sentiment, in their recent "Remarks." It is opposed to the fundamental principles of "The CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR," a publication which is considered, by our ultra-Calvinists, as far-gone in error, as almost any public journal of the day. Who, then, has embodied this article in his creed? The answer is,—*No one*, in the ranks of those against whom the allegation is made. The New-England divines, and the new-school men in the Presbyterian church, have uniformly held, that there is an important moral relation between Adam and his posterity; that this relation is not fortuitous, but of divine constitution,—not contingent, but certain; that his sin stood connected, in the government of God, with the moral character of his posterity; and that too, in a sense in which the sin of no other parent stands connected with the moral character of his offspring. This is to acknowledge Adam as the representative of the future race. If any theologian "has held and taught" any thing contrary to these positions, let him be named and exposed. Let it be shown, that the proper tribunals in the Presbyterian and Congregational churches are not ready to depose him. But let not the church be alarmed, by the continued peal of charges, which apply to nobody, or to a mere man of straw. This beating the air, in theology, is not the thing for the present day. We want something tangible,—something definite.

What, then, has been said on this subject, which has excited so much alarm, and led these "Act and Testimony" brethren to charge, by way of sweeping inference no doubt, the error recorded above, upon certain other members of the Presbyterian church? Two things have been denied. One is, that the posterity of Adam were actual partakers (*participes criminis*,) in his transgression; and the other, that his posterity receive sin as a *constitutional* or *physical* inheritance. But to deduce the sentiment alledged, from these denials, is indeed to *draw* an inference "with a cart-rope." Let us examine these two points. There are many who deny, that we had any *actual participation* in the sin of Adam; and it is to be hoped, that the time has not come, when this position is deemed heretical. If so, common-sense is heresy. But is this all that is meant by the charge in the "Act and Testimony"? If I thought so, I should acknowledge the fact at once, and justify the sentiment there condemned as erroneous. If in asserting, that there are some men who hold, "that we have

no more to do with the first sin of Adam, than with the sins of any other parent," they mean only to say, that some men hold, that we *did not commit*, in the eye of the law, "the first sin of Adam," any more than we *committed* "the sins of any other parent,"—then the charge is a very harmless one; and no one, in the exercise of his unshattered powers, would refuse to subscribe to it. It has been "held and taught," and no doubt will be, till the end of time, "that our relation to Adam" was not of such a nature, that we, as *moral agents*, in view of the preceptive demand of the law, and subject, in case of transgression, to its penalty, did so violate that law, in the act of Adam, and did so sin in that violation, as to be held *criminal* for that act, and justly liable to the eternal curse of God. Every part of this proposition applies to Adam; but will any one apply it to his unborn posterity? He was a *moral agent* under law; he did, by his own act, violate that law; he was personally *criminal* for that violation; and the law might justly inflict its penalty upon him. But where is the individual, who is willing to subscribe the affirmative of all this, as a part of his creed, in relation to the unborn posterity of Adam? You can find no such man. With respect to the other point to which I have adverted, it has been denied, that "our relation to Adam" was of such a nature, that his "first sin" so changed the *constitutional* powers and physical organization of his posterity, that they receive *sin* from him as a hereditary evil, and that they are both *criminal* in the judgment of the law, and justly liable to eternal death for this inheritance, PREVIOUS TO MORAL AGENCY, or the act of sin on their part. These are the things which are "held and taught;" but do they constitute the charge, or any part of it, as stated in the "Act and Testimony"? Far from it. There is no relationship between them. But more of this, when "*imputation*" shall come under review.

The next particular which demands notice, under this head, is the fifth in order, in the "Act and Testimony," and is thus stated:

'*Regeneration.* That man's regeneration is his own act; that it consists merely in the change of our governing purpose, which change we must ourselves produce.'

This allegation, as to the main points which it involves, is as groundless as the former. If the sentiment, that "man's regeneration is his own act," is "held and taught" by any class of theologians, it certainly is not by that class to which it is attributed. Mr. Duffield's book on regeneration, where we might expect, from the representations of the exclusive orthodox, to find every thing heretical on this subject, contains no such sentiment. And we have a declaration from his pen, of a later date, that he holds no such doctrine. The Christian Spectator has pointedly con-

demned this sentiment in repeated instances. "This term (regeneration,) is a complex one, and denotes *not merely* a change of heart, but the exercise of *divine power*, by which that change is secured. It is not, then, a correct use of the term, to drop the latter idea, and speak of regeneration, as merely giving God the affections. The scriptures, accordingly, nowhere make it the duty of men to *regenerate themselves*, but command them simply, 'Make you a new heart and a new spirit.'" vol. vi. p. 151. Why do not these brethren, then, in making their charge, name the man who has promulgated this doctrine, and cite chapter and verse of his book, where it stands recorded? Or is this statement a compound of their own, made up for the occasion, without any regard to the original connection and qualifications of the words used? Or is it an *inference* which the writer or writers expressly disclaim? These are questions which the subscribers of this document ought to answer at the bar of the christian public. Will they, as candid and honest men, do it?

But what do those theologians, who are accused of heresy, believe, respecting regeneration, from which the above allegation has been formed? And on this point, some things are denied, and some affirmed, which may not comport with the views of the "Act and Testimony" brethren; but which, at the same time, do not imply the doctrine they have alledged and condemned. In relation to the *nature* of regeneration, as a *subjective* change, the moderate Calvinists deny, that it is, in any sense, a *physical* change. It does not consist in the creation of any new faculties, in an alteration of the constitutional powers, nor in the removal of any physical obliquities or defects. They affirm, that this change is wholly *moral*. It is a change in the *disposition*, or in the habitual and permanent *voluntary* state of the mind. Educated in the school of Edwards, they use the words "will" and "voluntary," to denote not merely individual acts of choice, but all those permanent states of mind which involve the idea of *preference*. They say, therefore, with Dr. Strong, of Hartford, who will not be accused of heresy, "that a holy *will* is a holy *heart*,"—that a temper, disposition, taste, or relish, which is right or wrong, mean the same as a heart or *will* that is right or wrong." Sermons, i. p. 103. It is in this sense, that they consider the change in regeneration to be a change of "will," or "purpose;" in other words, a change of that moral disposition, or heart, which constitutes the man. As such a disposition (so far as it operates) controls or governs the individual acts of choice, they sometimes call it the "*governing purpose*" of the soul; and they use these words with the express design of marking it as a *disposition* or permanent *affection*, and not a mere transitory *exercise* of the will, as the High-Hopkinsians represent it. Understood in this sense, there is surely nothing heretical in the ex-

pression. But more on this point, in its proper place. As to divine influence in regeneration, while they strenuously maintain it, as a cardinal doctrine of the gospel, they deny, that man is so acted upon in this change, as to cease for a moment to be a moral agent, or to lose his intellectual or moral *activity*. The fruits of the Spirit,—the *direct* results of His operation,—are declared in the scriptures to be “love,” “faith,” etc. ; *actions* of the human soul, which, of course, is not a mere recipient, but active, while acted upon, in the production of these results. The words of Edwards, in short, express their views. “God produces all, and we *act* all. For that is what he produces, viz., our own *acts*. The *effect* itself is our *ACT AND OUR DUTY*.” A still higher authority has said, “YE have purified *your* souls in obeying the truth, through the Spirit.” How could the union of human and divine agency, in regeneration, be more expressly declared?

I have said, there is no heresy in the declaration, that regeneration is “a change of the governing purpose,” if we recollect, that by governing purpose is meant *moral disposition*, and that this is a *voluntary* state of mind, as described above. For if regeneration is not a change of an habitual, voluntary state of mind, in what does it consist? There are but two other things which can be supposed; and these may here be brought to the test. One is a change of the *individual exercises* of the soul; and the other, a change of some nameless constitutional *substratum*, either mental or corporeal, which forms the basis of good and bad moral exercises. On the first supposition, every successive act of holiness, through life, would be regeneration; and a person, in order to get to heaven, would need to be regenerated millions of times. According to this theory, there could be no other connection between the first and any subsequent act of holiness, than what was secured by some extraneous power or influence. This does not comport with the teaching of the bible. “A good man, out of the good treasure of the heart, bringeth forth good things.” This is sound doctrine, and good philosophy. On the second supposition, regeneration would be a *physical* change. Place this *substratum* where you please, in mind or body, in intellect or heart; refer it to what origin you please,—whether it come immediately from the hand of God, or descended from Adam, as a natural or physical inheritance; if it is something which lies back of moral action; something with which man has nothing to do, either in originating or cherishing; if it is entirely distinct from volition or choice, then *sin* is a physical existence, and regeneration is a physical change. Establish this, and the whole system of moral obligation is demolished at a blow. Man would be no more bound to love God, than he would be to make discoveries in the natural world, beyond the sphere and scope of his *five senses*, till a *sixth* were

superadded by creative power. As to the allegation in the "Act and Testimony," that this "change we ourselves must produce," I repeat the remark, that it is not correct. Divine truth, and the power of God, are both concerned in this change. "Of his own will begat he us, with the word of truth." It is only when considered *subjectively*, that this change is represented as an act of man's own will. And this, President Davies, who will hardly be denounced as a heretic, expressly teaches. "Coming to Christ," says he "is an act of the will; and, therefore, to *will it* heartily, is to perform the act." Witherspoon says, "Regeneration consists in a supreme desire to glorify God, and a *preference* of his favor to every other enjoyment."* So too, Dickinson declares, that the change wrought by the Spirit, is merely a change in the *will*, through an operation on the understanding. "He (the Spirit) does *but give them a true discovery*, a realizing view, and powerful impression, of what is best for them; and that necessarily determines their *CHOICE*."†

Let us hear the testimony against prevailing "errors," a little farther.

'*Divine Influence*: That God cannot exert such an influence on the minds of men, as shall make it certain, that they will choose and act in a particular manner, without destroying their moral agency; and that, in a moral system, God could not prevent the existence of sin, or the present amount of sin, however much he might desire it.'

This proposition, as here presented, nobody, certainly, who is concerned with the present controversy, believes. For what is the doctrine here charged, as "held and taught"? Nothing short of this, that God cannot, without destroying human agency, exert *any* influence, of *any* kind, on the minds of men, which shall render their actions certain! Now, where shall we look for the very extraordinary heretics who maintain this opinion?—who not only deny, that God can renew the hearts of men by his Spirit, but can even influence them by motives, or direct them by his providence; and who thus shut him out from the government of the world which he has made? I need not say, that Dr. Beecher, Mr. Duffield, Mr. Barnes, and Dr. Taylor, reject such a sentiment with abhorrence. If there are any men in this country, who "hold and teach" the doctrine of God's electing purpose and distinguishing grace, in the salvation of sinners, these are the men. It is a melancholy exhibition of party violence, that such men should be directly pointed at, in a solemn "Act and Testimony," as maintaining opinions which not only subvert the doctrines of grace,

* Works, vol. i. p. 172. † Dickinson on the Five Points, p. 150. Boston, 1741.

which their whole lives have been employed to support; but opinions which would set aside all prayer to God, respecting the conduct of his dependent creatures, and reduce his moral government to a mere name.

What, then, is the sentiment aimed at, by the "Act and Testimony" brethren?—for there is always something out of which the wildest misrepresentation is framed. It is simply this, that man, as a moral agent, has power to choose *either* way, in every act of volition; and that whatever influence may be exerted by God, to secure a particular act of choice, it is not an influence which deprives him of power to the *contrary* choice. No Presbyterian, certainly, can charge this sentiment with heresy, for it is unequivocally expressed in the Confession of Faith. The Westminster divines say, in the article on decrees, that "the liberty or *contingency* of second causes, is not taken away, (by the doctrine,) but rather established." Dr. Twiss, prolocutor of that body, states, in explanation of the term contingency: "Whereas we see some things come to pass necessarily, some contingently, so God hath ordained, that all things shall come to pass, but necessary things, necessarily, and contingent things, contingently, that is *avoidably*, and with a possibility of *not* coming to pass. For every university scholar knows this to be the notion of contingency." It is happy, that we have such authority for the meaning of the word contingency, in this article; and if we introduce this definition, the Confession will read, that *liberty, or the power of second causes*, (dependent agents,) *to AVOID the choice or act decreed, is not taken away by any influence which God uses to accomplish his decrees.* What, then, shall we say of the article on the "Gospel," (XX) which speaks of the work of the Holy Ghost, as "irresistible"? If we would not make one part of the Confession contradict another, we must say, with Dr. Woods, of Andover, that the term *irresistible* has been used by Calvinists, not in an absolute, but a relative sense; not with reference to the *power*, but the *fact* of resistance in the case supposed. "In a manner like this," he says, "we are always understood, when we speak of an *irresistible* or *overpowering* argument." "When we say, that influence (the Spirit's) is *irresistible* and *overpowering*, our meaning is, that the disease of the soul, though very powerful and stubborn, *is* made to yield to the merciful agency of the great physician,—that the remedy becomes *effectual*."* It is a remarkable fact, that the whole chapter on the Gospel was struck out of the Confession, before it was adopted by our Presbyterian church,—solely, as it would seem, for the purpose of excluding this unfortunate phrase, "*irresistible grace*."

* Letters to Unitarians, pp. 115, 116.

Let us now consider the remaining part of the proposition. It declares, that many "hold and teach," "that, in a moral system, God could not prevent the existence of sin, or the present amount of sin, however much he might desire it." I know of no man, in the Presbyterian church, or out of it, who has ventured to affirm this. It is obvious, however, what has led to the charge; and a simple statement of the real opinion aimed at, will show its flagrant injustice. There are, then, "many" who maintain, that God does not decree the existence of sin, as *essential to the perfection of the universe*. They do this, in opposition to certain metaphysical writers, who insist, that sin is "the necessary means of the greatest good," and was chosen by God, in this character, as preferable to holiness, in its stead; a doctrine on which Smith, in his "Illustrations of the Divine Government," has rested his system of Universalism, and which has been lately inculcated in the *Evangelical Magazine*, the organ of the East-Windsor divines. This doctrine has been strenuously opposed by Dr. Taylor, of New-Haven, and as publicly condemned by Dr. Green, of Philadelphia. It has never found its way into the Presbyterian church, unless in the person of a few individuals, who hold it in common with the doctrine, that "men ought to be willing to be damned;" and who were formerly treated as heretics, by the old-school divines, whatever alliances may have been found convenient at a later period. But it is held, to some extent, in New-England,* and Dr. Taylor,

* It is found, in its full length, and most deformed features, in a Thanksgiving Sermon, by the Rev. Charles Simmons, pastor of the Hebron church, in Attleborough and Seekonk, published in the *New-England Telegraph*, of January 7, 1835. As it has been denied, that such a doctrine has been maintained by any of the New-England clergy, we will make a few extracts from the above mentioned discourse. The text is, Rom. vi. 16, from which the preacher lays down the following proposition:

"*Saints have reason to thank God, that they have been the servants of sin.*" In explaining the text, he says, "The meaning of the apostle is doubtless this: that christians ought to praise and thank God, for causing them to have been the servants of sin; not for its own sake, but because it is the *occasion of a greater ultimate good to them, and to the universe*, than could otherwise exist." The following is from one of the reasons assigned: "*Saints will also have an experimental acquaintance with the nature of sin and misery, and the peculiar feelings of depraved and totally sinful creatures*, under the various instructions of Providence, which seraphs will never have, which will give them one important advantage over angels;" "they will forever see the glorious displays of the divine perfection, which sin will occasion. This will be their highest source of instruction." In consequence of such means of knowledge and happiness, it is remarked, that the saints will probably be raised "unspeakably above angels, so that the last shall be first, and so that the seraphs will eventually become mere dwarfs to the saints, in heavenly felicity." Some of the preacher's inferences are the following. "*Sinners are bound to thank and praise him (God) that they have thus far been the servants of sin.*" "We may conclude, that he (God) has exerted a positive and efficient agency, in the production of sin in the world." "We have reason to thank Him, that the fallen angels, and some of mankind, will be the servants of sin forever." Another deduction, and the last which we shall quote, is in these words: "We may justly conclude, that God will not accept the thank-offerings, prayers, praises, and religious services, of those who refuse to thank

in opposing it, has been met with this objection: "On what possible ground but this, could God have permitted the existence of sin? He might have excluded all sin from a moral system. How then, could he permit its existence, except as a *means of greater good*, than would result from universal holiness?" To this, which was felt to be an unanswerable objection, Dr. Taylor replied, by calling on the objector to *prove*, what he had taken for granted, as the foundation of his argument, viz., that God could, by moral influence, have entirely excluded sin from the universe. He did not affirm the *contrary*,—viz., that "God could not,"—as represented in the "Act and Testimony," which obviously points to his opinion on this subject. He simply demanded, that the objector should prove his premises, before he urged his conclusions. And it is solely for having made this claim,—the acknowledged right of every reasoner,—that he, and those who think with him, have been branded as denying, that God has power to prevent sin in a moral system. His *question* has been turned into an *assertion*; though he has repeatedly and solemnly declared, that he had asserted nothing of the kind,—that he wished to take no *positive* ground on such a subject, or decide *affirmatively*, why sin exists. He has declared, that the only object of his reasoning on this point, has been to oppose the doctrine, that sin is "the necessary means of the greatest good;" and that, if this doctrine is given up, he has no theory to maintain, as to the origin of evil, but can freely say, "Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight." Such are the circumstances under which the "Act and Testimony" repeats this flagrant misrepresentation, (which has been a hundred times exposed,) for the sake of perpetuating dissensions in the Presbyterian church. As to the question of moral evil, the signers of this document will certainly say, that *sin* is the object of God's abhorrence; that he forbids, in every instance, its perpetration; that he does not prefer its existence to its opposite, holiness; and that he is doing all he can, consistently with the various and complicated interests of the universe, to counteract its influence, and repair the ills it has done. Sin he forbids and hates; and neither for its own sake, nor for the sake of the good he may educe from it, does he ever prefer it to holiness in its stead. But no finite mind can say, what interests of the moral system might be disturbed, were any *other* divine influence, either in nature or degree, than is now

and praise him, in the sense of the text, that they have been the servants of sin. The text is the nature of a positive divine precept, as if the apostle had said, 'Render thanks to God, that ye were the servants of sin.' " After this, we trust no one will deny, that the doctrine, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, is maintained by the High-Hopkinsians of New-England, and the propriety of Dr. Taylor's opposition to such a doctrine. We here see, that, although some may refuse to admit this legitimate and revolting consequence, there are others, who have *logical* consistency enough, openly to declare, that men ought to thank God for all the sins they have ever committed. ED.

in operation, exerted upon moral agents. What more than this, have the men whom they stigmatize, affirmed?

The last particular I shall notice, under this head, is stated in the following words :

‘ *Atonement*.—That Christ’s sufferings were not truly and properly vicarious.’

A few remarks only, on this point, are demanded. The imputations here made, are unjust in the extreme. They apply to the Unitarian, but not to a single man for whom they were designed. The accusation is slanderous. The “sufferings” of Jesus Christ not “*vicarious*”! The whole class of theologians, to a man, who are intended to be embraced in this sweeping denunciation, have always, publicly and fearlessly, avowed and defended the vicarious character of Christ’s sacrifice. There has never been a dissenting voice,—a discordant note,—on this subject. They do indeed discard the ultra, or antinomian construction of this doctrine; but is this the denial of its nature? It was never so intended. But what do the men, who are branded as heretics in the Presbyterian church, believe, concerning the atonement made by Jesus Christ? They do not believe, that the Son of God literally sustained the identical penalty of the law, which is eternal death, for the human race, or for any definite portion of the race. But is this a denial of the vicarious nature of his death? By no means. They believe, that his *person* was substituted in the place of the sinner, and that his “*sufferings*” were substituted in the place of the sinner’s *punishment*. Here is even more *substitution* than is contended for, on the opposite side of the question,—a substituted person, and substituted sufferings,—while on the other part, it is contended, that we have, in the gospel scheme, only a substituted person, and literal punishment. But how can a difference of opinion, on this point, affect the “*vicarious*” nature of the Savior’s death? This matter is so clear, that it would be a waste of time to discuss it. I beg leave to finish what I have to say, on this particular, by an extract from a writer, who is probably included in the foregoing sentence of condemnation, for he is one of the reputed heretics. “The atonement was a substitute for the infliction of the penalty of the law, or the sufferings of Christ were a substitute for the punishment of sinners. In the case of all believers, (and such only will be saved,) the misery which Christ endured, is the real and only ground of their release; because without these sufferings, or the atonement, there could have been no pardon or grace for sinners. He suffered what was necessary to be endured, in order to bring rebels within the reach of mercy. Thus, in the administration of the divine government, the sufferings of Christ come in the place of the eternal condem-

nation of every ransomed soul, that is, of every penitent and believing sinner. This is *VICARIOUS suffering*. It is the suffering of Christ, in the place of the endless suffering of the sinner.*

3. I shall now consider the three remaining charges of error, made in the "Act and Testimony," and undertake to show, that they may be sustained against a large proportion of the Presbyterian church. They relate to "native depravity," "imputation," and "ability." The first two present but one topic of discussion. The reader will take the whole statement in connection.

'*Native depravity*: That there is no such thing as original sin; that infants come into the world as perfectly free from corruption of nature, as Adam was when he was created; that by original sin, nothing more is meant than the fact, that all the posterity of Adam, though born entirely free from moral defilement, will always begin to sin, when they begin to exercise moral agency, and that this fact is somehow connected with the fall of Adam.'

'*Imputation*: That the doctrine of imputed sin, and imputed righteousness, is a novelty, and is nonsense.'

The first of these propositions runs so near upon the borders of a contradiction, that it requires some metaphysical acumen to say, whether it does or does not, in one place, cross the line. The best analysis may be effected by the process of inversion; and then it will read thus: "By *original sin*, nothing more is meant, than the fact, that all the posterity of Adam" will "always begin to sin, when they begin to exercise moral agency;" and yet "*there is NO SUCH THING as original sin*"! But to wave this,—What are the matters in dispute, between the opposing parties, with regard to "native depravity," and "imputation"? The whole debate may be narrowed down to a small compass. The brethren who are charged with heresy, deny, that the posterity of Adam were in such a sense *one* with him, that they were *criminal* for his "first sin." Imputation, in this sense, was held by Edwards. Take his own words: "The sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God *imputes* it to them; but it is *truly* and *properly* theirs, and on *that* ground God imputes it to them." The Westminster divines accord with this view of the subject. All that descend from Adam by "ordinary generation, *sinned in* him, and fell with him, in *his first* transgression." Calvin and Turretin, and a host of others, of the old Calvinistic school, maintain the same positions.† Now this view of original sin, and imputation, the persons of whom I am speaking, reject. And so do the conductors of the BIBLICAL REPERTORY, at Princeton, who declare unequivocally, "that Adam's first act of transgression" was "*not*

* Beman on the Atonement, pp. 50, 51.

† For proof that Turretin, and Owen, did hold this doctrine, as Edwards did, see Christian Spectator, for 1831, p. 497.

strictly and properly that of his descendants, (for those not yet born could not perform an act,) but interpretatively or by imputation." They also declare, that "the ill-desert of one man cannot be transferred to another;" that the imputation they teach, "does not imply a transfer of moral acts, or *moral character*, but the opposite of REMISSION." In these statements, they have wholly abandoned the old doctrine of imputation, though they seek to retain the name. That doctrine was, (as Edwards truly states,) that the imputation was *founded on our participation in Adam's sin*. This the Princeton brethren deny. Adam's first transgression, they say, "was not *strictly and properly* that of his descendants." The sin of the apostasy *was* truly and properly theirs, say Edwards and the rest. The sin is theirs, only as it is "considered" or "reckoned" theirs, say the Princeton brethren. No, replies Edwards, it is so "considered" or "reckoned," because it *is* truly and properly theirs, and "is *not* theirs merely because God imputes it to them." A more palpable contradiction cannot exist; and though the *term* may be retained, the *thing* intended by the doctrine of imputation, is utterly set aside. As to the substitute for the doctrine, offered by the Princeton brethren, that Adam's sin is fastened on his descendants, "interpretatively," when they had no share in its commission, merely by its being "considered" or "reckoned" theirs, we leave it to the common-sense of mankind to pronounce on such a sentiment. "Will not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Can a righteous God impute moral turpitude which does not exist?

There is another view of the subject, which is equally a departure from the old doctrine, and is, if possible, liable to still greater objections. It is this:—that the descendants of Adam are *punished* for his sin, while yet neither the act itself, nor yet its moral turpitude, belongs to them, or was transferred to them. Edwards, Owen, Turretin, and other Calvinistic divines, saw the incongruity of *punishing* a moral being, before he was *criminal*, that is, before he had done any thing worthy of stripes; and hence it was, that they contrived the scheme of imputation, which made the posterity sinful, by their participation in Adam's transgression. This point established, and all is clear. The acute mind of Edwards saw this; and he laid an ample foundation. Of the posterity of Adam, he says, "The sin of the apostasy"—"is *truly and properly theirs*." The person who can subscribe to this, can consistently say, that they are punished for that sin. But who maintains this position now? I do not say, there are none; but our Princeton brethren are not of this class. They cannot subscribe to Edwards' view of imputation; and Edwards, no doubt, had good reasons for rejecting theirs. *They* do not believe, that moral beings can commit sin, hundreds and thousands of years before they have an existence; or that a sin thus

committed by *another*, can be so imputed to them, as to render them the subjects of personal ill-desert, or moral turpitude; and *he* could not admit the theory, that it is right to *punish* a moral being, till he is personally a sinner, or till he is criminal, in the estimation of some law which he has violated. And so far as these trains of thought are concerned, I agree with both of them; but, on the other hand, I reject so much of the theory of Edwards, as makes the sin and criminality of Adam, the sin and criminality of his posterity; and so much of the theory of the Princeton brethren, as admits of *punishment*, without personal *ill-desert*. If this were not a very grave subject, one would be almost provoked to smile, at the deep shade of mystery which is often thrown around this discussion, by a strange and unauthorized use of terms. *Guilt* is employed to denote mere *liability to punishment*: and hence a man may be guilty, and not criminal; and be justly *punished*, without any *moral turpitude*. This use of terms is adapted to bewilder and mislead; and in any thing else than theology, it would not be tolerated. If writers will say, that the *guilt*, and not the *criminality*, of Adam's "first sin," is imputed to his posterity, as some do, they ought to define guilt, not *liability to punishment*, but *subjection to suffering*; because the law cannot punish in such circumstances. Punishment pre-supposes ill-desert, or *guilt*, in the proper sense of the term. Remove this peculiarity in phraseology, and what is there left in the doctrine of imputation, as defended in the BIBLICAL REPERTORY, to which Mr. Barnes, Mr. Duffield, and Dr. Taylor, would not subscribe? A brief creed of union would run thus: 'We believe, that Adam's first sin was so imputed or reckoned to his posterity, that they are *guilty* (not meaning *criminal*, but *liable to punishment*,) for that act. N. B. By *punishment*, we mean, not the infliction of penalty, for the actual violation of law, but subjection to certain "*consequences*," which, in the divine constitution, would follow the first sin of Adam.'

It is matter of deep regret, that the author or subscribers of the "Act and Testimony," have not given us an explanation of some of the terms they have employed in this production. Take a specimen. What is meant by the expression, "born entirely free from *moral defilement*," as applied to the posterity of Adam? Such expressions may do to gallop over, but will they do to reflect upon? What is "*moral defilement*?" Can it be any thing else, than the result of sinning? Does any thing morally defile a person, but an act of sin? Does "*moral defilement*" ever attach to any thing but a moral agent? There are but three possible constructions of which this language is susceptible. It must mean, either, that children, before they are born, commit actual sin, which superinduces "*moral defilement*;" or, that the sin of Adam was "*truly and properly THEIRS*," according to Edwards; or they mean

by "moral defilement," nothing more nor less than *physical* depravity. The first, that is, actual sin anterior to birth, they probably do not mean. This would be pushing moral discoveries somewhat farther than has ever been attempted in this country. It would be more adventurous than the undertaking of a learned divine, of the present day, who endeavored to prove, that children are *actual* transgressors from the moment of their birth. Do they mean the second? That is, that the posterity of Adam so "sinned in him," that his sin "is *truly* and *properly* theirs," and they are the subjects of "*moral defilement*" from this act of participation, on their part, long before they were born? This view of imputation and original sin, I have already shown, is contrary to common-sense, and the Biblical Repertory; and here I am willing to leave it. Do they mean to have us understand the expression, "*moral defilement*," in the third sense? Do they mean *physical* depravity? And is it heresy to deny this? If this is what they intend, they ought not to call it "*moral defilement*." If it is something that exists previous to moral agency; something with which the choice or volition of the agent has nothing to do; something born with, or inherent in, the original constitutional powers; then it is not "*moral defilement*," and it is unphilosophical to call it by this name. Edwards, who has never been accused of heresy, and whose notions respecting the connection of Adam and his posterity, corresponded much more nearly with those of the old Calvinists on this point, than a large proportion of the reputed orthodox in the Presbyterian church, believed in no other "*moral defilement*" before actual sin, than that which he supposed was contracted by our *oneness* with Adam, and our participation, from this connection, in his sin. He never evinced any leaning towards physical depravity. He teaches, that the posterity of Adam, previous to moral agency, are "sinners *only* by the one act or offense of Adam." Edwards believed in "*moral defilement*," previous to actual sin; but those who deny, that the posterity of Adam are *criminal* for his act, as the orthodox at Princeton do, must deny "*moral defilement*," or original sin, in this sense.

What then do these "Act and Testimony" brethren mean by the phrase, "*moral defilement*"? Have they any clear and definite idea of the import of their own language? Do they mean the personal criminality of Adam's posterity *for* his act, or the existence of something in the constitution of the soul, which is *sinful*, and justly merits the curse of the law of God, previous to moral agency? Or, in still plainer terms, do the posterity of Adam, or *infants*, anterior to moral agency, deserve damnation for *another's* sin, or for their constitutional or physical *structure*? Probably very few, in our day, can be found, who would be willing to subscribe the affirmative of these propositions.

What, then, is the meaning of this loud and protracted cry of heresy, respecting original sin? If it relates to the denial of imputation, as maintained by Calvin, Owen, the Westminster divines, and Edwards, then the brethren at Princeton are heretics; for they tell us, that their doctrine "includes neither the idea of any mysterious union of the human race with Adam, so that *his* sin is strictly and properly *theirs*, nor that of a transfer of a moral character." If it relates to the denial of physical sin, previous to moral agency, then Edwards was a heretic. Now, if neither of these doctrines is essential to an orthodox creed, as the above references abundantly establish, then how can it be proved, that a man is a heretic, merely because he rejects them? What, then, is the thing (not the *name*) contended for? Why are plain men so much alarmed, when they hear, that the doctrine of original sin is given up? Not because they have any attachment to the old doctrine of imputation. Not that they are anxious to make out, that man is a sinner, in the very structure and constitution of his soul. These theories were invented, to *account* for what is a great scriptural truth, the thing really aimed at in the doctrine of original sin, viz., *that Adam's sin fixed the character of his posterity; and that the certainty of human transgression arises, not merely from outward circumstances, but also from the soul itself.* Now these truths are not given up by the men denounced in the Act and Testimony. They hold, that the bible reveals them; and that the belief of them is fundamental. But the *modus operandi* of Adam's first sin, in fixing and forming the character of his unborn posterity, is another thing, and is not revealed. "By one man's disobedience **MANY WERE MADE SINNERS.**" Here the bible leaves it. And here *we* ought to be willing to leave it. Let not those, then, who, in common with Edwards, reject the notion of physical depravity, and, in common with the **BIBLICAL REPERTORY**, the theory of a transfer of moral qualities, be charged, on this account, with rejecting these great scriptural facts. They consider Adam, in the way mentioned above, as the representative of his race; that his sin determined their future character; that not a shadow of uncertainty rested upon this fact; and that all this is accomplished, in the government of God, without making the posterity of Adam, previous to moral agency, the subjects of criminality and punishment, either for what their first father did, or for what became a part of their *constitutional existence*, as his posterity. With the above qualifications, they also believe, that there is a ground of certainty in *the human soul*, as well as from the action of extraneous causes, that every child of Adam will begin to sin, as soon as he commences moral agency, and, unless prevented by the grace of God, continue this course through an endless existence. These are the great facts aimed at in the doctrine of original sin. All the rest is mere theory. And when I said, that the statement in the "Act

and Testimony" was a theological caricature, I said so, because that document keeps back the vital point now stated, viz., that the men denounced, hold, as firmly as their opposers, the two great facts mentioned above, and which constitute all, that has ever given any real importance to the doctrine of original sin.

What has now been said of the doctrine of imputed sin, is equally applicable to that of imputed righteousness. There are "many" who reject the doctrine, as taught by the old divines, and among them are the conductors of the the BIBLICAL REPERTORY. They maintain, that the righteousness of Christ is not, *truly* and *properly*, that of the believer; that it is simply *considered*, or *reckoned* to be his; and, that this is all that is meant by imputation. As I appealed to Edwards, in the former case, I shall now go to Owen, for proof, that these views are a total departure from the old doctrine. "*Imputare* includes an act, *antecedent* unto this accounting or esteeming a thing to belong unto another." "To be *reputed* righteous, and to have righteousness *imputed*, differ as cause and effect. For, that a man be reputed righteous, that is judged or esteemed so to be, there must be a real foundation of that reputation, or it is a mistake, and not a right judgment; as a man may be reputed to be wise, when he is a fool." etc. "Wherefore to impute righteousness unto one who hath none of his own, is not to *repute* him to be righteous who is indeed unrighteous, but is to *communicate* a righteousness unto him, that he may *rightly* and *justly* be esteemed, judged, or reputed righteous."* I may appeal to your pages, (vol. iii. p. 501,) for decisive evidence, that Turretin held the doctrine in the same way. The only difference, then, between the Princeton brethren, and those aimed at in the "Act and Testimony," is, that while both reject the *thing* originally meant by imputation, the former retain the *term*, and the latter drop it. But do they drop with it, the great scriptural doctrine, which the theory of imputed righteousness was designed to explain and support, viz., *that the believer is justified solely on the ground of Christ's merits*? No. They regard it as the *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*. It was this doctrine which gave all its importance to the "explanatory" one of imputed righteousness; and I say, in this case, as in that of original sin, it is a theological caricature, to represent men as renouncing a belief in imputed righteousness, without adding, that they maintain, with unshaken attachment, the doctrine of justification by the merits of Christ alone.

Let us now consider, briefly, the remaining error charged in the "Act and Testimony."

'*Ability*: That the impenitent sinner is by nature, and independent of the aid of the Holy Spirit, in full possession of all the *powers* necessa-

* Owen on Imputation, 232, 233.

ry to a compliance with the commands of God ; and that if he labored under any kind of inability, natural or moral, which he could not remove himself, he would be excusable for not complying with God's will.'

As to the sentiment contained in the first part of this statement, it stands in almost the same terms in the BIBLICAL REPERTORY, for July, 1831, in an article so publicly ascribed to Dr. Alexander, that it is not improper to refer to him by name. "Man cannot be under obligation to do what requires *powers* (the very term) which do not belong to his *nature* or constitution." p. 372. Now, as all men are declared, by Dr. A., to be "under obligation" to obey the commands of God, of course all are by nature "in full possession of all the powers necessary to compliance." To refer the existence of these powers to the "aid of the Holy Spirit," is a departure from the first principles of Calvinism ; IT IS THE PECULIAR AND DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF MODERN ARMINIANISM. This condemnation of the long-established doctrine, of man's natural ability, this direct reference to "gracious ability" as the true solution, is a striking exemplification of the remark, that extremes meet,—that "false Calvinism" as Andrew Fuller says, in speaking on this very subject, "in its ardent desire to steer clear of Arminianism, is brought to agree with it."

As to the position, that man labors under no inability which he has not *power* to remove, (though left to himself he never will remove it,) this is surely no new doctrine in the Presbyterian church. Dickinson says, "Let the sinner's impotency be rightly denominated, and it must be called *obstinacy*." "Sinners, says President Davies, "complain of their want of ability ; but what is their inability but *unwillingness*?" That this solution is the true one, we know from the lips of Christ himself, who, in a formal statement of the real difficulty under which the impenitent labor, says, "Ye *will* not (οὐ θέλετε) come unto me, that ye might have life." The only question, then, is, whether "obstinacy" and "unwillingness" are not things which men have power to remove. That these feelings are so strong, in many cases, as *not* to be removed, we all know. That in one class of cases (the sinner's opposition to God,) they never are removed, without the intervention of the Spirit's influences, is equally certain. But have not men *power* to subdue obstinacy and unwillingness ? Who doubts this ? Who ever imagined, that a mere increase in the *strength* of these feelings, while their nature remains unchanged, deprives a man of this power ? Take them, then, in their highest exercise, as in the case of Joseph's brethren, who "*could* not speak peaceably to him." Have these men lost the power to subdue these feelings, and to love their brother ? Take them in impenitent sinners. "It is inquired," says the younger Edwards, "concerning President Edwards' moral inability, whether the man who is the subject of it *can remove it* ? I answer, *Yes*." Diss. on Lib. p. 18. The moment you deny

this, you change the entire character of the sinner's difficulty. It ceases to be "obstinacy" and "unwillingness;" it becomes a physical incapacity. Whether it is heresy to say, that beings laboring under such an incapacity, are "excusable for not complying with God's will," let common-sense decide.

4. I shall advert, with as much brevity as possible, to the origin of this "Act and Testimony." It purports to be, and no doubt is, an honest expression of alarm, for "the *purity* of the church." It must not be forgotten, however, that the term *purity* is employed somewhat technically, having no necessary connection with virtue or morality, but denoting a particular form or type of orthodoxy. In this sense, a church may be very pure, and at the same time, defiled by every moral abomination. It may be fairly questioned, whether this is a scriptural use of language. But this only by the by. Alarm, however, for the purity of the church, is only the proximate cause of this manifesto. The more remote causes must be sought for, and may be found, elsewhere: some of them, in the history of the Presbyterian church; others, in incorrect views of creeds and confessions. That there are other causes, than those that appear on the face of the document,—causes which have mingled their influence with the ostensible one, or, by a silent and long-continued action upon the mind, have superinduced that mental state which gave birth to this NOVELTY in the history of an active and enterprising church, is manifest from the fact, that about the same shades of difference in doctrinal views, have existed in years that are gone by, which obtain at the present day. The grand feature,—the marked type of sentiment,—has been, and now is, the same. Perhaps no church on earth, unless the apostolic age may furnish an exception, ever embodied so large a number of ministers and members, who maintained so great an uniformity in doctrine. This doctrine is Calvinism; ranging, it is true, from *ultra* to *moderate*, but still, rarely, if ever, losing its distinctive character, or crossing that line which separates it from opposing systems. In relation to the ministers, it has not yet been proved, that *one* of them, in regular standing, (certainly not those who have been most bitterly accused of heresy,) has deserted the Calvinistic basis, or platform. Nor can such a charge be established.

The causes which gave existence and tangible form to this strange document, are principally of two classes; those which originate in the love of power, and those which stand connected with a perverted use of minute and extended Confessions of Faith.

1. The love of power. This is a delicate subject, and ought to be touched with a cautious hand. There are some facts, however, pertaining to this point, which are so thoroughly understood, that it can hardly be deemed impertinent, even by the most fastidious, to state them. Ever since the organization of the Pres-

byterian church in the United States, under a general assembly, till within a few years past, a certain form of orthodoxy, which has been correctly denominated Ultra-Calvinism, has held the ascendancy. It has been long understood, that two classes of theologians, differing on minor points, constituted the church; those who embraced Calvinism, as it was, encumbered with an ancient mental philosophy, and those who received it with certain modifications, which have generally been adopted by the most acute theologians in New-England, and by Fuller and others in Great Britain. That these two classes are found in the Presbyterian church, is no modern discovery. It has always been known. While the former class were vastly the majority, there was no alarm about *heresy*, as held by the latter class. Ministers and members from the New-England churches, were welcomed to the bosom of the Presbyterian church, and to a standing in her judicatories; and so much anxiety was evinced, to induce emigrants from the east to the west to relinquish their congregational predilections, and gradually, if not immediately, to adopt the presbyterian forms, that the celebrated Act of Union was proposed and sanctioned by the general assembly, in 1801. If the question now pending, were a simple question of *orthodoxy*, these admissions to the Presbyterian church could not have been encouraged nor permitted. Dr. Green and his associates, were as orthodox in 1801, as in 1830; and yet, at the former period, they sanctioned the admission of New-England recruits to the Presbyterian church, and at the latter period, they endeavored to exclude Mr. Barnes from the presbytery of Philadelphia. They can explain their conduct on no other principle, than the one already assigned. There is something else here, besides the simple dread of heresy. These brethren can truly say, "*Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis.*"

But while New-England ministers have been admitted to full standing in the Presbyterian church, they have always been viewed with a jealous eye from a certain quarter. A deep-rooted and sturdy aristocracy, which may be styled the aristocracy of ultraism, had been growing and maturing for many years, amidst the circumstances recited above. This aristocracy (as every thing human *may* do) felt and loved its power. The effect was, that while all the ministers of the Presbyterian church were in equally good standing, and according to their own system, equally orthodox, the majority managed affairs in their own way, and often gave the minority too much occasion to feel, that they were barely *tolerated* in the church. Every thing went on well enough, while the control remained in certain hands. The majority rejoiced to see their church enlarged, by so many accessions from abroad; but the panic about heresy was immediately excited, when some of the wiser ones of the party, whose word had long

been dictation and law, in the various judicatories, foresaw, that the tables were about to be turned. Since the case of Mr. Barnes agitated the Presbyterian church throughout the United States, and a majority of the assembly, in 1831, were found to be in his favor, the cry of heresy, and the spirit of denunciation, have shaken and convulsed the church, from its center to its circumference. The very same men who had remained in the church for years unmolested, have since been publicly branded as heretics, and the power of the religious press has been exerted to destroy their influence, at home and abroad. By these and kindred efforts, one of the largest and most highly favored denominations in this country, is thrown into discord and anarchy. Here we detect something more than the simple love of "*purity*," or the simple dread of "*heresy*;" something anterior to the present agitation; some causes more remote and more deeply seated, in their origin, than that solitary one, which is delineated upon the face of this document. The love of power, long cherished and indulged, has been ignited by a spark of jealousy; the elements of party strife have been aroused and thrown into action; and the consequences need not be told. A part of them, at least, are already matter of history. This document itself forms one link in an extended chain of homogeneous events, which have existed for years, and acted or been acted upon, successively, both as cause and effect. But a more important consideration remains to be mentioned.

2. The "Act and Testimony" is much indebted for its existence, to mistaken notions respecting minute and extended Confessions of Faith. It is a vital question, and one that ought to be settled,—and the peace of the church requires, that it should be settled in our day,—What was the intention of the framers of the larger and more voluminous creeds, which have been adopted by many Protestant churches? That they are human compositions, all admit; and that they are of no authority, any farther than they are founded on the bible, is equally true. But the main question is this: Are these long creeds to be received, as the short ones are, *totidem verbis*, in all their parts, and in every iota of doctrine they embrace; or are they to be adopted, as containing the *system* of christian doctrine, in contra-distinction to all opposing systems? What, then, is the real *animus imponentis*? This is the question now to be considered; and though attended with some intrinsic difficulties, and in the minds of many, forestalled by strong prejudices, it can be so settled, in the judgment of the impartial, as to put the whole matter forever to rest. As to the *animus*: What was the intention of these long creeds, such as the Westminster Confession, and the Saybrook and Cambridge Platforms? What was the end proposed,—the purpose to be accomplished,—by them, in the respective churches, where they

should be adopted? Most of these confessions are sufficiently explicit on this point. In the Presbyterian church, a minister, or elder, at his ordination, is required to receive and adopt the Confession of Faith, "as containing THE SYSTEM of doctrine taught in the holy scriptures." Can the import of this declaration be misunderstood? It is certainly explicit enough for any ordinary understanding, without note or comment. The same may be affirmed of the Cambridge Platform. That was received and adopted by the pilgrim fathers, "for substance of doctrine." The expressions, "system of doctrine," and "substance of doctrine," are qualifying phrases, and speak for themselves; and if they mean any thing, they teach us, in the plain, common-sense import of the English language, that these formularies were to be received, as presenting merely the "*substance*" of christian doctrine,—the true "*system*," in distinction from all opposing systems, such as the Unitarian, the Pelagian and the Arminian. If this had not been the *animus* of the imposer, the real intention, the terms "system" and "substance" would never have been inserted.

This is rendered still more certain, as to the Presbyterian church, by the striking departure in its terms of subscription, from those of the Church of Scotland, from which, in the words of the BIBLICAL REPERTORY, "by far the greater portion of our rules and habits are derived." Every licentiate of the Scottish church, is required to give his assent to the "*whole doctrine contained in the Confession*," and "to disown all other doctrines, and tenets, and *opinions*, whatsoever, contrary to, or inconsistent with the foresaid Confession." Now this is the kind of subscription to the assembly's formularies, which is contended for by many. But the rejection of the Scottish form, by the founders of our Presbyterian church, and the substitution of the phrase, "system of doctrine," shows conclusively, that the *animus*, or intention of the imposers, was directly the reverse. I wish it were in my power to quote at large the sentiments and reasonings of the BIBLICAL REPERTORY on this subject, in the number for October, 1831, p. 521. A distinction is there made, as to the *leading* and the *explanatory* parts of a confession, which has called forth not a little reproach against New-Haven divines, as if it was of their invention. "There are, with regard to every doctrine, certain constituent, formal ideas, which enter into its very nature, and the rejection of which, is the rejection of the doctrine; and there are certain others, which are merely *accessory* or *explanatory*." As to the latter, it is stated, "When the Confession was adopted by the Presbyterian church of this country, it was with the distinct understanding, that the mode of subscription did not imply strict uniformity of views." We know from President Davies, what was the practice on this subject in his day. "We allowed the candidate to maintain his objections against any part of the Confession, and the judicatures judged

whether the articles objected to were essential to christianity ; and if they judged they were not, they would admit the candidate, notwithstanding his objections." Later practice has been the same. The Minutes of the Presbytery of New-York, and of many others, and possibly the Records of the Princeton Board of Directors, can inform us, that the same measures have been more recently adopted in relation to some articles embraced in the Confession of Faith.

The views of the Puritan divines on this subject, are placed beyond all doubt, by the famous "Heads of Agreement," between the Presbyterians and Independents, in England, which also form a part of the Saybrook Platform. Strongly attached, as these divines were, to their extended Confessions, they declared it sufficient "in matters of faith," to "own either the *doctrinal* part of those commonly called Articles of the Church of England, or the Confessions or Catechisms, shorter or longer, compiled by the Assembly at Westminster, or the Confession agreed on at the Savoy." By this declaration, they expressly set aside, as unessential, a considerable number of statements of an "explanatory" nature, which are contained in the Westminster Confession, but are omitted in the Thirty-Nine Articles. My limits will not permit me to collate these two formularies at length. Suffice it to say, that the "Articles" wholly omit the doctrine of Adam's being our federal head ; of his sin's being *imputed* to his descendants ; of our being *in* him seminally, and thus sharing in his transgression :—the doctrine, that Christ's active obedience constituted a part of his atonement for sin ; that the atonement operates in the way of discharging a *debt*, for those who are justified, and becomes effectual, by God's *imputing* to them the obedience and satisfaction of Christ ;—the doctrine, that regeneration is something antecedent to conversion, and is a change in which man is wholly passive. These, and other doctrines of an "explanatory" nature, contained in the Westminster and Savoy Confessions, were certainly regarded as important by the Puritan divines ; but the ground taken in the "Heads of Agreement," shows beyond all question, that they neither considered them essential to soundness in the faith, nor necessary to be maintained, as the condition of ministerial confidence and co-operation.

But, waving all consideration of precedent and custom, it is plainly impossible, in the nature of things, to secure such conformity, in every minute article of doctrine, as is implied in any other construction of these creeds, than the one now given. The project would be perfectly chimerical. Select, for illustration, the Presbyterian church, and the Westminster Confession. Here you have a voluminous creed, embracing a vast number of doctrinal points, some essential, and some unessential, to salvation, expressed in form and language purely human, and consequently differing

from the form and language of the bible. Does any mortal man believe, that the whole Presbyterian church, embracing 2150 ordained and licensed preachers, and 247,964 communicants, could be *pressed*, by any moral machinery, into the same human mold? Such an effect might be produced in the Roman church, where the spiritual *head* thinks for all the members, and where its decrees or veto can be enforced by the iron arm of power; but among Protestants, where the current of thought is unrestrained and free, where religious investigation is not a sin, and where the bible is the only standard by which religious opinions, and even CREEDS themselves, are to be tried, no such thing is practicable. Let the question now be fairly met,—Shall every minister be deposed, and every church-member be excommunicated, who does not, *ex animo*, embrace every iota of every doctrine stated in this creed? The ground assumed and occupied by the “Act and Testimony” brethren, would seem to require it. Are they perfectly agreed among themselves? and are they quite sure, that there might not be a new war for orthodoxy, the moment the old one should be happily terminated? It might be well for them to think of this, lest a division, upon their principles, should seem to require a *subdivision*. But if the limited number who have subscribed this document, or given in their adhesion, (amounting to 350* ordained and licensed preachers, out of 2150,) are all perfectly agreed in every iota of doctrine, and receive the Westminster Creed, in the same sense in which they receive the bible, only, that they do not think it inspired; or, admitting they receive it with the same confidence with which they would receive the same amount of quotations from the bible; the same thing cannot be said of the Presbyterian church, as a body. What shall be done with those who disbelieve *one* point, or cherish a doubt on *another*? Shall they be cut off? Shall a minister be deposed, who rejects the doctrine of “*eternal generation*,” and who does not believe, that this doctrine is taught in the passages referred to for proof, viz., John i. 14, 18, which were undoubtedly designed to teach the opposite sentiment? Or shall another be pronounced unsound, and be treated accordingly, who does not believe in the *procession* of the Holy Spirit, in his existence, from the Father and the Son; and who should dare to say, that this doctrine is not taught in John xv. 26, and Galatians iv. 6, where the mission of the Spirit into our world, and not his *origin*, or *mode of existence*, is evidently intended?† Questions of this character might be multiplied to any extent; but it is unnecessary to detain the reader. To attempt to bring a large body of men to entire con-

* This is the number, according to “The Presbyterian,” Jan. 22, 1835.

† See Confession of Faith, chap. ii, sec. 3.

formity in the extended creeds referred to, would be visionary, beyond a parallel, and was never attempted or anticipated by their framers.

Should it be said, that neither the Westminster Confession, nor the Saybrook Platform, is as large as the bible, and that we expect perfect conformity in the acknowledgment of each and every part of the bible, and why not in "the form of sound words," here presented? The reply is at hand. God made the bible, man the creeds. The first is the word of truth itself, the last is a human exposition, or commentary. These long creeds undertake to cover the whole ground of revelation; and how is it possible, that a human production, so extensive, and one that virtually professes to settle the meaning of almost the entire book of God, should be perfect in all its parts? But these are not the only disabilities under which extended Confessions of Faith lie, if they are to be considered, not as containing simply "*the system*" of orthodoxy, but as requiring a belief in every *minute* and *specific* sentiment they contain. The bible must be believed, whatever becomes of human creeds. Confessions of Faith, in order to be received and adopted, in all their minutiae of statements, must not only correspond, in all their multifarious parts, with themselves, but also with the bible. Is it to be expected, that such will be the fact? This would be to make the framers more than men. But the trouble does not end here. The bible reveals facts and principles; and there they stand. These are, every where and at all times, the same. But is it so with human creeds? What are they? Not merely a recital of facts and principles, copied from the bible; but they aim at something more. They undertake to explain these revealed facts and principles. And this is done by mere men; by men uninspired. Hence human creeds are always strongly tinged with the philosophy of the age in which they are framed. It is not so with the bible. It borrows nothing from the reigning philosophy, because it has nothing to explain, nothing to reconcile. It rigidly adheres to one fixed purpose, and that is, to tell men what is *truth*. Hence the bible, like its author, can live the same through every age. But the sphere of human creeds, (I speak of the larger creeds, and not of categorical declarations of belief in relation to a few points,) is very different. They undertake to tell us the *quo modo* of the facts and principles of revelation; and consequently, the popular mental philosophy of the age will be incorporated with their very structure, and disclose itself in all their details. It is on this principle, and from not distinguishing between a Confession of Faith, that embraces a whole body of divinity, and is to be adopted as containing the true "*system* of doctrine," and one which comprises a few prominent points, and is to be received *totidem verbis*, that the philosophical

errors of one age become the theological errors of another. Add to all this, the proneness of man to pay a blind homage to antiquity, especially if its main features are grand, and good, and magnificent ; and we are in possession of the real secret, why some men are almost conscience-bound not to receive a new idea on the subject of theology. Hence the cry against all improvements,—all new light, in religion. We shall never have a new BIBLE ; but we are to expect improvements in the mode of understanding and explaining the bible ; and new light will continue to shine upon the holy page, with greater and greater intensity of brightness, while time shall last, and not improbably, while eternity rolls on its unwasting ages.

The question relative to the *animus imponentis*, may now be considered as settled, at least, so far as the intention or purpose is concerned. And who is the *imposer* of the confession, in the Presbyterian church, but the general assembly ? And who but this body, has a right to decide upon the orthodoxy of its ministers ? And this decision has been given again and again. It was the assembly, that directed the terms of subscription or adoption, and required the officers of the church to receive the Confessions of Faith in no other manner, than “as containing the *system* of doctrine taught in the holy scriptures.” If any man receives and adopts the confession, in any other manner, he does something, that the *imposer* has not required. Ministers have, for a series of years, been received by the presbyteries, from the Congregational churches of New-England, and this reception has been sanctioned by the general assembly, the imposer of the creed, and the final judge in this case : and now, when a large proportion of its ministers are from this origin, it is too late to raise a question on this subject. Indeed the ASSEMBLY has never made any complaint. This authorized judge is satisfied with the orthodoxy of its ministers. Who, then, are these “Act and Testimony” men, that usurp the prerogatives of another, and shoulder aside the only legitimate authority, that they themselves may exercise dominion over the church, and measure its orthodoxy by their own private judgment, contrary to the first principles of the constitution ? They are a few ministers and ruling elders, who believe more, and in this sense, may be considered more orthodox, than the imposer of the creed requires. These are the men who undertake, without any shadow of a claim, and unsolicited by the church, to stand forth as the conservators of the general assembly, and to become, with regard to orthodoxy and heresy, judge, and jury, and sole dictators, in every case. There is an anti-presbyterial bearing in this thing, which ought not to be looked for from any men who have not actually passed the Rubicon, and stand high and dry on the ground of secession. Taken in connection with the institutions

of the church to which they belong, there is an arrogance in this whole document, that borders upon effrontery.

The consequences of this course might well arrest the most adventurous footsteps, and cause the most fearless heart to misgive and tremble. This doctrine is the entering wedge of schism. Must, then, this large and lovely church be sundered? And for what? For nothing more than has existed, and been known, and tolerated, ever since its broad and deep foundations were laid in our native soil. Must the strong walls of this beautiful Zion be broken down, and the scattered fragments of her towers, and bulwarks, and palaces, cover the ground, and the ruins of her fallen greatness become the by-word of those who hate the Lord? Must her revivals cease, her songs be turned into wailing, and her peaceful sanctuaries be desecrated by the unhallowed scenes of contention and strife among brethren? And all this for what? For just what our forefathers tolerated in an age far less catholic, in its general spirit, than the present. If these brethren press this matter, a century cannot repair the waste their unnatural warfare will produce. The ruin will begin in the Presbyterian church, but it will not end there. The same spirit,—a burning zeal for orthodoxy, which absorbs every other feeling, and overlooks every other interest,—will produce the same effect in New-England. The churches there, too, must be split, on points of minor importance. Every interest in christendom must feel the shock. More than *three thousand* churches, and those the very churches, too, which have been most active and efficient in the distribution of bibles, and the printing of tracts, and the conversion of the heathen, must be rent, and distracted, and paralyzed. And for what? To gratify a chivalrous spirit of knight-errantry, in prosecuting a crusade against heretics who do not exist. A deed is about to be done, which will make the earth darker than it was before; which will dash the hopes of the far-distant heathen; which will be felt in the revenue that annually flows into the treasury of the Lord; which will cause the lovers of revivals to hang their harps high upon the willows, where, instead of mingling their melody with Zion's songs, their strings will sigh in the breezes; which, if sainted spirits have eyes that see our world, and the scenes that are enacted upon it,—and those eyes were made for tears,—would cause a Rodgers, a Smalley, and a Dwight, to weep over the desolations that must follow. These good men, and a multitude of kindred spirits, now in heaven, differed on these same minor points, on earth, but they loved as brethren; and as brethren in our common Lord, they preserved
THE UNITY of the church.

IOTA.